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7foreword
In Spring 2012 a series of lectures was held at the Faculty of Law of the University of 
Trieste, focusing on selected relevant aspects related to the various legal subjects 
that are normally taught in the ordinary courses of our Faculty (Constitutional 
Law, History of Law, European and Comparative Law, Private International Law, 
Italian Private Law, Criminal Law). The lectures were mostly given in foreign 
languages by Italian and foreign colleagues, in particular young academics.
Later it was decided to collect and publish some of the lectures in a volume: 
Sources of Law and Legal Protection. Triestine Lectures, edited by Professors of our 
Faculty who invited the speakers and organized the event, adding a limited 
number of contributions delivered at two different conferences.
This volume will be the first of a series designed to collect teaching materials, 
mostly in English and German, to be distributed in the academia. The interna-
tionalization and globalization pose a challange to law: also university education 
should strive to master it.
The contributions reveal a clear scientific approach in dealing with the vari-
ous subjects. The purpose of this book is to create a channel for the circulation of 
writings by young academics. Therefore it was considered appropriate to estab-
lish a scientific committee of external referees, as a means to guarantee the high 
quality of the individual contributions.
Trieste, 12th November 2012
Maria Giovanna Cubeddu 
Foreword
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Abstract
The Author analyses the topic of the influence of transnationalization of law on demo-
cracy, the latter considered as a form of political self-determination founded on equality 
of rights. It is argued which are the consequences on the form, the dimensions and the 
measure of self-determination when binding decisions are devolved to large political 
communities and adopted by agreement of many of their leaders. In such cases, it is in-
teresting considering the advantages or disadvantages for democracy or, simply, for self-
determination. It is a matter of special interest optimizing the cost-benefit ratio of self-
determination of transnationalization of law.
Keywords
Transnationalization of law. – Democracy. – Political self-determination. – 
Equality of rights. – Political communities. 
Transnationalisierung 
und nationale 
Verfassungsordnung
gertrude lübbe wolff
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Demokratie bedeutet politische Selbstbestimmung auf der Grundlage der 
Gleichberechtigung - Selbstbestimmung (auch) im Bereich dessen, was nicht 
individuell von jedem für sich, sondern kollektiv zu entscheiden ist. Wenn die 
Zuständigkeit für allgemeinverbindliche Entscheidungen, insbesondere die 
Zuständigkeit für die Rechtsetzung, von der Ebene kleinerer Kollektive auf die 
Ebene größerer politischer Kollektive verlagert wird - also etwa von der kommu-
nalen oder regionalen auf die staatliche Ebene oder von der staatlichen Ebene auf 
die der Europäischen Union, und wenn die Rechtsetzung faktisch zunehmend 
durch Vereinbarungen zwischen Vertretern vieler politischer Kollektive determi-
niert wird, dann hat das Folgen für die Formen, die Dimensionen und das Maß 
an möglicher Selbstbestimmung. Man kann von Demokratienutzen und Demo-
kratiekosten solcher Entwicklungen sprechen, oder einfach von Selbstbestim-
mungsnutzen und Selbstbestimmungskosten. Diese beiden Seiten der Sache 
muss man sehen. Es stellt sich dann die Frage, wie sich das Verhältnis von Selbst-
bestimmungskosten und Selbstbestimmungsnutzen der Transnationalisierung 
des Rechts optimieren lässt. 
Der Prozess der Transnationalisierung des Rechts - der Verlagerung von 
Rechtsetzungszuständigkeiten auf die supranationale Ebene der Europäischen 
Union und der Prägung des Rechts durch internationale Verträge - ist weit vor-
angeschritten. Die Schätzungen des Anteils, zu dem das nationale Recht durch 
Unionsrecht determiniert ist, reichen bis zu 80%1. Hinzu kommt eine immer 
weiter wachsende Anzahl internationaler Verträge, die das Recht der Mitglied-
staaten der Europäischen Union prägen, sei es unmittelbar oder (auch) mittelbar 
dadurch, dass das Unionsrecht seinerseits wiederum zu einem erheblichen Teil 
durch internationale Verträge determiniert ist.
Es ist absehbar, dass dieser Prozess der Transnationalisierung des Rechts 
weiter voranschreiten wird. Recht ist einerseits schon Voraussetzung, ande-
rerseits aber auch Folge der Herausbildung von Märkten. Der Herausbildung 
grenzüberschreitender und globaler Märkte folgt daher unweigerlich die Trans-
nationalisierung des Rechts. Der Bedarf an europäischer und interantionaler 
Regulierung, den die Finanzmärkte immer deutlicher hervorbringen, ist dafür 
das aktuellste Beispiel.
Nichts illustriert den Zusammenhang zwischen Markt und Rechtsbedarf so 
nachdrücklich wie die Geschichte der Europäischen Union. Sie verdankt ihre Exi-
stenz als politische Union diesem Zusammenhang. Am Anfang dieser Geschich-
te standen in den fünfziger Jahren Pläne zur Gründung einer europäischen po-
litischen Union. Nachdem diese Pläne auch in ihrer Schwundstufe, als Pläne zur 
Gründung einer Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft, gescheitert waren, 
1 S. z.B. Hoppe, EuZW 2009, 168 ff. Dass die Schätzungen unterschiedlich ausfallen, liegt nicht 
nur daran, dass die Größe der zu vergleichenden Rechtsmassen sie dem Überblick entzieht, 
sondern auch daran, dass „Prozent des Rechts“ keine wohlbestimmte Größe ist; man müsste 
sich zunächst einmal darüber verständigen, in was für Einheiten die zu vergleichenden Rechts-
quantitäten zu messen sind. 
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verlegte man sich darauf, den Anfang mit der wirtschaftlichen Integration zu 
machen. Damit verband sich die Erwartung, dass dies die politische Integration 
über kurz oder lang unweigerlich nach sich ziehen würde2. 
Dieses Kalkül hat sich als richtig erwiesen. Heute haben wir eine europäische 
politische Union, die den größten Teil unseres nationalen Rechts bestimmt oder 
zumindest wesentlich mitbestimmt. Ein Teil der Mitgliedstaaten dieser Union 
hat selbst die Währung vergemeinschaftet. Die Diskussion darüber, ob und ge-
gebenenfalls welche weiteren politischen Zentralisierungsschritte das zur not-
wendigen Folge hat, ist noch nicht abgeschlossen.
Die Vereinheitlichung des Rechts auf Unionsebene betrifft natürlich auch die 
nationalen Verfassungsordnungen. Es betrifft sie zunächst ganz direkt, weil das 
Unionsrecht jeder Rangstufe Anwendungsvorrang vor dem mitgliedstaatlichen 
Recht jeder Rangstufe beansprucht, so dass auf nationaler Ebene Verfassungs-
änderungen in Anpassung an Vorgaben des europäischen Rechts erforderlich 
werden können und erforderlich geworden sind (in Deutschland z.B. die Öff-
nung des Wehrdienstes an der Waffe für Frauen3 und die Öffnung des Kommu-
nalwahlrechts für Unionsbürger4, aber auch Änderungen in den verfassungs-
rechtlichen Vorgaben für wichtige Einrichtungen des Bundes wie die Post5). Die 
wichtigsten Änderungen der nationalen Verfassung im Zusammenhang mit der 
Entwicklung der Union liegen natürlich nicht in solchen punktuellen inhalt-
lichen Veränderungen, sondern in den Vorschriften, die den Transfer von Ho-
heitsrechten auf die Union ermöglicht und damit die Bedingungen kollektiver 
Selbstbestimmung, deren Ordnung die wesentliche Aufgabe der Verfassung ist, 
fundamental verändert haben.
Für den Regulierungsbedarf der globalen Märkte behilft man sich einstweilen 
weitgehend mit Koordination über völkerrechtliche Verträge (wobei die Gren-
zen zwischen „supranationalen“, eine verselbständigte Hoheitsgewalt auf über-
nationaler Ebene etablierenden und rein vertraglichen Arrangements fließend 
sind). Aber auch das verändert den Modus der Selbstbestimmung. 
Diese Transnationalisierung des Rechts und der Rechtserzeugungsprozesse 
hat offensichtliche Nutzen, die man durchaus auch als Selbstbestimmungsnut-
zen verstehen kann: Sie ermöglicht Entscheidungen, die auf nationaler Ebene, 
von jedem Staat für sich allein, entweder überhaupt nicht oder jedenfalls nicht 
mit irgendeiner Aussicht auf Erfolg getroffen werden könnten. Wenn wir zum 
Beispiel einen wirksamen Klimaschutz wollen oder einen wirksamen Schutz 
von Arbeitnehmern gegen einen wirtschaftlichen Wettbewerb, der auf dem Ge-
2 Vgl. die Darstellung in BVerfGE 123, 267 <272-274>, m.w.N. 
3 Ersetzung des früheren Art. 12a IV 2 GG, wonach Frauen auf keinen Fall Dienst mit der Waffe 
leisten dürfen, durch die Bestimmung, dass sie hierzu auf keinen Fall verpflichtet werden dürfen.
4 Art. 28 I 3 GG.
5 Art. 87 f. GG. 
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biet der Ausbeutung von Arbeitskräften ausgetragen wird, dann geht das nur mit 
Hilfe transnationalen Rechts.
Den Selbstbestimmungsnutzen stehen aber auch Selbstbestimmungskosten 
oder, anders ausgedrückt, Demokratiekosten gegenüber. Ich will an dieser Stel-
le nicht im Detail analysieren, worin diese Kosten liegen und wie sie zustande-
kommen. Wenn man das genau machen wollte, müsste man zwischen den ganz 
unterschiedlichen Prozeduren der völkervertraglichen und der supranationalen 
Rechtsetzung sorgfältig unterscheiden. 
Für beide Fälle gilt jedenfalls, dass wir es mit einer zwangsläufig höheren Exe-
kutivlastigkeit der Entscheidungsprozesse zu tun haben, also mit einer Stärkung 
der Machtposition der Exekutive im Verhältnis zu den Parlamenten. Die wesent-
lich erhöhte Komplexität der Entscheidungsprozesse, die mit der Transnationa-
lisierung dieser Prozesse verbunden ist, erschwert außerdem ganz erheblich die 
für repräsentativdemokratische Zusammenhänge essentielle Zuschreibung von 
Verantwortlichkeiten. 
Hinzu kommt schließlich noch ein Faktor, der in der Demokratietheorie 
nach meiner Kenntnis heute keine große Rolle mehr spielt (bei Platon war er 
präsent), nämlich die schlichte Größe der Kollektive, die unter den Hut eines 
gemeinsamen Rechts gebracht werden sollen. Natürlich ist es einerseits richtig, 
die Bundesrepublik Deutschland nicht deshalb für weniger demokratisch zu hal-
ten als Malta, weil sie ungefähr 200 mal so viele Einwohner hat. Andererseits 
wäre es falsch, die Bedeutung der Kollektivgrößen für das Maß an erfahrbarer 
Selbstbestimmung im Kollektiv einfach zu negieren. Die Ausssichten für jeden 
einzelnen, sich und seine Interessen in den Entscheidungen des Kollektivs zur 
Geltung zu bringen, sinken mit zunehmender Größe des Kollektivs. Das fängt 
schon bei der Chance, einem Belang überhaupt politisches Gehör zu verschaffen, 
an. Gregor Gysi, ein prominenter linker Politiker in Deutschland, mit großem 
Talent, wichtige Zusammenhänge verständlich auf den Punkt zu bringen, hat das 
Problem einmal in einer Fernsehtalkshow an einem Beispiel illustriert, unge-
fähr so: Beim Stadtbezirksvorsteher kriegst Du noch vergleichsweise leicht einen Termin. 
Damit Du einen beim Oberbürgermeister kriegst, wirst Du schon gute Gründe anführen 
und länger warten müssen. Dass der Ministerpräsident Deines Bundeslandes dich emp-
fängt, ist wenig wahrscheinlich, eine Audienz bei Frau Merkel absolut unwahrscheinlich, 
und den Plan, Dein Anliegen Herrn Barroso vorzutragen, kannst Du gleich vergessen. 
In der Wirtschaftswissenschaft spricht man von positiven Skaleneffekten oder 
größenbedingten Einsparungen (economies of scale), um die mit der Steigerung 
von Produktionsmengen - der Größe der Produktion - üblicherweise eintretende 
Effizienzsteigerung (sinkende Grenzkosten) zu bezeichnen. In der Demokratie-
theorie sollte man vielleicht von einem oberhalb gewisser Größenordnungen 
einsetzenden umgekehrten Skaleneffekt sprechen. 
Die Selbstbestimmungskosten der Transnationalisierung des Rechts und der 
umgekehrte Skaleneffekt, der dabei eine Rolle spielt, lassen sich auf einfache 
Weise verdeutlichen. Man muss sich nur fragen, ob die langfristigen politischen 
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Konsequenzen der Globalisierung der Märkte, wie sie im Rahmen der Welthan-
delsorganisation (WTO) vorangetrieben wird, den politischen Konsequenzen 
gleichen werden, die die Gründungsväter der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemein-
schaft ganz richtig als Folge der Europäisierung des Marktes vorhergesehen ha-
ben. Ich kenne niemanden, der auf diese Frage mit Begeisterung antwortet: „Ja, 
und das wäre doch auch wunderbar - ich kann mir nichts Besseres vorstellen!“. 
In diesem Schauder steckt das Wissen von den Selbstbestimmungskosten der 
Transnationalisierung politischer Entscheidungsprozesse und Entscheidungs-
kompetenzen, der man mit dieser Frage ins Auge sieht. Es ist wohl derselbe 
Schauder, der schon Kant veranlasst hat, den ewigen Frieden nicht in der Idee ei-
nes Weltstaates zu suchen.6
In dem Maße, in dem die Rechtsproduktion selbst oder die ihr zugrundelie-
genden entscheidenden politischen Aushandlungsprozesse sich auf transna-
tionale Ebenen verlagern, wächst naturgemäß die Wertschätzung der Möglich-
keit, Normierungsentscheidungen noch „bei sich zuhause“ treffen zu können. 
Überhaupt nimmt nach dem allgemeinen Gesetz, dass Knappheit wertsteigernd 
wirkt, im Zuge der Globalisierung die Wertschätzung des verbliebenen spezi-
fisch Nationalen, Regionalen und Lokalen zu. 
Die Vermutung liegt nicht fern, dass die Regionalisierungstendenz und die 
Tendenz zur Stärkung der kommunalen Selbstverwaltung, die in Europa, gegen-
läufig zur Europäisierung und Globalisierung, seit einigen Jahrzehnten zu beob-
achten ist, unter anderem ein Ausdruck dieser Präferenzverschiebung sind. 
Jedenfalls gehört zu den Erscheinungsformen dieses Wertewandels eine 
zunehmende Skepsis gegenüber weiteren Delegationen „nach oben“, und eine 
wachsende Empfindlichkeit gegen Kompetenzanmaßungen seitens internatio-
naler und supranationaler Organe, einschließlich einer Verschiebung der Maß-
stäbe für das, was überhaupt als Kompetenzanmaßung begriffen wird. Diese Emp-
findlichkeit wird sicher in unterschiedlichen Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen 
Union unterschiedlich ausgeprägt sein. Aber unabhängig vom Grad ihrer Ausprä-
gung würde ich vermuten, dass die Tendenz überall in dieselbe Richtung geht.
Besonders stark ausgeprägt ist diese zunehmende Tendenz in einigen der 
östlicheren EU-Mitgliedstaaten. Es ist vermutlich kein Zufall, dass ein dortiges 
Gericht, das Verfassungsgericht der tschechischen Republik, das erste ist, das 
es gewagt hat, eine Entscheidung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs (EuGH) für 
6 „Die Idee des Völkerrechts setzt die Absonderung vieler voneinander unabhängiger benach-
barter Staaten voraus, und, obgleich ein solcher Zustand an sich schon ein Zustand des Krieges 
ist (wenn nicht eine föderative Vereinigung derselben dem Ausbruch der Feindseligkeiten vor-
beugt): so ist doch selbst dieser, nach der Vernunftsidee, besser als die Zusammenschmelzung 
derselben, durch eine die andere überwachsende, und in eine universale Monarchie überge-
hende Macht; weil die Gesetze mit dem vergrößten Umfange der Regierung immer mehr an 
ihrem Nachdruck einbüßen, und ein seelenloser Despotism, nachdem er die Keime des Guten 
ausgerottet hat, zuletzt doch in Anarchie verfällt.“ (Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, Bd. XI der von W. 
Weischedel hsrg. Werkausgabe, Frankfurt 1968, S. 193 (225)). 
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kompetenzüberschreitend („ultra vires“) zu erklären und ihm deshalb den Ge-
horsam zu verweigern.7 
In Deutschland hat es eine solche Entscheidung bislang nicht gegeben. Aber 
die tendenziell zunehmende Sensibilität in Kompetenzfragen ist durchaus auch 
bei uns spürbar. Eine kritische Diskussion über die Rechtsprechung des Euro-
päischen Gerichtshofs hat sich in den zurückliegenden Jahren in Deutschland 
besonders an der Entscheidung des EuGH im Fall Mangold festgemacht. In einer 
großen deutschen Zeitung erschien z.B. ein Artikel des ehemaligen Bundesprä-
sidenten Roman Herzog und eines Mitautors, der sich wohl vor allem an das 
Bundesverfassungsgericht richtete und den Titel trug: „Stoppt den Europäischen 
Gerichtshof“ 8
, 
in dem es hieß, der EuGH entziehe mit immer erstaunlicheren Be-
gründungen den Mitgliedstaaten ureigene Kompetenzen. Dieser Artikel setzte 
beim Mangold-Urteil an. 
Ob der EuGH hier das Gemeinschaftsrecht richtig ausgelegt hat, darüber 
kann man sicher streiten. Sicher ist aber auch, dass es sich um Auslegungen han-
delt, über die 15 Jahre früher nicht ansatzweise dieselbe Aufregung entstanden 
sein würde. 
Der EuGH hat mit dem Mangold-Urteil im Jahr 2005 eine gesetzliche Be-
stimmung des deutschen Rechts für gemeinschaftsrechtswidrig erklärt, die es 
– mit dem Ziel einer Verbesserung der Arbeitsmarktchancen der betreffenden 
Gruppe – erlaubte, Menschen über 52 befristet einzustellen. Diese Regelung, so 
der EuGH, sei unvereinbar mit einer EG-Richtlinie (RL 78/2000/EG), die u.a. Dis-
kriminierungen aufgrund des Alters verbietet, und mit einem solche Diskrimi-
nierungen ebenfalls verbietenden allgemeinen Grundsatz des Unionsrechts. Im 
fraglichen Zeitpunkt war allerdings die Umsetzungsfrist für die fragliche Richt-
linie noch nicht abgelaufen und die Grundrechte-Charta, die ein ausdrückliches 
Verbot der Altersdiskriminierung enthält (Art. 21Abs. 1 GrCh), war noch nicht in 
Kraft. Der EuGH soll deshalb, so die zahlreichen Kritiker dieser Entscheidung, 
den mit der Umsetzungsfrist eingeräumten Spielraum der Mitgliedstaaten mis-
sachtet und ein zum relevanten Zeitpunkt noch nicht existierendes Grundrecht 
erfunden haben. Außerdem wird ihm vorgeworfen, er habe – während Grund-
rechte an sich das Verhältnis zwischen Individuum und öffentlicher Gewalt be-
treffen - eine unmittelbare Wirkung des angenommenen Grundrechts zwischen 
Privaten (sogenannte horizontale Wirkung) konstruiert.
Das klingt erschreckend. Bei näherer Betrachtung nimmt sich die Sache aber, je-
denfalls gemessen an tradierten Beurteilungsstandards, nicht ganz so furchtbar aus9. 
7 Pl. Us 5/12 vom 31. Januar 2012 (Auf den Internetseiten des Verfassungsgerichts der Tschechi-
schen Republik verfügbar).
8 FAZ vom 8.9.2008.
9 Es ist ständige Rechtsprechung des EuGH, dass Richtlinien es auch schon vor Ablauf der jewei-
ligen Umsetzungsfrist den Mitgliedstaaten verbieten, Regelungen zu treffen, die die künftige 
Wirksamkeit der Richtlinie behindern würden. Obwohl das nirgends explizit im Europäischen 
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Es geht mir hier nicht um die Rechtfertigung der konkreten Entscheidung, 
die nicht sehr sorgfältig begründet ist und die sachliche Rechtfertigung der frag-
lichen deutschen Regelung in einer äußerst kleinteiligen, typisierungsaversen 
Weise überprüft hat. Erst recht geht es mir nicht darum, die Rechtsprechung des 
EuGH im Allgemeinen vor Kritik in Schutz zu nehmen. Die Rechtsprechung des 
EuGH gerade in Kompetenz- und Kompetenzausübungsfragen kritisch zu be-
gleiten, ist unbedingt notwendig. 
Was die Mangold-Rechtsprechung des EuGH angeht, ist aber nicht, wie man 
angesichts der Heftigkeit vieler Reaktionen vermuten könnte, eine sensationel-
le Anmaßung das eigentlich Bemerkenswerte, sondern die veränderte Empfind-
lichkeit gegen Einschränkungen des nationalen Handlungsspielraums, die sich 
in den Reaktionen auf ´Mangold` zeigt. Diese erhöhte Empfindlichkeit ist rational, 
ganz unabhängig von der Frage, ob ´Mangold´ dafür das geeignetste Objekt war. 
Mit dem zunehmenden Sinn für die Selbstbestimmungskosten, und damit 
für wünschenswerte Grenzen der Transnationalisierung des Rechts wächst der 
Sinn dafür, dass wir uns in einem Dilemma - einem Demokratiedilemma - be-
finden. Denn einerseits bedauern wir die Selbstbestimmungskosten der Trans-
Primärrecht steht, hat diese seit langem akzeptierte Rechtsprechung nie einen Kritiksturm 
entfesselt, der auch nur entfernt mit dem durch die Mangold-Entscheidung ausgelösten zu 
vergleichen wäre. Man kann darüber diskutieren, ob in „Mangold“ der Sache nach überhaupt 
eine Fortentwicklung dieser Rechtsprechung zu sehen ist. Wenn ja, dann wäre sie jedenfalls 
naheliegend, denn der Sinn von Umsetzungsfristen ist es, den Mitgliedstaaten Zeit für das Sich-
Hinbewegen auf den geforderten Rechtszustand einzuräumen, nicht dagegen Spielraum für 
Rechtsänderungen in die gegenteilige Richtung. Was die angebliche Erfindung eines Grund-
rechts angeht, entspricht es der ständigen und gerade von deutscher Seite mit viel Beifall auf-
genommenen Rechtsprechung des EuGH, die in der gemeinsamen Verfassungstradition der 
Mitgliedstaaten verankerten Grundrechte auch als gemeinschaftsrechtliche anzuerkennen. Das 
Bundesverfassungsgericht hat 1986 (in seiner Solange-II-Entscheidung) diese Rechtsprechung 
des EuGH durch Zurücknahme seiner eigenen grundrechtsbezogenen Kontrollkompetenzen 
im Bereich des gemeinschaftsrechtlich determinierten Rechts honoriert. Soweit die Kritiker 
monieren, dass hinsichtlich der Altersdiskriminierung von einer gemeinsamen Verfassungst-
radition der Mitgliedstaaten keine Rede sein könne, weil nur zwei der zum Zeitpunkt der Man-
gold-Entscheidung geltenden mitgliedstaatlichen Verfassungen ein ausdrückliches derartiges 
Verbot enthielten, vernachlässigen sie, dass schon der allgemeine Gleichbehandlungsgrundsatz 
unzweifelhaft zur gemeinsamen Verfassungstradition der Mitgliedstaaten gehört. Schon dieser 
allgemeine Grundsatz verbietet ganz unstreitig sachlich ungerechtfertigte Ungleichbehandlun-
gen auch insoweit, als sie an das Alter anknüpfen. Mehr als ein solches Verbot hat der EuGH 
nicht postuliert. Von einem Diskriminierungsschutz der verschärften, die Sachlichkeit von Dif-
ferenzierungen weitestgehend ausschließenden Art, wie er in Deutschland in den speziellen 
Diskriminierungsverboten der Art. 3 Abs. 2 und 3 GG gesehen wird, kann keine Rede sein; die 
Möglichkeit sachlicher Gründe für eine altersspezifische Befristungsregeln hat der EuGH aus-
drücklich konzediert und nur die vorhandene Regelung als insoweit zu pauschal und über das 
Regelungsziel hinausschießend angesehen. Und was schließlich die angebliche unmittelbare 
Drittwirkung angeht, ist daran zu erinnern, dass der EuGH nicht unmittelbar das Verhalten 
Privater, sondern eine Rechtsnorm und damit einen Akt öffentlicher Gewalt beurteilt hat. Da-
bei ist er zwar nicht seiner bisherigen Rechtsprechung zur Horizontalwirkung von Richtlinien 
gefolgt, aber dass allein die Linie der bisherigen Rechtsprechung sich im Rahmen methodisch 
vertretbarer Auslegung des Primärrechts hielte, wird man nicht sagen können. 
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nationalisierung des Rechts. Zugleich ist es aber offensichtlich, dass gerade auch 
im Interesse wirksamer demokratischer Selbstbestimmung der Prozess der 
Transnationalisierung weitergehen muss und wird, dass wir in vielen Bereichen 
weitere Harmonisierung und Koordination benötigen. Der Regulierungsbedarf 
bei den Finanzmärkten ist dafür nur das offensichtlichste Beispiel. 
Das Prinzip, das zwar keinen Ausweg aus diesem Dilemma bietet, aber doch 
auf Optimierung in diesem Dilemma zielt, ist schon erfunden und auf europä-
ischer Ebene sogar zum Rechtsprinzip erhoben: das Subsidiaritätsprinzip. Es ist 
das Prinzip, das einzige, unter dem die Transnationalisierung des Rechts sich 
ohne Schaden für die Demokratie und die Substanz der nationalen Verfassungs-
ordnungen in der notwendigen Weise intensivieren kann. Jeder Freund der 
Europäischen Integration müsste es auf seine Fahnen schreiben, weil es eine 
Bedingung für die Akzeptabilität und für die faktische Akzeptanz weiterer Eini-
gungsschritte in Europa ist. 
Thomas von Danwitz, der derzeitige deutsche Richter am EuGH, hat die Idee der 
Subsidiarität einmal als einen Grundsatz „jeder wohlgestalteten Kompetenzord-
nung“ bezeichnet10. Dem kann man nur zustimmen. Es geht hier nicht bloß um 
die inhaltliche Angemessenheit staatlicher Regulierung, die beeinträchtigt sein 
kann, wenn Regelungen in unnötig großer Distanz von lokalen, regionalen oder 
nationalen Besonderheiten getroffen werden, sondern vor allem um Schonung 
des demokratischen Selbstbestimmungsrechts der kleineren politischen Einheit. 
Man kann den Subsidiaritätsgrundsatz als rechtspolitisches Prinzip betrach-
ten, dem man bei der Allokation von Kompetenzen in einer föderalen Verfas-
sung oder einem supranationalen Mehrebenensystem entsprechen sollte. Etwas 
anderes ist der Subsidiaritätsgrundsatz als Rechtsprinzip. Es fungiert in einer 
bestehenden Ordnung mit bereits allozierten Kompetenzen als Maßgabe für die 
Befugnis ihrer Inanspruchnahme. 
In dieser Bedeutung ist das Subsidiaritätsprinzip umso unentbehrlicher, je 
weiter die Transnationalisierung fortgeschritten ist. Der EU lassen sich immer 
weniger Sachbereiche in toto kompetenziell vorenthalten. Umso wichtiger wird 
die feinjustierte Schonung mitgliedstaatlicher Selbstbestimmung durch das 
Subsidiaritätsprinzip. 
Leider ist nichts schwieriger als die praktische Effektivierung dieses Prinzips. 
Eine erste Problemursache liegt schon darin, dass der selbstbestimmungsorien-
tierte Sinn des Subsidiaritätsgrundsatzes, wie überhaupt die eigenständige Be-
deutung und Selbstbestimmungsrelevanz der Frage, auf welcher Ebene eines 
politischen Mehrebenensystems Kompetenzen anzusiedeln sind und wie weit 
die Befugnis zu ihrer Ausübung reicht, häufig gar nicht verstanden wird. 
In Deutschland lässt sich das in jeder Diskussion über Fragen der innerdeut-
schen föderalen Kompetenzordnung sehr schön beobachten. Der verbreitetste 
Zugriff auf die Frage, welche Kompetenzen vernünftigerweise auf welche Ebene 
10 v. Danwitz, Subsidiaritätskontrolle in der Europäischen Union, in: FS Sellner, 2010, S. 27 ff. (27).
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gehören, wie die bestehende Kompetenzordnung auszulegen ist und ob eine ge-
gebene Kompetenz auch ausgeübt werden sollte, ist immer der opportunistische: 
Man wünscht sich die Kompetenz dorthin, wo man am ehesten erwartet, dass 
die Kompetenzausübung gemäß den eigenen inhaltlichen Präferenzen ausfällt. 
So wünschten sich zum Beispiel die Kriminologen und auch die meisten Journa-
listen, von denen Beiträge zu diesem Thema in den Zeitungen erschienen, dass 
die Kompetenz für den Strafvollzug beim Bund verbleibt, denn es gab da Länder 
wie das finstere Bayern, denen man nicht die liberale Strafvollzugspolitik zu-
traute, die man selbst für richtig hielt. 
Verbreitet trifft man auch auf den unitaristischen Standpunkt: Hier legt man 
Wert darauf, dass jedenfalls eine einheitliche Regelung getroffen wird. Man möch-
te zum Beispiel in der Frage, ob und unter welchen Voraussetzungen in Gaststät-
ten geraucht werden darf, keinen „Flickenteppich“, so heißt es dann, und der kann 
natürlich nur durch eine Regelung auf der zentraleren Ebene vermieden werden. 
Der unitaristische Standpunkt ist von dem opportunistischen nicht leicht zu 
unterscheiden, denn oft ist er selbst von Opportunismus getragen. 
Die vernünftige Organisation eines Mehrebenensystems lässt sich auf kei-
nen dieser Standpunkte gründen. Der Unitarist hat für dezentrale Regelungs-
kompetenzen ohnehin nichts übrig, und der Opportunist wird mit der Kom-
petenzallokation, die er gerade präferiert, nur so lange zufrieden sein, wie die 
tagespolitischen Verhältnisse sich nicht ändern. Sobald einer von diesen finste-
ren Bayern Bundeskanzler wird, muss er sich freuen, dass die Gesetzgebungs-
kompetenz für den Strafvollzug zu den Ländern gewandert und der Bayer somit 
gehindert ist, mit seinen Bundestagskumpanen die finstere bayerische Strafvoll-
zugspolitik auch auf Nordrhein-Westfalen zu übertragen. 
In Kompetenzangelegenheiten, und so auch bei der Anwendung des Subsi-
diaritätsgrundsatzes, muss die Frage, auf welcher Ebene vernünftigerweise die 
Regelungsbefugnis liegt, von der Frage, welche Regelungsinhalte man selbst 
oder die legiferierenden Akteure gern hätten, strikt unterschieden werden. 
Diese Unterscheidung ist in concreto schon intellektuell eine nicht immer ganz 
leichte Übung. Jedenfalls begegnet man immer wieder dem Kurzschluss von der 
Annahme, eine bestimmte Regelung sei richtig auf die Annahme, es könne nicht 
falsch sein, sie auf möglichst hoher Ebene zu treffen. Leider ist zudem auch noch 
die Formulierung, in die man auf europäischer Ebene den Subsidiaritätsgrund-
satz gegossen hat, dabei nicht besonders hilfreich. 
Der EU-Vertrag statutiert den Subsidiaritätsgrundsatz als eine Kompetenzaus-
übungsregel, nach der die Union nur tätig werden darf, „sofern und soweit die 
Ziele der in Betracht gezogenen Maßnahmen von den Mitgliedstaaten weder auf 
zentraler noch auf regionaler oder lokaler Ebene ausreichend verwirklicht wer-
den können, sondern vielmehr wegen ihres Umfangs oder ihrer Wirkungen auf 
Unionsebene besser zu verwirklichen sind“ (Art. 5 Abs. 2 EUV). 
Die Befugnis zur Ausübung einer Unionskompetenz hat danach zwei Voraus-
setzungen. 
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Erstens: Das ins Auge gefasste Regelungsziel kann nicht ausreichend auf nied-
rigerer Systemebene verwirklich werden. Das ist das so genannte Negativkri-
terium oder Nicht-ausreichend-Kriterium. Zweitens muss, kumulativ, das so 
genannte Positivkriterium oder Besser-Kriterium erfüllt, nämlich das Rege-
lungsziel wegen des Umfangs oder der Wirkungen der Maßnahme besser auf 
Unionsebene realisierbar sein. 
Auf den ersten Blick könnte man meinen, dass das erste Kriterium im zwei-
ten enthalten ist, so dass ihm keine selbstständige Bedeutung zukommt: Wenn 
ein Regelungsziel besser auf Unionsebene verwirklicht werden kann, dann 
scheint das ja auf den ersten Blick zu implizieren, dass es auf mitgliedstaatlicher 
Ebene eben nicht so gut – und damit, so könnte man meinen, auch nicht ausrei-
chend – verwirklicht werden kann. 
Beachtet man deshalb nur noch das Positivkriterium, dann bleibt allerdings 
von der begrenzenden Funktion des Subsidiaritätsgrundsatzes nichts mehr übrig. 
Denn dass die Union Ziele, die sie sich einmal vorgesetzt hat, am besten ver-
wirklichen kann, indem sie die dazu notwendigen Regelungen selbst erlässt, 
versteht sich einigermaßen von selbst. Wenn sie das nicht tut, macht jeder Mit-
gliedstaat, was er für richtig hält, und es wird in der Regel nichts dafür sprechen, 
dass dabei genau das herauskommt, was die Union gerade anstrebt. Wenn z.B. 
die Union sich die Bekämpfung von Straftaten durch eine mindestens sechsmo-
natige Vorratsspeicherung von Telekommunikationsdaten zum Ziel setzt, dann 
kann dieses Ziel mit Sicherheit besser auf Unionsebene erreicht werden als da-
durch, dass man den Mitgliedstaaten die Möglichkeit lässt, in dieser Frage je für 
sich zu entscheiden. Denn wenn man die Sache den Mitgliedstaaten überlässt, 
wird es mit Sicherheit den einen oder anderen geben, der eine solche Speicher-
pflicht nicht oder nur für drei Monate vorschreibt, und dann wäre das Ziel ja 
nicht so gut erreicht wie durch eine Norm auf Unionsebene11. Jedenfalls mit die-
sem Argument lässt sich hier eine unionsrechtliche Regelung nicht begründen.
Nach diesem Muster ließe sich auch ein unionsrechtliches Verbot des Alko-
holkonsums in öffentlichen Parkanlagen vor dem Subsidiaritätsgrundsatz recht-
fertigen. Wenn eine so verstandene Zielverwirklichungsüberlegenheit des EU-
Rechts das einzige wäre, was der Subsidiaritätsgrundsatz verlangt, wäre er völlig 
11 Hinsichtlich der Vorratsdatenspeicherungsrichtlinie der EG (RL 2006/24/EG – Vorratsspei-
cherung von Daten, die bei der Bereitstellung elektronischer Kommunikationsdienste erzeugt 
oder verarbeitet werden) hat der EuGH über die Frage der Vereinbarkeit mit dem Subsidiaritäts-
grundsatz nicht entschieden. Eine von Irland mit Unterstützung der slowakischen Republik an-
gestrengte Nichtigkeitsklage betraf die Frage, ob das Normenwerk rechtmäßigerweise auf die 
Binnenmarktkompetenz nach Art. 95 EGV gestützt worden war oder ob es wegen primär straf-
rechtlicher Zwecksetzung nur auf der Grundlage des EU-Vertrages (Art. 31 Abs. 1 Buchst. c und 34 
Abs. 2 Buchst. b EUV) hätte erlassen werden dürfen. Nur diese Frage hat der EuGH (durch Urteil 
vom 10. Februar 2009 in der Rechtssache C.-301/06) beantwortet – dahingehend, dass auch die 
Binnenmarktkompetenz habe genutzt werden dürfen, um unterschiedliche nationale Regelun-
gen mit – angesichts der hohen Kosten der vorgeschriebenen Speichermaßnahmen - entspre-
chend unterschiedlichen Belastungen für die betroffenen Unternehmen zu vermeiden.
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inhaltsleer und nicht mehr das, was er sein soll. Er soll eine Barriere sein gegen 
den unitaristischen Fehlschluss, der da lautet: Wenn eine Maßnahme gut, richtig 
und wichtig ist, dann ist es auch gut, richtig und wichtig, sie möglichst zentral, im 
größtmöglichen politischen Kollektiv, zu treffen, weil ja nur so verhindert wer-
den kann, dass in irgendeinem der zugehörigen kleineren politischen Kollektive das 
Gute, Richtige und Wichtige womöglich unterbleibt. Wo dieser Schluss als zulässig 
gilt, da ist es mit jeder dezentralen demokratischen Selbstbestimmung vorbei. 12
Tatsächlich ist natürlich Art. 5 III EUV so nicht gemeint; die Ineinssetzung 
von Positiv- und Negativkriterium ist unrichtig. 
Das wichtigste Element des Respekts vor der demokratischen Selbstbestimmung 
der Mitgliedstaaten steckt in dem ersten, dem negativen Kriterium, nach dem die 
Union nur tätig werden darf, wenn die Ziele der in Betracht gezogenen Maßnah-
men von den Mitgliedstaaten nicht ausreichend verwirklicht werden können. 
Hier muss das Wort „können“ ernst genommen werden. Danach genügt es 
eben nicht, dass ein Ziel der Union deshalb nicht verwirklicht wird, weil die Mit-
gliedstaaten, oder einige von ihnen, auf nationaler Ebene nicht die Regelungen 
treffen wollen, die aus der Sicht des Unionsgesetzgebers sinnvoll und notwendig 
sind, um das Ziel der in Betracht gezogenen Maßnahmen zu erreichen. 
Zusätzlich hat man das Subsidiaritätsprinzip, wie bekannt, durch ein soge-
nanntes „Frühwarnsystem“ und durch ein Klagerecht der mitgliedstaatlichen 
Parlamente zu stärken versucht. Das Frühwarnsystem besteht darin, dass gegen 
Entwürfe für Gesetzgebungsakte der Union die Parlamente der Mitgliedstaa-
ten binnen acht Wochen den Einwand der Subsidiaritätswidrigkeit erheben 
können13. Das führt aber nur zu Berücksichtigungs- und Prüfungspflichten der 
Gesetzgebungsorgane und, wenn der Einwand nichts fruchtet, zu einem Klage-
recht der nationalen Parlamente und des Ausschusses der Regionen, Nichtig-
keitsklage vor dem EuGH zu erheben14.
12 Meines Erachtens ist zudem die Analyse von Takis Tridimas richtig, dass das Prinzip der Subsi-
diarität „comes into play at an earlier stage than proportionality“, weil die Subsidiarität die Frage 
betrifft, ob überhaupt auf Gemeinschaftsebene gehandelt werden muss, während das Verhält-
nismäßigkeitsprinzip erst ins Spiel kommt, wenn diese Frage positiv beantwortet ist; vgl. Takis 
Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, 2nd. ed., 2006, S. 176. Hier zeigt sich, dass, obwohl 
der Unionsvertrag beide Prinzipien gleichermaßen als Kompetenzausübungsregeln eingeord-
net hat, der Subsidiaritätsgrundsatz dem üblichen Verständnis einer Kompetenzregel als einer 
Regel, die bestimmt, ob ein Akteur in einer bestimmten Materie tätig werden darf, näher steht als 
der Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz, der das Wie betrifft (auch wenn zuzugestehen ist, dass diese 
Unterscheidung Abgrenzungsschwierigkeiten bereitet, weil von der Definition des Bezugsob-
jekts abhängt, ob die Frage nach der Zulässigkeit einer Regelung als Ob-Frage oder als Wie-Frage 
dasteht). Daraus ergibt sich die Frage, ob es korrekt sein kann, dass der Gerichthof häufig die 
Frage, ob eine Maßnahme mit dem Grundsatz der Subsidiarität vereinbar ist, erst nach der Klä-
rung und positiven Beantwortung der Verhältnismäßigkeitsfrage prüft - eine Reihenfolge, die 
zugleich die häufig unzureichende inhaltliche Unterscheidung beider Prinzipien begünstigt.
13 Art. 6 des Protokolls über die Grundsätze der Subsidiarität und der Verhältnismäßigkeit.
14 Werden die Einwände mit einem Drittel bzw. – in bestimmten für besonders sensibel erachte-
ten Angelegenheiten – einem Viertel der insgesamt den Parlamenten zugeteilten Stimmen erho-
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Die Funktion des Frühwarnsystems besteht also primär in der Organisation 
von Kommunikation über den Subsidiaritätsgrundsatz. Das Klagerecht, das die 
Einwände mit einem gewissen - angesichts der bisherigen Rechtsprechung des 
EuGH allerdings begrenzten - Drohpotential unterfüttert, ist allerdings durch 
ein hohes Quorum (der Einwand muss in der Regel von einem Drittel der Par-
lamentsstimmen erhoben sein) begrenzt; die dafür notwendige Koordination 
wird durch eine Einwendungsfrist von nur acht Wochen sehr erschwert. Was 
die Wirkkraft des Frühwarnsystems in seiner gegenwärtigen Form angeht, ist 
daher Skepsis angebracht.15 
Am ehesten sollte man auf den Europäischen Gerichtshof hoffen, zumal hier 
de lege lata auch die naheliegendste Ressource für die Stärkung des Frühwarnsy-
stems liegt. Nur wenn die nationalen Parlamente mit ihren Einwänden im Vor-
feld einer wirksamen Gerichtskontrolle agieren, werden sie die Kommission zu 
wirksamem Nachdenken veranlassen können.
Der Gerichtshof hat zwar im Prinzip anerkannt, dass es sich bei dem Subsi-
diaritätsgrundsatz um eine justiziable Rechtsnorm handelt. Es sieht aber bislang 
nicht so aus, als sei das mehr als ein Lippenbekenntnis. Als Hüter des Selbstbe-
stimmungsrechts der Mitgliedstaaten tritt er bislang nicht auf, und es ist bislang 
auch nicht erkennbar, dass er sich durch das Subsidiaritätsprinzip wirklich in 
diese Rolle gesetzt sähe. 
Der Präsident des EuGH, Wassilios Skouris, hat einmal geschrieben: „Das 
Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzip verlangt, dass staatliche Eingriffe in die Freiheits-
sphäre des Einzelnen nicht weiter gehen dürfen als dies notwendig ist, um ein 
legitimes, im Gemeinwohl liegendes Ziel zu erreichen. … In strukturell ähnli-
cher Weise schützt das Subsidiaritätsprinzip des Art. 5 EGV die Mitgliedstaaten 
davor, dass die Gemeinschaft in ihre Kompetenzen eingreift und Aufgaben an 
sich zieht, die auf mitgliedstaatlicher Ebene in hinreichender Weise oder sogar 
besser erledigt werden können.“16 Das trifft das Wesentliche und hilft, den Sub-
ben, dann muss das initiierende Organ, in aller Regel die Kommission, den Vorschlag überprüfen 
und einen begründeten Beschluss fassen, der allerdings auch dahin lauten kann, dass an dem 
beanstandeten Entwurf festgehalten wird. Etwas weiterreichende Verhinderungsmöglichkei-
ten bestehen in Angelegenheiten, die dem ordentlichen Gesetzgebungsverfahren unterliegen, 
für den Fall, dass ein Entwurf mit der Mehrheit der Parlamentsstimmen beanstandet wird. Auch 
in diesem Fall wird die Weiterverfolgung des Gesetzgebungsprojekts aber nur gestoppt, wenn 
der Rat mit einer Mehrheit von 55 % seiner Mitglieder oder das Parlament mit der Mehrheit der 
abgegebenen Stimmen befinden, dass der Vorschlag mit dem Subsidiaritätsprinzip nicht in Ein-
klang steht. Zum Ganzen s. im Einzelnen Art. 6-8 des Protokolls über die Grundsätze der Sub-
sidiarität und der Verhältnismäßigkeit. Speziell zum Klagerecht Art. 8 des Protokolls über die 
Grundsätze der Subsidiarität und der Verhältnismäßigkeit i.V.m. Art. 263 AEUV (ex-Art. 230 EGV).
15 Vgl. auch Papier, Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip als Bremse des schleichenden Zentralismus in Eu-
ropa? Vortrag, Tübingen, 28. November 2006 (www), S. 14; ohne große Erwartungen auch Ritzer/
Ruttloff, EuR 2006, 116 (131 ff.); etwas optimistischer Koch/Kullas, Subsidiarität nach Lissabon - 
Scharfes Schwert oder stumpfe Klinge? Centrum für Europäische Politik, März 2011 (www). 
16 Skouris, Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip und seine Bedeutung in der Rechtsprechung des Gerichts-
hofs der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, in: FS für Luzius Wildhaber, 2007, S. 1547 ff. (1557 f.).
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sidiaritätsgrundsatz als wesentlichen Baustein einer auf Selbstbestimmung zie-
lenden Ordnung zu identifizieren: 
So wie der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit als das zentrale materielle 
Element des Grundrechtsschutzes die individuelle Selbstbestimmung – traditio-
nell Freiheit genannt – dagegen schützt, unnötig beschränkt zu werden durch 
Regelungen, die eine politische Entität, dem das Individuum angehört, in Aus-
übung ihres kollektiven Selbstimmungsrechts verfügt, so schützt der Grundsatz 
der Subsidiarität die Selbstbestimmungsansprüche der kleineren politischen 
Entitäten (hier: der Mitgliedstaaten) gegen unnötige Beschränkungen durch die 
Ausübung der Selbstbestimmungsrechte der größeren politischen Einheit (hier: 
der EU), der sie angehören. 
Verhältnismäßigkeit und Subsidiarität haben insofern eine gleichartige 
Funktion, und die jeweils erforderliche Abwägung sollte gleichen Grundsät-
zen folgen. Aber sie haben ihre Funktion nicht am selben Ort und dürfen daher 
auch nicht einfach vermischt werden. Mit der Feststellung, dass ein normatives 
Rauchverbot in Gaststätten im Hinblick auf die Grundrechte der davon nega-
tiv Betroffenen verhältnismäßig ist, ist die Frage, ob über ein solches Verbot in 
Brüssel, Berlin, München oder Oberammergau entschieden werden sollte, noch 
nicht beantwortet. 
Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat in seinem Lissabon-Urteil deutlich ge-
macht, dass es sich hinsichtlich der Wahrung des unionsrechtlichen Subsidiari-
tätsgrundsatzes eine Reserve-Kontrollkompetenz vorbehält, als Bestandteil einer 
sogenannten ultra-vires-Kontrolle: „Wenn Rechtsschutz auf Unionsebene nicht 
zu erlangen ist, prüft das Bundesverfassungsgericht, ob Rechtsakte der europä-
ischen Organe und Einrichtungen sich unter Wahrung des gemeinschafts- und 
unionsrechtlichen Subsidiaritätsprinzips... in den Grenzen der ihnen im Wege der 
begrenzten Einzelermächtigung eingeräumten Hoheitsrechte halten ...“17 
Die ultra-vires-Kontrolle sichert die Grenze der grundgesetzlichen Integrati-
onsermächtigung, die darin liegt, dass die Bundesrepublik Deutschland der Uni-
on nach Art. 23 I GG nur einzelne Hoheitsrechte, nicht aber das Recht zur Ver-
fügung über den Bestand an eigenen Hoheitsrechten – und damit die staatliche 
Souveränität als solche – übertragen darf, und auch dies nur mit der Maßgabe, 
dass dabei der Subsidiaritätsgrundsatz eingehalten wird. 
Neben der Absicherung der deutschen Eigenstaatlichkeit liegt darin auch 
ein verfassungsrechtlicher Flankenschutz für den unionsrechtlichen Subsidia-
ritätsgrundsatz.
Die institutionelle Stärkung, die dieser Grundsatz dadurch erfährt, bleibt 
aber zwangsläufig schwach. Der EuGH kennt die vorbehaltene Reservekompe-
tenz und das damit verbundene Risiko eines Konflikts mit den Gerichten, in 
dem seine Autorität in Frage gestellt wird. Er weiß aber natürlich auch, dass und 
warum das Bundesverfassungsgericht bemüht sein muss, es zu einem solchen 
17 BVerfGE 123, 267 <353 f.> (die Weglassungen betreffen Zitate).
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Konflikt nach Möglichkeit nicht kommen zu lassen. Die  kürzlich ergangene Ho-
neywell-Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts hat klargestellt, dass das 
Gericht die vorbehaltene ultra-vires-Kontrolle nicht im Sinne einer allgemeinen 
Fehlerkontrolle – auch nicht in Kompetenzfragen18 – ausüben wird19. 
Anders als mit großer Zurückhaltung kann die vorbehaltene Reserve-Kontroll-
kompetenz in der Tat nicht ohne ruinöse Folgen ausgeübt werden. Damit bleibt 
aber natürlich auch die präventive Wirksamkeit dieser Reservekompetenz als in-
stitutionelle Stütze des unionsrechtlichen Subsidiaritätsgrundsatzes begrenzt.
Institutionelle Arrangements, die für eine bessere Absicherung des Subsidia-
ritätsgrundsatzes auf der Ebene der EU sorgen könnten, sind schwer auszuden-
ken. Es ist eine gesonderte, gemischte - aus Vertretern der europäischen und der 
nationalen Ebene zusammengesetzte - Gerichtsbarkeit für Kompetenzstreitig-
keiten vorgeschlagen worden, die mit Hilfe von Vorkehrungen zur Vermeidung 
einer Fraternisierung der Richter mit der EU und Stärkung ihrer Loyalität zum 
Herkunftsstaat einen besseren Subsidiaritätswächter als der EuGH abgeben 
soll20. Ich fürchte, dass ein solches Konstrukt schon aufgrund von Koordinations-
problemen und internen Frontstellungen, die sich hier zwangsläufig ergeben, 
nicht gedeihlich funktionieren kann21. 
Wenn es aus anderen Gründen zu erneuten Vertragsänderungen kommt, 
sollte man an eine schärfere und klarere Ausformulierung des Subsidiaritäts-
grundsatzes und an eine Senkung des Quorums beim Frühwarnsystem den-
ken. In Deutschland hat sich eine Verfassungsänderung, die dem Subsidiari-
tätsgrundsatz im Verhältnis zwischen Bund und Ländern Nachdruck verleihen 
sollte, als wirksamer Ansporn zu einer intensiveren verfassungsgerichtlichen 
Kontrolle erwiesen22. Auch die mit dem Vertrag von Lissabon eingeführte Mög-
lichkeit von Volksbegehren auf EU-Ebene (Europäische Bürgerinitiative, Art. 11 
Abs. 4 EUV) hat das Potential, zu einem Instrument der Wahrung des Subsidiari-
tätsgrundsatzes zu werden. Diesen Grundsatz ernstzunehmen, entschieden sei-
ne Beachtung und seine institutionelle Stärkung einzufordern, und damit auch 
auf der fortdauernden Bedeutung der nationalen Verfassungsordnung zu beste-
hen, ist weder ein Ausdruck des Nationalismus noch Ausdruck eines prinzipiel-
len Euroskeptizismus. Ganz im Gegenteil. Es geht hier um ein zentrales Prinzip 
der Demokratie in Mehrebenensystemen und um eine wesentliche Bedingung 
18 Wie Kompetenzverstöße sich von bloßen Fehlern unterscheiden lassen, ist ohnehin unklar.
19 BVerfGE 126, 286. 
20 Broß, VerwArch 2001, 425 (429). S. auch, für Überlegungen zu einem mit nationalen Parla-
mentsabgeordneten, EP-Abgeordneten und Mitgliedern des Ausschusses der Regionen zusam-
mengesetzten Subsidiaritätsausschuss, der als Schlichtungsorgan im Gesetzgebungsverfahren 
tätig werden solle, Calliess, EuGRZ 2003, 181 (195); Koenig, JZ 2003, 167 (169 f.), m.w.N.
21 Kritisch auch Everling, EuZW 2002, 357 ff; Mayer, Kompetenzüberschreitung und Letztent-
scheidung, 2000.
22 S. dazu - auch mit Blick auf die europäische Ebene - Calliess, EuGRZ 2003, 181 (187 ff.).
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dafür, dass die transnationalen Systeme und Ordnungsleistungen, auf die wir 
dringend angewiesen sind, die Stärke gewinnen und bei den Bürgern die Ak-
zeptanz finden, die notwendig sind, damit wir unsere Lebensbedingungen auch 
unter den Bedingungen der Globalisierung wirksam politisch gestalten können.
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Summary
1. Constitutional developments from the Glorious Revolution to the Act 
of Settlement. – 2. The affirmation of the role of Prime Minister and of 
rule by Cabinet. – 3. Towards the crucial year. – 4. The long, eventful road 
to the Representation of the People Act. – 5. The Dogmas of the Constitution.
Abstract
From the 1688 revolution to the beginning of 19th century, the English constitution un-
derwent a deep transformation. While the divine right of Kings and the royal prerogative 
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waned, the role of Prime Minister and rule by Cabinet became paramount; a two-party sys-
tem gradually imposed itself in the new-born “Great Britain”. But this essential change went 
nearly unobserved by political thinkers and jurists of the time, with the notable exception 
of J.J. Park, who published The Dogmas of the Constitution, a sharp denunciation of the 
gap between theoretical and actual constitution, in 1832, the year of the Great Reform Act.
Keywords 
British Constitution - Constitutional Theory - Glorious Revolution - 
Great Reform Act - J. J. Park - Prime Minister - Rule by Cabinet
‘If constitutional change has been gradual in Britain, it has certainly 
not been in a straight line of even progression. A cynic might describe 
it as long periods of lethargy interspersed with sudden bouts of energy’1
1 – Constitutional developments from the Glorious Revolution to the 
Act of Settlement
In 1688 the Glorious Revolution was a turning point not just in the political 
history of England, but in the development of the Constitution as well. Having 
imposed on the fiercely anti-Catholic majority of his subjects a policy strongly 
bent on the rehabilitation of Catholics and a drive towards absolutism clearly 
reminiscent of the unlucky attempt of his father, the executed Charles I, King 
James II had to face a strong opposition in the country, and eventually gave up 
any attempt to defend his crown on the field. The Glorious Revolution (so called 
because bloodshed was avoided in England, although not in Ireland and in Scot-
land) ended with the King fleeing into exile and throwing the Great Seal of the 
Realm in the Thames (so it was said, at least), whereas William III of Orange 
(1650-1702; King of England 1689-1702) was called to the throne, and reigned 
along with Queen Mary Stuart, James’s daughter. The new ruler was a strong 
Protestant prince with a keen military talent and had been called to England by 
an appeal of political and religious leaders of the country, after the birth of a Cath-
olic heir to James II in June had brought the crisis to a head. William’s strength 
depended both on the military force he deployed (mainly Dutch veterans) and on 
the fact that he was soon to become the only practical alternative to a civil war. 
Hardly anybody who had experienced the chaos generated by the fight between 
King and Parliament half a century earlier was likely to choose a new, violent 
1 Lord hoLme of cheLtenham, The Changing British Constitution: Checks and Balances, in Torre-Volpe 
(Eds.) La Costituzione Britannica / The British Constitution. Atti del convegno dell’Associazione di 
Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo. Bari, Università degli Studi, 29-30 maggio 2003, I-II, Gi-
appichelli, Torino, 2005 (Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo. Convegni, V), pp. 567-573, at p. 567.
27what is the english constitution? 
struggle. Nonetheless, William had to accept a compromise. After a conflict that 
had begun during the reign of Elizabeth I, and had reached tragic results during 
the reign of the Stuarts, parliamentary forces were not ready to assign the crown 
to a King who had not accepted clear legal restrictions to the power he was to 
wield. It must not be forgotten that the decision to forego the rights of James 
II and assign the throne to a new prince whose dynastic rights were weak was 
not an easy one, and led to a fracture in the front itself that had stood against 
the Stuart King. The interpretation of the flight of the King as an act that had left 
the throne ‘vacant’ (and not simply an abdication, that would have implied an 
heir) was not self-evident: the risk of turning hereditary into elective monarchy 
was clearly perceived. It is therefore unsurprising that in the following years at-
tempts of the Jacobite forces to regain the crown were not without a certain back-
ing in the country, and played also a role in the dialectics between the new-born 
parties, Whigs and Tories. These parties (curiously enough, their names were in 
the beginning terms of abuse…) had originated a few years before, during the ‘Ex-
clusion Crisis’ (1678-1681), i.e. the attempt to exclude James, at the time Duke of 
York and heir presumptive, who had converted to Catholicism in 1669, from the 
succession of his brother, Charles II. The long crisis had ended with the dissolu-
tion of Parliament in March 1681, and James – who had been sent to Scotland for 
a few years – came back to London with his right to the throne untouched. At this 
juncture, the Tories had lined up with the King, whereas the Whigs had shared 
the feeling of suspect and fear at the prospective of a Catholic monarch that was 
widespread in the country. Generally speaking, the Tories envisaged a command-
ing monarchy and feared the return of a powerful parliamentary authority, while 
the Whigs aimed to a limitation of the prerogative powers of the monarch that 
had to be counterbalanced by a strong Parliament. 
At the beginning of 1689, with James II exiled in France and William and 
his army in London, the ‘Convention Parliament’ had to face a rather complex 
constitutional dilemma. In the House of Lords there was a certain opposition 
against choosing the Prince of Orange as King; even most of the bishops whose 
resistance to James’s Declaration of Indulgence had precipitated the crisis sided 
against this alteration to the established laws of succession, on the ground that 
such an option would be as illegal as the royal acts they had opposed beforehand. 
In the House of Commons, the Whig majority maintained that the King had 
broken the covenant with the people, thus neglecting his duties, and leaving the 
throne vacant. The idea of a vacant throne was not, anyhow, compatible with the 
traditional theory of hereditary succession, expressed in the old formula, the King 
never dies. This implies that at the death of the monarch, his/her heir immediate-
ly and automatically succeeds: if it was the Parliament’s task to decide who was 
to ascend to the throne, an elective monarchy was virtually established. Such an 
idea was therefore opposed by moderates, who also disliked the concept of a con-
tract between King and Nation. William and Mary refused the proposal to reign 
as regents while James lived, and afterwards as his heirs (the new-born Prince of 
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Wales had clearly been easily forgotten). In the end, the offer of the crown to Wil-
liam was a compromise not deprived of ambiguity: the Tories could call James’s 
flight ‘abdication’ and his physical absence ‘vacancy of the throne’, whereas the 
Whigs could hint at the breach in the fundamental law of the country and to the 
infringement, on the King’s part, of the covenant between him and his people. 
Anyhow, one thing was clear: no one was ready to be responsible for an explicitly 
revolutionary settlement. 
The ascension to the throne of William and Mary, however, marked the be-
ginning of a new era in the relations between Crown and Parliament: oddly 
enough at the beginning of the reign, neither the King nor the Parliament had 
any legitimacy without the other.2 The new regime is usually described (but 
some historians disagree) in terms of a constitutional monarchy, although not 
of a parliamentary monarchy. As a matter of fact, the interpretation of the Glo-
rious Revolution and the Bill of Rights as the beginning of parliamentary sov-
ereignty was largely indebted to the Victorian constitutional theorist and jurist 
Albert Venn Dicey and should be abandoned as it overstates the implications of 
the 1688 settlement. The long struggle between King and Parliament, ended in 
1689, had been concerned with the limits of sovereignty, and therefore it was 
highly unlikely that, after having imposed limits on the authority of the King, the 
new settlement would not vest any limit to the authority of Parliament: the risk 
of a potentially boundless power was clearly felt, and feared. In 1689 the supreme 
legislative power, despotically wielded by Stuart kings, had been transferred to 
the King in Parliament, that is to say the combination of the powers of the Crown 
and of the assembly in Westminster. After kings, parliaments and army had all 
endeavoured to monopolize power in the previous decades, although unsuccess-
fully, compromise seemed the only possible solution. It is therefore extremely 
unlikely that a boundless power would be granted to Parliament. More than in 
terms of parliamentary sovereignty, the new system can be described in terms of 
a parliamentary-based government. What was offered to William and Mary ‘was 
therefore an expressly (and no longer impliedly) limited Crown’.3 
2 ‘The Convention Parliament was no Parliament. […] Historically, Parliament was an agency of 
the crown, summoned by the sovereign, or at least in his name, as with the Parliaments which 
had forced out Edward II and Richard II. The Convention Parliament of 1689 had not been sum-
moned in any king’s name, but by an alien. It bore no resemblance to the Convention of 1660, 
which had merely asked the legal ruler to return to his own. But the Convention Parliament of 
1689, without legal status, legislated the alien who had summoned it into king; and he then as-
sented to a measure transforming the Convention into a regular Parliament. For legal purists 
all this was impossible’ (LoveLL, English Constitutional and Legal History. A Survey, OUP, New York, 
1962, pp. 394-395). On the ensuing paradox, see Wicks, The Evolution of a Constitution. Eight Key 
Moments in British Constitutional History, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland (Oregon), 2006, 
p. 15: ‘In a revolution fought to preserve, rather than overthrow, the law, this was a curious basis 
for settlement, but 300 years of Crown and government rest upon this strange turn of events’.
3 Ibid, p. 11. It is to be admitted, though, that there is some evidence also for a reconstruction 
of the events as an affirmation of parliamentary sovereignty, especially with reference to the 
arbitrary dynastic change decided by the assembly at Westminster both in 1689 and with the 
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With the Declaration (= “An Act declareing the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and 
Setleing the Succession of the Crowne”, 13th February 1689) and later the Bill of Rights, 
the role of Parliament and Rule of Law4 were nonetheless recognized by King and 
Queen. The Rule of Law binds the sovereign, whose power can no longer be called 
absolute; there is a new cooperation in the exercise of power: King in Parliament as 
to the legislature, King in Council as to the executive and King in His Court as to the 
judiciary. As a result of the Bill, the powers of the sovereign were limited, and the 
rights of Parliament were set out. They included rules for freedom of speech in 
the House (‘the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to 
be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament’), along with condi-
tions for regular elections to Parliament (‘election of members of Parliament ought to 
be free’) and the right to petition the King without fear of retribution. These issues 
had been a reason for disagreement between Crown and Parliament since the first 
parliaments of Queen Elizabeth I. In the context of the 1688 crisis, parliamentary 
forces realized that this was an excellent occasion to state the limits of the royal 
prerogative while testifying what rights belonged to MPs. The Crown had also to 
respect laws approved by the Parliament, without neglecting or suspending them 
(‘the pretended power of suspending of laws or the execution of laws by regall authority 
without consent of Parliament is illegal; the pretended power of dispensing with laws or 
the execution of laws by regall authority as it hath been assumed and exercised of late is 
illegal’). Every royal interference with the law was banned: even though the sov-
ereign is still the fount of justice, he cannot unilaterally establish new courts or 
act as a judge. The Bill of Rights also warranted that no taxation could be estab-
lished by royal prerogative: the agreement of Parliament became thus necessary 
for the implementation of new taxes. Cruel and unusual sanctions were prohib-
ited, and the right to bear arms was granted to non-Catholics. A further bugbear 
of the previous decades, a permanent army under control of a powerful leader, 
was excluded as well: ‘the raising or keeping a standing Army within the Kingdome in 
time of peace unlesse it be with consent of Parliament’ was banned; actually, though, 
Act of Settlement in 1701. GoLdsWorthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament. History and Philosophy, Clar-
endon, Oxford, 1999, pp. 142 ff. claims that at times the power of King (or Queen) in Parliament 
was described as absolute, i.e. not subject to any legal remedy, even though it was not unlimited. 
See also ibid., pp. 190-191, for a further possible distinction between ‘legality’ and ‘constitution-
ality’, and their relation to the limits of sovereignty. As a matter of fact, the solutions to the 
constitutional crisis in 1688 and to the impending one foreshadowed by the upcoming death 
of Queen Ann without an heir apparent were always the result of difficult compromise. This 
fact probably allows for very different interpretations of their outcome. It is not at all surpris-
ing that in 1689 Some Observations Concerning the Regulating of Elections to Parliament, by Anthony 
Ashley-Cooper, 1st Earl of Shaftesbury and one of the founders of the Whigs, appeared posthu-
mously, displaying a sharp opening: ‘the Parliament of England is that supreme and absolute power, 
which gives life and motion to the English government’ (quoted in Browning (ed.), English Historical 
Documents 1660-1714, Routledge, London – New York, 1996, p. 211). Nonetheless, one cannot help 
wondering how many agreed, at court, between High Churchmen, between MPs, and even in 
the country as a whole?
4 Rule of Law had long been symbolised by Magna Charta, especially chapters 39-40.
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permanent armies under the control of the King remained part of the political 
scene well into the Georgian era. Finally, with a decision that was later reinforced 
by the Act of Settlement, Catholics – and consorts of Catholics – were excluded 
from the succession to the crown: ‘all and every person and persons that is, are or shall 
be reconciled to or shall hold communion with the see or church of Rome or shall professe 
the popish religion or shall marry a papist shall be excluded and be for ever uncapeable to 
inherit possesse or enjoy the Crowne and government of this realme’.
It is remarkable that, although a success for parliamentary forces, the Bill of 
Rights cannot altogether be considered as a sort of imposition on the new King, 
nor the sign of any acceptance, on his part, of the contract theories of govern-
ment. The Declaration of Rights before the Bill had in truth echoed the one is-
sued by William of Orange before landing to England with his army: in that 
masterpiece of propaganda5 not only had William claimed his wife’s rights to 
the succession of James II, even calling in doubt the authentic birth of James’s 
new-born Catholic son, but, quite more poignantly, he had avowed that the aim 
of his journey to England was the defence of the ancient rights of the English 
people. These rights were perceived as a part of Common Law tradition against 
the Stuart’s attempt to create despotism, even though they were actually crea-
tions of more than a century’s struggle between Crown and Parliament. Once 
incorporated first in the Declaration and then (in a slightly different version) in 
the Bill of Rights, such privileges could not be denied by William, who had ex-
hibited them just a few weeks before (30th September 1688). In answer to the so-
called ‘invitation’ of the peers who were opposing James II, he had claimed that 
his expedition to England was ‘intended for no other design, but to have a free 
and lawful Parliament assembled as soon as possible’. Having been recognized as 
a traditional restraint on the power of the Crown, which existed before James II 
and whose denial had brought forth the King’s fall, the rights granted by the Bill 
could not be deemed an imposition on William, nor the acknowledgement of a 
contractual origin of his power.6
5 William’s manifesto had a crucial impact: not only was it issued in around 60,000 copies 
(‘in an age in which even the best-selling political pamphlets were rarely printed in more than 
2,000 or 3,000 copies’), but secret on its exact content was strictly guarded until the very last 
moment: cf. israeL, The Dutch Role in the Glorious Revolution, in Israel (ed.), The Anglo-Dutch Mo-
ment. Essays on the Glorious Revolution and Its World Impact, CUP, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 105-162, at 
pp. 121-122.
6 The Prince of Orange had come to England with the purpose of obtaining English assistance 
for the United Provinces in their fight against France. In order to achieve this aim, William was 
ready to grant some limitation to the power of the Crown; in the interim between his landing 
at Torbay and his coronation he was tireless in his assertion that the new constitutional settle-
ment that was taking shape was consistent with his Declaration. Cf. israeL, General Introduction, 
in The Anglo-Dutch Moment, pp. 1-43, at pp. 17-19.
Most historians deny that the Declaration and the Bill of Rights amounted to a set of conditions 
that William had eventually to accept: a different position is held by schWoerer, The Bill of Rights: 
Epitome of the Revolution of 1688-89, in Pocock (ed.), Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776, PUP, 
Princeton New Jersey, 1980, pp. 224-243, who maintains that the Bill was a radical document 
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Although it marks a border between Parliament’s legislative power and the 
prerogative of the Crown, the Bill does not include the catalogue of rights a 21st 
century jurist would probably expect to find in such an important part of the 
English Constitution. As a matter of fact, this was not the aim of the Bill: it was 
meant to explicitly state the limitations on monarchic power. As such, it had first 
a political value, and only later a juridical one. Nor did it claim to be anything 
new: apparently the Bill was restoring an important legacy of the past, the an-
cient constitution (the adjective had at the time rather prevalent positive under-
tones) attacked by James II. The Bill provides a new settlement of power between 
Crown and Parliament:7 individual rights emerge just as far as they are mirrored 
in their dialectic.
Although some limits to his power had been clearly declared, the King re-
tained nonetheless the royal prerogative, i.e.:
–  he was head of State and of Anglican Church;
–  he appointed members of the Privy Council, high ranks of the Army, Navy, 
Church and civil service;
–  he granted honours and gave titles and privileges;
–  he was in charge of diplomacy, he issued declarations of war and peace, and 
formed international treaties;
–  he summoned, prorogued and dissolved Parliament, he created peerages;
–  he could refuse the royal assent to bills approved by the Parliament, thus 
preventing them to become law (= veto).
It is impossible to deny that he was still a governing King.
Anyhow, the real sanction of the revolution settlement was the new financial 
system put in place after the Glorious Revolution. It created a strong dependence 
of the monarch on the support of Parliament, in order to have enough supplies to 
carry out his policy. After 1688 it can be said (in Trevelyan’s words), ‘No King after 
James II has ever been in a financial position even to attempt to break the law 
or quarrel seriously with the House of Commons’.8 It was largely because of the 
practical need to secure finances that Parliament (although in theory still called 
by the monarch) was continually in session. A difficult, lingering problem was 
thus solved: among the causes of the fight between Crown and Parliament earlier 
in the century had figured the reluctance of the tax-payers to contribute to the 
expressing the position of those that aimed to change not just the King, but kingship as well, al-
though ‘in sum, more was hoped for than was achieved in the Bill of Rights; more was achieved 
than has been always appreciated’ (ibid., p. 237).
7 A century afterwards Thomas Paine will censure this aspect of the Bill, dismissing it as ‘but a 
bargain which the parts of government made with each other to divide profits, power and prestige’: The 
Rights of Man, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1969 [1792], p. 215.
8 treveLyan, The English Revolution 1688-89, OUP, London, 1938, p. 180.
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cost of unpopular policies, and their political ability through Parliament to re-
fuse supplies. Given the new political context created by the Glorious Revolution, 
this contrast was finally solved, thanks to a psychological rallying of the ‘mid-
dling’ sort, gentry and nobility behind the Crown and its policies. This result was 
achieved after 1689, in the early stage of the wars against France; the consequent 
financial revolution solved the long-lasting financial problems of the Crown. 
The new system was based on a severe land tax, the beginning of an excise tax 
and the foundation of the Bank of England. But this new settlement was built 
on the concession of parliamentary control over both policies and resources to 
enforce them. Having thus created a strong need of the King for the cooperation 
of Parliament, it became quite unnecessary to enact that Parliament ought to be 
held frequently. In 1694, anyhow, the Triennial Act required general elections to 
be held at least every three years: it ‘was the first statutory restriction upon the 
royal prerogative of dissolving Parliament and must be regarded as a significant 
curtailment of royal power’.9 Between the tactics used by Parliament to control 
the executive, the practice of ‘tacking’ must be mentioned, too: it was usually 
used as a last resort, and it meant an attempt by Parliament to attach to money 
Bills clauses relating to other issues, in order to grant them the royal assent. One 
has to bear in mind, though, that if the Houses had the possibility to exercise a 
certain control over the monarch, the Crown had the opportunity to limit parlia-
mentary authority thanks to the division between Whigs and Tories. As a matter 
of fact, in the political game, the measures proposed by the Crown could usually 
count on the support of one of the two parties, and a keen display of royal influ-
ence or of strategy could lead the monarch to command a majority in the House 
of Commons. The practice of balanced ministries usually followed by William 
and – more often than not – by his successor, was a step in the same direction.
Whereas William III was jealous of his prerogative, under the reign of Queen 
Ann I (1665-1714; Queen of England and later of Great Britain 1702-1714) a cabi-
net system received strong impulse. One should not forget, in this perspective, the 
importance of the Act of Settlement, passed in 1701, during the reign of William 
III: it stated that Catholic monarchs, and those married to Catholics as well, were 
excluded from the throne. Furthermore, the law required that not merely must 
the sovereign be a Protestant, but he must also be a member of the Church of Eng-
land (unlike William III). It also stated that, on the death of William III, the throne 
would pass to Mary’s sister, Ann. After her death, it would be the turn of Sophie of 
Hanover, grand-daughter of James I, and of her descendants. The perspective of the 
installation of a foreign house on the throne of England probably led Parliament to 
envisage limits to their authority, especially as far as foreign policy was concerned; 
independence of the judiciary was granted as well, providing that judges could not 
9 o’Gorman, The Long Eighteenth Century. British Political and Social History 1688-1832, Arnold, Lon-
don, 1997 (The Arnold History of Britain), p. 37.
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be removed without the assent of Parliament.10 It must also be remarked that the 
Act of Settlement put an end to the issues that had been left open by the Glorious 
Revolution. Whereas in 1688 the Convention Parliament had not dared to affirm 
its right to call a new house to the throne and had chosen a shortcut, pretending 
to believe in the abdication of James II and apparently forgetting the existence 
of a Catholic heir, in 1701 the Parliament’s right to choose the King was virtually 
established: rightful succession relented in front of political necessity. Whatever 
remained of the old panoply of the divine right of kings was soon to disappear. Al-
ready in 1696, incidentally, the formula of the Oath of Association passed by Parlia-
ment had included the definition of William III as lawful King that had been care-
fully avoided in 1689.11 At the beginning of the 18th century a new constitutional 
system was definitely born, whose legacy is still of vital importance nowadays.12 
2 – The affirmation of the role of Prime Minister and of rule by Cabinet 
During the reign of Ann the role of Whigs and Tories acquired importance, as the 
Queen, unlike William III, was not able to use the rivalry between the two parties 
10 This newly-established independence of the judiciary must not be overestimated, though. 
Until 1761 the sovereign guarded the right to dismiss judges when ascending the throne, 
and even though such a prerogative was exercised only seldom, it implied that influence of 
the Crown was still going on. Furthermore, wages were usually late, and until 1799 pensions 
depended exclusively on the King’s will. Moreover, even if the Crown had lost most power to 
damage judges, it was still possible to cajole them, by granting them honours, appointing them 
(or their relatives and friends) to posts, even creating them peers. This explains the scepticism 
with regard to the actual independence of judges that can be traced in 18th century sources. Cf. 
LemminGs, Professors of the Law. Barristers and English Legal Culture in the Eighteenth Century, OUP, 
Oxford, 2000, pp. 270-274.
11 ‘The Act of Settlement […] was the final ratification of the Revolution of 1688, and in its pro-
nouncements on the succession it frankly ignored the comforting illusion of “legality” which 
some people still cherished. These people said that after all Mary II was the “true” heir of James 
II and that William III was king because he was her husband, which was not impossible logic 
and had the precedent of Philip I and Mary I. The theory became a little more strained with Ann. 
[…] However, to move the succession to Sophia in 1701 could not be justified on such grounds; 
it was an outright assertion that Parliament was free to decide the matter as it thought best’ 
(LoveLL, English Constitutional and Legal History, p. 396). It is noteworthy, though, that the dual 
monarchy of William and Mary was totally unprecedented: their equal share in the dignity of 
the title – albeit the exercise of royal power resided, during his lifetime, with the King alone 
– implied a position quite more authoritative than the one granted to Philip in the 1550s: cf. 
morriLL, the Sensible Revolution, in The Anglo-Dutch Moment, pp. 73-104, at p. 84 
12 ‘The Bill of Rights, the Habeas Corpus Act (1679), […] and the legal guarantee of an indepen-
dent judiciary, which was enshrined in the Act of Settlement (1701) demonstrate the important 
contribution that Parliament made to establish the modern rule of law within the English con-
stitutional system. […] The rule of law and the guarantees regarding an independent judiciary, 
serving as the precondition of effective legal protection […] are based without doubt on the legal 
sovereignty of the King in Parliament’: PernthaLer, The English Roots of European and Global Consti-
tution, in La Costituzione Britannica / The British Constitution, pp. 521-530, p. 528.
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in order to affirm the Crown’s policy. The figure of the Prime Minister (although 
the position of Prime Minister had no official recognition yet) gained a greater 
significance, too. This was one of the most remarkable features of the time, as far 
as the constitutional system was concerned, along with the growing importance 
of the Whig party. The most important event of Ann’s reign was the birth of the 
Kingdom of Great Britain, after the Act for the Union with Scotland in 1707. The two 
kingdoms were unified as far as international legal personality, flag, great seal, 
army, navy, currency, taxation, units of measurement and political institutions 
were concerned, whereas the legal and the educational system of Scotland were 
preserved. The independence of the two churches in their government, disci-
pline and worship was recognized as well. The Act of Union generated tension in 
the population, especially in Scotland where it was at times seen as an incorpora-
tion of the kingdom of Scotland in the kingdom of England. However, in 1707 a 
new entity was doubtlessly created, as it is confirmed by the beginning of new 
institutions. A new Parliament was born through the union of Scottish and Eng-
lish parliaments, although the unification was sometimes felt as an annexation, 
since the new Parliament was still based in Westminster Palace and it fulfilled 
the functions of the previous English one.13 The outcome can also be read as the 
birth de jure of a new Parliament, whereas de facto it was still the old Parliament – 
with the integration of a few Scottish MPs – which was going on. The 1707 events 
can strengthen the opinion that the 1689 settlement did not imply an unlimited 
parliamentary sovereignty (or, at any rate, that such sovereignty came to an end 
in 1707), as not only did the Act of Union include explicit limitations to the powers 
of the Houses (e.g. as far as Scottish legal and ecclesiastic system was concerned), 
but also it did not imply, as a whole, any such authority.
It was with the House of Hanover, though, that the ‘Whig supremacy’ (1714-
1760) began and that juridical and political realities grew increasingly separate. 
The Whigs indeed did give their support to the new dynasty, whereas the Tories 
had eventually to accept the new kings, but were never able to support unambig-
uously George I (1660-1727; King of Great Britain and King of Ireland 1714-1727) 
and George II (1683-1760; King 1727-1760). The position of the Tories became 
awkward, as they traditionally lined up with the King and the royal prerogative. 
The adhesion of a minority of Tories to the Jacobite rebellion of 1715 was also 
used by the Whigs to discredit their opponents. Meanwhile, in May 1716 the Sep-
tennial Act unilaterally extended the life of an elected Parliament from three to 
seven years, thus also strengthening the pre-eminence of the Whigs, who had 
largely won the 1715 general election. The act was amended in 1911, reducing the 
maximum term of Parliament to five years.
13 Also the fact that the number of MPs granted to Scotland was inferior to the one correspond-
ing to the population of the two countries increased this sensation. On the other hand, it must 
be remarked that as far as tax payment was concerned, the number of Scottish MPs was quite 
superior to the one Scotland was entitled to, and in 1707 this was a rather more important pa-
rameter. Previous negotiations show that the final solution was a compromise.
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The role of the Prime Minister was not altogether new. Royal favourites had 
been granted a position of leadership in the government of the country since the 
reign of Elizabeth I at the latest, and George Villiers, later Duke of Buckingham, 
had been de facto King in the last years of James I’s and at the beginning of Charles 
I’s reign, until his nearly absolute (and sometimes whimsical) rule was stopped by 
Felton’s dagger in 1628. Later on, the Lord Treasurers and other eminent members 
of the Privy Council had enjoyed great autonomy from the King and played a role 
similar to that of the Prime Minister, until their fall – a fall that sometimes did 
not just cost them their office, but their wealth or their life as well. In the 18th cen-
tury, though, the situation changed. Whereas clever politicians like Cecil and royal 
favourites like Buckingham had been trusted to the highest degree by Kings or 
Queens, and had often been attacked by the House of Commons or, at any rate, had 
to face its potential, if not always concrete, hostility, the new figure of the Prime 
Minister had to deal both with the Crown and with the Houses of Parliament, and 
his power was founded in both relationships. It must be noted that with the first 
kings of the house of Hanover the political role played by the Crown declined, as 
the monarchs were a bit of aliens in the British society (George I even spoke only 
little English) and therefore hardly envisaged personal political aims (with the rel-
evant exception of foreign policy, especially as far as Hanover was concerned). The 
long lasting (and sometimes knotty) dialectics between King and Parliament of the 
previous century was thus transformed in subtler dialectic between the leader of 
the Cabinet, who enjoyed the confidence of a nearly absent King but relished in his 
own independence, and the Houses. A minister was no more just a counsellor – al-
though a very influential one – of the monarch, but was undergoing a transforma-
tion: he became the man to whom the actual policy of the country was entrusted. 
Words can sometimes tell an interesting story: as remarked above, the terms 
used to identify the two parties playing an essential role in British eighteenth-cen-
tury constitutional history, Whig and Tory, were originally insults, and also ‘Prime 
Minister’ was long used derogatorily, implying unjustified royal favouritism. The 
first important leaders of the Cabinet, such as Godolphin and Harley during the 
reign of Queen Ann, had to defend themselves against the accusation of being a 
‘Prime Minister’, as this was a non-existing office in the British constitution. After 
all, the first use of this title in an official act occurred two centuries later, in the Che-
quers Estate Act (1917), when the officer ‘now popularly known as Prime Minister’ was 
allowed the use of a state-owned country house. One cannot help wondering that 
after such a long time in which Prime Ministers had been the heart of British gov-
ernment, the corresponding title was still deemed just depending on general use. 
Even Sir Robert Walpole (1676-1745; de facto ‘Prime Minister’ 1721-1742), who 
actually created the role of Prime Minister, denied this title. When he was at-
tacked on the ground that he was wielding a power and an office not accounted 
for in the constitution, he replied that, on the contrary, as one of the King’s coun-
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cil he had just one voice.14 Regardless of what he said, anyway, a very relevant 
change occurred with Walpole: he created a new position and changed the bal-
ance of the constitution. Before him, every minister was appointed by the King 
and was individually responsible to him; with Walpole the leader of the Cabinet 
shouldered responsibility for the government as a whole. His power was rooted 
in the position he held in the Cabinet, and in his control over the House of Com-
mons. Walpole united the Treasury – of which he was head – with the political 
leadership in the Commons. He was First Lord of the Treasurer and Chancellor 
of the Exchequer as well, thus displaying a strong authority over financial policy 
as a whole. His decision to sit within the House of Commons allowed him to 
have ascendancy over its members in every possible way, bribery (or, at any rate, 
a very unscrupulous use of patronage)15 and propaganda not excluded. Walpole 
enjoyed a double confidence, both of the House and of the Crown. Moreover, he 
was leader of the dominant party, the Whigs, thus assuring a stronger control 
over Parliament. Walpole was a great leader of the House:16 not only was he very 
good at manoeuvring MPs, he was also very often present during debates and us-
ing his oratory skills to win the day. In the long run, this state of affairs will lead 
to the birth of the party system as well. 
The role of Prime Minister developed as a constitutional convention that 
emerged as necessary in the new settlement created in 1689. On the one hand, 
the increase of routine government business made it impossible for the monarch 
to exercise personal control, thus implying the assistance of a cabinet. Further-
more, the executive responsibilities of the Crown depended for their enforce-
ment on parliamentary supplies, and therefore the need of an influential liaison 
between monarch and Parliament was deeply felt. A Prime Minister was just 
what was called for: the King needed a strong parliamentary leader in his closet, 
a man who could command a strong majority in the House of Commons. Other-
wise, the risks of being unable to implement policies in face of a reluctant Parlia-
ment were too high: in order to rule Parliament, the head of the executive need-
ed to sustain majority support in the Commons. Support of the King, although 
still crucial, was not sufficient to retain power. On the other hand, support of 
14 It is a bit of a paradox that the role of Walpole as Prime Minister was especially emphasized 
by the opposition (especially contemporary press).
15 The use of patronage was made easier by the progressive control of the Prime Minister over 
the granting of many honours that previously belonged to royal prerogative. Unlike his 19th 
century successors, Walpole did not use patronage in order to control his fellow cabinet or 
party members, but especially to win the support – or, at least, the neutrality – of political op-
ponents: personal and public interest therefore overlapped.
16 The following Prime Ministers did not always share Walpole’s decision: as late as 1902 Prime 
Minister Lord Salisbury chose to sit in the House of Lords (obviously no Prime Minister ever 
thought to follow his example after the Parliament Act in 1911). It is noteworthy, though, that 
when in 1767 even a remarkable statesman as Pitt the Elder decided to accept the earldom of 
Chatham and to go to the Lords, his choice fatally weakened the Cabinet (cf. o’Gorman, The Long 
Eighteenth Century, p. 206).
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the King was still essential, and the House of Commons needed a reliable inter-
locutor with the Crown. The double role played by the Prime Minister provided 
an answer and also led to a reduced freedom of choice for the King, who had to 
appoint a political leader who could command an important parliamentary ma-
jority, regardless of his own personal preferences. It is premature to say that the 
monarch had to choose the leader of the party which was returned to Parliament 
with a majority of seats after a general election, as in the 18th century ministers 
could not count on a reliable party support and had to create their own majori-
ties; nonetheless, it was a step in that direction. When in the late Nineteenth cen-
tury the emergence of strong disciplined political parties enabled the Cabinet to 
dominate the House of Commons and become the beneficiary of the sovereignty 
of Parliament, the Prime Ministers of the time were reaping what had been sown 
by their ingenious 18th century predecessors. It must be mentioned, though, that 
the new position of Prime Minister did not always have a smooth course, as their 
leadership depended more on their personal achievements than on party accom-
plishments: whereas eminent figures such as Walpole and Henry Pelham man-
aged to perform the new office with remarkable skill, their successors could not 
sustain the same position.17 
The personal character of Walpole’s rule was also emphasized by his rivals 
and by contemporary opposition press. It was Henry St. John, Viscount Boling-
broke (1688-1751), Walpole’s main competitor, who, deeply disliking his regime, 
described that period in terms of an antithesis between a ‘court’ and a ‘country’ 
party. As a matter of fact, this distinction was not new: an ideological and politi-
cal contraposition between court and country has indeed been recently alleged 
between the possible causes of the English civil war. Its roots were at least dat-
ing back to the beginning of the Stuart era, if not to the last years of Elizabeth’s 
reign. In Bolingbroke’s interpretation, anyhow, this dichotomy had a different 
value, being more concerned with a moral attitude than with the structure of 
society. Furthermore, whereas in its antecedents the word ‘country’ was related 
to the world of counties, i.e. of local, and sometimes rural authorities, Boling-
broke used it as a reference to the Country as a whole, to the superior interests 
of Great Britain. The ‘court party’ was, according to Bolingbroke, a faction, more 
than a party, whose members were ready, for selfish reasons, to submit the Par-
liament to the predominance of the Crown. Such a choice would eventually lead 
to the ruin of the post-1688 order: the balance of the constitution, achieved with 
the Glorious Revolution, could be destroyed by a growing predominance of the 
Crown, or – even worse – by a deprivation of Parliament’s authority, through pre-
ponderance of a personal rule and of selfish interests. One must bear in mind 
that the Whig supremacy was also marked by a strong decline of the Tories, who 
played an extremely limited role in the political life of the Country. They were cut 
17 In the long run, anyhow, even an authoritarian King like George III – who tried to impose 
ministers of his liking – could not overlook the stature gained by the figure of Prime Minister. 
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out from office and were a permanent minority in the House of Commons, also 
due to the nature of the franchise and to the distribution of borough seats that 
hindered their possibility of success in the infrequent elections. In Bolingbroke’s 
opinion, therefore, the ‘country party’ was not exactly a party, but a sort of sum-
moning to every honest man, in order to save the Country. In this effort, attention 
was paid to a larger involvement of the people, more than to the broad base of sup-
port commanded by the Tories in rural England: concern for public opinion was 
therefore not forgotten. Among the political differences between Bolingbroke’s 
and Walpole’s followers, the discussion on the value of the King’s influence was 
primary. The role, once played by the royal prerogative, was now performed by the 
royal influence, which was usually expressed in granting honours and rewards to 
MPs. According to Bolingbroke, such a behaviour verged on corruption. It created 
dependence of the House of Commons on the Crown – and thus on the Cabinet – 
and could therefore bring to an end the well-balanced British constitution. On the 
contrary, Walpole’s followers maintained that the influence of the Crown was nec-
essary both in order to preserve the traditional balance in the constitution and to 
avoid the risks of too strict a separation between the branches of the legislature. 
Two very important constitutional principles of the time being ‘The King can do 
no wrong’ and ‘The King cannot act alone’, countersignature of royal deeds became 
necessary. Likewise, ministers or undersecretaries had to be present, for instance, 
whenever the King met foreign diplomatists. Countersignature had existed be-
fore, but during Walpole’s rule the ensuing accountability of ministers – that 
was previously only juridical – became political as well. However, even though 
many powers and prerogatives shifted from the Crown to the Cabinet, they were 
formally still part of the royal prerogative. Furthermore, the King played a key 
role in the executive and until 1781 he sat in the Cabinet as well. The shifting of 
such powers was due to constitutional conventions, but the executive power still 
wielded by the monarch acted as a counterbalance to the importance of Prime 
Ministers. A further factor restraining the Prime Minister’s supremacy was that 
the Cabinet was not yet deemed to be collectively responsible for its policy. When 
in 1742 Walpole fell from power, only three Ministers shared the same fate. As a 
matter of fact, the idea of cabinet solidarity was hardly born: its members were 
usually appointed individually, not as a group, and they surely did not come into 
office on an agreed programme. Ministers were expected to agree just on certain 
issues, such as foreign policy, defence and finance.18 
It was only during the reign of George III (1738-1820; King 1760-1820) that 
the fall of a Prime Minister led to the fall of the Cabinet. The King was, and still 
is, a controversial figure. He was the first Hanoverian King born in England, 
18 ‘Mid-eighteenth-century governments did not exist to carry programmes of legislation’: 
derry, Politics in the Age of Fox, Pitt and Liverpool: Continuity and Transformation, Macmillan, Lon-
don, 1990 (British History in Perspective), p. 10.
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who spoke English as first language and was genuinely devoted to the Church of 
England; moreover at the time of his ascension to the throne, the political situa-
tion looked propitious. Satisfaction was not to last long, though. Judgement on 
George III’s rule largely depends on a ‘Whig’ or a ‘Tory’ interpretation: according 
to the former, the King sought to increase the power of the Crown and threat-
ened both the independence of Parliament and the constitutional balance; those 
who defend his behaviour maintain that he was simply exercising the powers 
granted by royal prerogative, powers that at the time were still in the King’s avail-
ability. As a matter of fact, both interpretations ‘rest in a static view of the politi-
cal context’ and forget that, during the half century of George’s reign, the British 
Constitution underwent a substantial evolution: the behaviour of the King in the 
1760s should be judged accordingly.19 During his reign, both the executive and 
the role of Parliament expanded enormously, the function of an active opposi-
tion was acknowledged, public opinion grew in importance, Whig and Tory par-
ties experienced essential transformations and – according to some historians, 
at least – a two-party system emerged. George III tended to a stronger govern-
ment than his predecessors and embarked on direct action towards the House 
of Commons, not forgetting, in his own turn, a dubious use of the resources of 
patronage, which he sometimes denied to a Cabinet that was not of his liking.20 
The intense use of royal patronage in order to command a sustained majority in 
both chambers drew much criticism at the time, and crown influence was often 
attacked on the ground that it undermined the independence of Parliament, thus 
threatening the ancient liberties of English people. This blame is still sometimes 
echoed by historians, but it appears to have been overestimated. At any rate, the 
Crown’s influence significantly declined during George’s reign: both the number 
of placemen in the House of Commons and the strength of the Crown party in 
the House of Lords waned.
Surely the King played an active role in the formation of every ministry 
formed during his reign, even though the freedom of his choice was sometimes 
cornered by circumstances. At any rate, if the King’s favour was still necessary for 
a successful ministry, it was not sufficient: the continued support of both Crown 
and Commons was essential. A Prime Minister who could not count on sufficient 
parliamentary support was doomed to failure, as the King’s favourite, Lord Bute, 
had experienced in 1762. A dynamic survey of George III’s reign shows, besides, 
how his influence over appointed ministers declined over time. At the beginning 
of his reign, he was surely a King with a policy, who summoned ministers in his 
closet to discuss (or even suggest) government action, and who attended Cabinet 
meetings. Gradually, also due to his declining health, the King stopped attending 
Cabinet meetings, or discussing beforehand with ministers affairs of state. It be-
19 Cf. dickinson, George III and Parliament (2011) 30 Parliamentary History, pp. 395-413 (quotation 
at p. 397).
20 E.g. to the Fox-North coalition in 1782 (cf. Derry, Politics in the Age of Fox, p. 42).
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came frequent for the Cabinet to reach a decision without the monarch’s advice 
and then report it to the King for approval. On the other hand, the monarch’s 
repugnance for certain reforms could seriously hinder or even bring to a close 
the action of the Cabinet in that field (e.g. parliamentary reform). It is notewor-
thy how twice, during George III’s reign, recourse to the royal veto was contem-
plated. The exercise of veto had been discontinued since 1708, but the King con-
sidered its use both against Fox’s India Bill in 1783 and against the Catholic Relief 
Bill in 1807. He relented, though: in 1783 he forced repeal of the Bill on the Lords 
by circulating a letter that branded as his enemy those who would vote in favour 
of the measure, while in 1807 the Cabinet eventually abandoned the Bill. In the 
analysis of constitutional development, this hint is open to a double reading: the 
fact that the King thought to exercise it, shows that veto was not forgotten (and 
that George III was conscious of the extension of his prerogative); on the other 
hand, the fact that the monarch found a different way to express his displeasure 
and sink the unwelcome Bill, can be evidence that he was not ready to risk a seri-
ous constitutional crisis.
In 1782 Lord North (1732-1792) – Prime Minister since 1770 – was forced to 
resign after a motion of censure (concerning the war in America) in the House of 
Commons. It is noteworthy that the motion was never voted, since Lord North 
was aware that he would certainly be defeated. The whole Cabinet resigned. Al-
though reshuffle under a new head of the Cabinet was by no means unheard of 
in the following years, this was a great step towards parliamentary government. 
In point of fact, the 1780s are a landmark in the constitutional evolution of Great 
Britain: in 1781 the King ceased to attend cabinet meetings; soon after he was 
forced to accept, much against his will, the resignation of his Prime Minister, 
who was no more able to command a majority in Parliament; furthermore, col-
lective responsibility of the Cabinet emerged. After a brief attempt of a coalition 
government, featuring Lord North and Charles James Fox (1749-1806), George 
III decided to call Pitt the Younger (1759-1806; Prime Minister 1783-1801, 1804-
1806) to lead a minority government. In 1783 the Prime Minister obtained from 
the King the dissolution of Parliament: since then, this important royal preroga-
tive has actually passed to the Prime Minister. The continued support of both 
Crown and Commons was still essential, but the idea that confidence of the 
Houses is more essential than confidence of the sovereign developed decidedly, 
although the latter (for other ministers as well) guarded its importance at least 
up to 1832. With the Great Reform Act, as a matter of fact, the Crown virtually 
lost the capacity to influence heavily the results of general elections. Already in 
1778 Lord North had warned the King about the necessity of ‘one directing Minister 
who should plan the whole of the operations of government and control all other Depart-
ments of Administration, so as to make them cooperate zealously and actively with his 
designs’.21 Pitt the Younger was the right man for the task. It is with this extremely 
21 dickinson, George III and Parliament, p. 40.
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young Prime Minister (he was 24) that a new era undeniably begun. Not only 
did he enjoy a political dominance in the Cabinet, but he was also an influent 
parliamentary leader, able to command a parliamentary majority not through a 
cunning use of patronage (as Walpole before him), but through his skills as parlia-
mentarian and an ample consent built around his political figure. Furthermore, as 
First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer he was in charge of the 
economic policy and had therefore the possibility to carry out significant financial 
as well as administrative measures. Party discipline (that increased during 19th cen-
tury) brought to a new settlement, the Prime Minister being more confident in his 
majority in the Commons and in his leadership, expressed in his ability to deal ef-
ficiently with the House, party institutions and voters as well. As a rule, 18th century 
Prime Ministers had been great parliamentary leaders, quite at ease in the debates 
of the House, and surely not inclined to public speech outside Parliament; during 
19th and 20th century, on the contrary, a new model of Prime Minister appeared, 
often silent in the House, but ready to meet (and charm) his electors. 
All in all, in the last years of George III’s reign, constitutional conventions had 
reduced the powers of the monarch, handing most of them down to this new con-
ventional figure, the Prime Minister. Formally, the Crown still wielded conspicu-
ous power; in reality, it had been drastically reduced. Probably it was with the shift 
of power from the Crown to the Cabinet, along with the growth of a strong bond 
between Prime Minister and Parliament and of collective responsibility of the 
Cabinet, that the British constitutional monarchy was transformed into a parlia-
mentary monarchy. The permanent office of Prime Minister – even though only in 
the 20th century it was officially recognized!22 – was an essential element in such a 
revolution. So, although at the beginning of 18th century some circumstances had 
not been too dissimilar, a great change had taken place: the heart of the system 
was now in the House of Commons, whereas the House of Lords and the influence 
of the Crown had both faded. This situation led to a necessary permanent connec-
tion between the Cabinet and the House of Commons. The evolution of parlia-
mentary forces was not as simple as it has sometimes been described, but a genu-
ine two-party system was emerging. Even though Pitt cannot be straightforwardly 
called a Tory (he was labelled as such by Fox and his followers, who prided in their 
self-ascribed legacy of the Whig tradition) at the end of George’s reign there was 
a governing party prepared to accept itself as a new Tory party and an opposition 
who called itself Whig. It is a vexed question whether (and to what extension) Pitt 
the Younger had enjoyed the benefits of Cabinet solidarity and of party discipline. 
His following in the Commons is difficult to estimate, too: surely a group of MPs 
politically identified with him, but the overwhelming majority he usually com-
22 Up to the Thirties, the Prime Minister did not have the right to a salary as such, but just 
as First Lord of the Treasure. It is quite a paradox that the acknowledgment of a salary to the 
Leader of the Opposition took less time. Cf. torre, Il Cabinet system da Thatcher a Blair: leadership 
e Costituzione, in La Costituzione Britannica / The British Constitution, pp. 306-354, pp. 311-312, n. 13.
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manded in the issues related to the Anglo-French Wars is most likely misleading. 
Probably these factors evolved during his rule. The situation was surely settled at 
the time of the ministry of Lord Liverpool (1770-1828; Prime Minister 1812-1827): 
Liverpool could rely on his colleagues following him were he forced to resign, on 
the decline of Crown influence, on a stronger control of party. It is significant that 
the figure of the leader of opposition23 was consequently to gain a growing impor-
tance, too, but it must be remarked that in election the most dramatic victories 
were not won by an opposition seeking to gain office, but by the government.24 A 
further key factor for the new balance of the constitution was the reduced number 
of MPs and Lords who thought of themselves as political independents.
What ensued was a wide distance between the mixed well-balanced theoretical 
constitution, and reality:
–  much of the royal prerogative had been passed to the Prime Minister;
–  the King being not accountable, Ministers were politically accountable to 
Parliament;
–  Cabinet was now more homogeneous and the leadership of the Prime 
Minister undisputable;
nonetheless:
–  the confidence of the King was still of vital importance;
–  the House of Lords had powers similar to those of the House of Commons, 
except as far as finance was concerned;
–  size of electorate was still small and elections were open to manipulation 
by the Cabinet.
The main features of the British constitution were probably born, with a strong 
Cabinet government, a parliamentary sovereignty, the first attempts to a single 
party control of government, and the accountability of the government to the 
Parliament (in fact, to the House of Commons) through the conventions of min-
isterial and collective responsibility.
3 – Towards the crucial year
At the beginning of 19th century the monarchy was increasingly brought into dis-
repute: the mental illness of King George III, the disorientation of the Regency 
Period (1811-1820) and the dubious morality of King George IV (1762-1830; Prince 
23 On the theme of opposition, de verGottini, Lo «Shadow Cabinet». Saggio comparativo sul rilievo 
costituzionale dell’opposizione nel regime parlamentare britannico, Giuffrè, Milano, 1973 was in Italy 
a pioneer in this field with his work, particularly from p. 49 to p. 65.
24 derry, Politics in the Age of Fox, pp. 192-193.
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Regent 1811-1820, King of the United Kingdom 1820-1830) put the Crown in a 
difficult position. Furthermore both politicians and the Anglican Church were 
charged with corruption.
The issue of Catholic Emancipation (i.e. the ending to political discriminations 
against Catholics) had long loomed over the ministries of the first quarter of 19th 
century. In 1801 Pitt had resigned when George III had refused to agree to Catholic 
Emancipation at the time of the union with Ireland: the King maintained that his 
coronation oath bound him to reject a measure that would weaken the privileged 
position of the Church of England. In 1807 the so-called Ministry of All the Talents 
had resigned after refusing the pledge asked by the King, never to raise the issue 
of Catholic Emancipation again. George IV was as stern as his father on the is-
sue. Nonetheless, since 1807 every House of Commons (with a single exception) 
had passed a Catholic measure by a substantial majority,25 and only the tenacious 
resistance of the House of Lords had prevented the passing of a Bill. Meanwhile, 
Catholic Emancipation had reached, during Lord Liverpool’s government, the 
status of an ‘open question’: every member of the Cabinet was free to exercise his 
own judgement on it, regardless of cabinet solidarity, as soon as he stated that 
he was acting as an individual, and not as a member of government. In January 
1828 George IV asked Lord Wellington (1769-1852; Prime Minister: 1828-1830, 
1834), a Tory, to form a ministry, under the condition that Catholic Emancipation 
was not to be included in government measures. The Cabinet was nevertheless 
aware that the Catholic question had to be resolved, and that it was desirable to 
deal with it while the Ministry could still count on a reliable majority in the House 
of Lords. The effect of Wellington’s pledge was just to put off emancipation for a 
few months, while conflict was exacerbated. Such a choice was counter-productive 
for the Prime Minister, as it caused rancour and bitterness in the Ultra wing of 
Tory party.26 The last straw was the O’Connell case, an Irish politician who defeated 
the government candidate in a by-election rich in propaganda. O’Connell could 
not take his seat, as he was a Catholic: also in order to grant peace in Ireland, the 
Cabinet decided that Catholic emancipation could not be postponed. Thus in 1829 
the Roman Catholic Relief Act was passed in spite of the strong opposition of King 
George IV and of the Anglican Church along with the personal dislike of the Prime 
Minister and of Home Secretary Robert Peel (1788-1850). The Act brought to an end 
political discrimination against Catholics, allowing them to become members of 
Parliament. According to Clark, the Emancipation Act marked the end of the Protes-
tant Constitution, proving a real revolution in British constitutional history.27 Not 
25 davis, The House of Lords, the Whigs and Catholic Emancipation 1806-1829’ (1999) 18 Parliamentary 
History, pp. 22-43, at p. 29.
26 davis, Wellington and the “Open Question”: The Issue of Catholic Emancipation, 1821-1829, (1997) 
29 Albion: a Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies, pp. 39-55, at p. 54.
27 cLark, English Society 1660-1832: Religion, Ideology and Politics during the Ancien Regime, 2nd edn, 
CUP, Cambridge, 2000, pp. 519 ff.
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all historians agree, though. Anyhow, the Act made parliamentary reform easier. 
Ironically, disappointed Ultra Tories thought that reform of the franchise had be-
come necessary, as ‘they pointed out that only government control over small 
boroughs had secured a majority for Catholic emancipation’, the measure having 
little support in the country.28
On 26th June 1830, King George IV’s death brought about the subsequent dissolu-
tion of Parliament. In the general election the Tory party won a majority, but sup-
port for Prime Minister Wellington was weak. His ill-timed position in strong 
defence of the existing system of government and against the need of reform led 
to his defeat in the House of Commons in a vote on a financial measure, and to 
his subsequent resignation. With the Whig Cabinet of Charles Grey (1764-1845; 
Prime Minister 1830-1834) the road towards the Reform Bill, that is to say, the 
improvement of the electoral system in Great Britain, was open.
It was in the same year, 1832, that John James Park (1795-1833) wrote The Dogmas 
of the Constitution, a book which was rather neglected at the time, but that ought to 
be appreciated for its lucid perception of the evolution of the British constitution 
since the Restoration, the careful use of historical precedents and criticism of cur-
rent interpretations, and for drawing dramatically attention to the dangerous dif-
ference existing between practice and theory of the Constitution. It is the author 
himself who warns the reader that his book was written ‘in a period of overwhelm-
ing delusion’ and who describes that mood in the following, rather alarmed, terms: 
‘a lying delusion which has become at length […] not a folly merely, but a CRIME; 
since it is, perhaps, putting in risk the very existence of the Country’.29
J. J. Park was a scholar and an antiquarian since his adolescence. Having de-
cided upon law as a career, in 1815 he got into Lincoln’s Inn and already in 1819 
he published a treatise on the law of dowry, that was to be regarded as one of the 
standard books on the topic. He was called to the Bar in 1822. He soon gained a 
reputation as a critic of legal codification and of the ideas of Jeremy Bentham. In 
1830 he also graduated at the German University of Göttingen: he came to know 
Friedrich Carl von Savigny and was an admirer of the German Historical School 
of Law.30 In 1831 he was appointed professor of English Law and Jurisprudence at 
the King’s College, London: in The Dogmas of the Constitution he published some 
of the lectures delivered in his first course there. The College had been founded 
28 evans, The Great Reform Act of 1832, 2nd edn, Routledge, London – New York, 1994 (Lancaster 
Pamphlets), p. 43.
29 Park, The Dogmas of the Constitution, Fellowes, London, 1832, pp. VII-VIII.
30 Since 1830 he will sign his works ‘Doctor of Law of Göttingen’. The extension of Park’s enthu-
siasm for the Historical School is open to question, though. Cf. vareLa suanzes, Estudio preliminar, 
in Los Dogmas de la Constitución. Cuatro lecciones, correspondientes a la primera, décima, undécima y 
decimotercera de un curso sobre teoría y práctica de la Constitución. Edición y Estudio preliminar de 
J. Varela Suanzes. Traducción de I. F. Sarasola, Istmo, Madrid, 1999 (Colección Fundamentos, 157), 
pp. 7-51, at p. 14.
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in 1829 by eminent figures linked with the more conservative wing of the Tory 
party and of Anglican Church, in nearly open contrast with the University Col-
lege, founded in 1826 by Bentham and his followers.
Even though he taught in a Tory-oriented College, Park claimed nonethe-
less to be independent both from Tories and from Whigs. As he clearly states in 
the Preface of the Dogmas, his aim was not to speak either for Parliamentary Re-
form or against it, but to show the great and dangerous difference between the 
traditional Theory of the Constitution, and its Reality. He presents himself as a 
promoter, or a disciple at least, of a school of ‘observational political science’. The 
Preface is dated 31st March 1832. It was a crucial moment for the Reform and for 
England as well.
4 – The long, eventful road to the Representation of the People Act
The goal of the Act was to ‘take effectual measures for correcting divers abuses that have 
long prevailed in the choice of members to serve in the Commons House of Parliament’.
The House of Commons was then composed of 658 members; there were two 
types of constituencies, counties and boroughs. County members usually repre-
sented landholders, whereas borough members should have represented the mer-
cantile and trading classes. Boroughs ranged from small villages to very populated 
cities and had been chosen since the Middle Ages, often in a rather whimsical or, 
at any rate, haphazard way. In the following centuries very little had been done to 
redress the situation, and large industrial cities such as Leeds, Manchester and 
Birmingham did not send their representatives to the House. Franchise was quite 
varied, too, but also in this respect the system had proved irrational.31 Basically, the 
vast majority of individuals was unable to vote (just 13% approx. of adult males in 
England and Wales, around 1% in Scotland). In the constituencies figured ‘rotten’, 
‘pocket’ and ‘open’ boroughs. Rotten boroughs were boroughs with a very limited 
number of voters: few than one hundred each, and some with only thirty-two 
(Dunwich), twenty-five (Camelford), or even less (Gatton, seven voters, and the 
most infamous of all, Old Sarum, whose eleven voters lived all elsewhere and had 
last been called upon actually to vote in an election in 1715). Predictably enough, in 
such boroughs the result of elections was always manipulated and corruption was 
not at all unheard of. Manipulation was not confined to ‘rotten boroughs’, though. 
Some constituencies were under the control of rich landowners, and were known 
as ‘pocket boroughs’ (i.e. they were ‘in the pockets of their patrons’). Voters who 
resisted the influence of landlords were instead open to corruption, and in some 
boroughs (sometimes such as the open ones, where vote was free) electors were 
31 ‘It was not a system based on property, but the caricature of one’ (Brock, The Great Reform Act, 
Hutchinson & Co., London, 1973, p. 26).
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even bribed collectively: ‘the franchise was regarded as a form of property, not as 
a natural right’.32 Attention must also be drawn to the fact that in many boroughs 
elections had become unnecessary, because the electors had financial or other 
strong inducements to vote for the candidate of the landowner, of the Crown, or 
of the government: an election was just a waste of time and money. Fewer than 
one-third of parliamentary seats were contested in the century before the Reform 
Act.33 Attempts for reform had a long story behind their backs. Popular pressure 
for reform was particularly strong at the beginning of 19th century, also due to the 
demographic growth that in the first half of the century nearly doubled the popu-
lation; nonetheless the House of Commons had rejected all the bills aiming at a 
global change in the system of representation.34
Seeing it through 21st century eyes, it is easy to find in the absence of a secret 
ballot the root cause of much corruption: when every elector’s choice is bound to 
be publicly known, it is easier for votes to be bought and sold, and it is more dif-
ficult for the persuasive influence of a distinguished member of the elite to be re-
sisted. It is noteworthy, however, that at the beginning of 19th century there was 
a different feeling on this issue: no attempt was made by the Whigs to introduce 
secret ballot in the Bill. As a matter of fact, it was regarded both as improper and 
as dangerous too, the elector being thus potentially able to sell his vote to more 
than a contender. Secret ballot had to wait until the 1872 Ballot Act. 
The Catholic Relief Act and, later on, the fall of Wellington had brought substantial 
weakness to the Tories and so Whig Prime Minister Charles Grey had the chance 
to carry out Parliamentary reform.35 On 1st March 1831, Lord John Russel brought 
forward the First Reform Bill36 that was approved by one vote only (302 to 301), 
in the biggest parliamentary division ever recorded. It is worth stating that most 
resistance was directed against the new map of constituencies, rather than the 
32 derry, Politics in the Age of Fox, p. 18.
33 The number of constituencies that actually went to a poll had declined remarkably in the 
second half of 18th century (contested elections in county seats had already shrunk from 65% 
in 1705 to 8% in 1757: cf. stone, The Results of the English Revolutions of the Seventeenth Century, in 
Three British Revolutions, pp. 23-108, at p. 88). It must be remembered, however, that the absence 
of a contest did not necessarily imply the absence of electoral competition. Cf. o’Gorman, The 
Long Eighteenth Century, pp. 139-140.
34 It is notable, though, that some of the most remarkable statesmen in the second half of the 
century were elected for rotten boroughs, such as Pitt the Elder (elected for Old Sarum in 1735: 
cf. o’Gorman, The Long Eighteenth Century, p. 181), while Pitt the Younger contested the Cambridge 
University seat, but lost, and was returned in a by-election for the pocket borough of Appleby.
35 ‘There was no reason for the Whigs ever to have come into office, had the Tories not im-
ploded over religious issues’ (evans, The Great Reform Act, p. 39). Incidentally, the commitment to 
parliamentary reform was basically the one important issue on which the members of the new 
Cabinet shared the same ideas…
36 ‘A well-kept secret, its extent and audacity now came as a bombshell’ (cLark, English Society, p. 541).
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minor extension of the franchise: personal, selfish reasons surely played a role, 
but it was above all the link between population and representation underneath 
the Bill that was objected to, even by Whigs. The Ministry having also lost two 
votes on two motions, the Earl of Grey decided to ask the King to dissolve Parlia-
ment: the Whigs won an overwhelming majority in the elections. The Second Re-
form Bill was passed by a majority of 136 votes in July, and was then sent up to the 
House of Lords. Despite their well-known opposition to the reform, Lords were 
expected to abstain, rather than openly defy public will. Nonetheless, they reject-
ed the Bill: the defeat of the Bill (rejected by 199 votes to 158) was worse than the 
Government had feared, and caused great concern. Should the King have been 
convinced to create new peers in order to approve the Bill, he would have been 
prevented to do so by the huge number of nominations required. Disorder fol-
lowed, with riots at Derby, Nottingham, Bristol and in other towns. 
The King was asked to prorogue Parliament and in the new session of De-
cember 1831 the Third Reform Bill was presented, and passed with even larger 
majorities in the following March (it was in this crucial moment that Park dated 
his Preface). Once more, opposition was strong between the Lords, but the oppo-
nents decided to change their tactics, being aware that another open rejection of 
the Bill could lead to a most serious social and political crisis. They chose, there-
fore, to propose wrecking amendments to the Bill. The Ministry saw only one 
alternative: the creation of a large number of pro-reform peerages, but the King 
denied his assent. Lord Grey tendered his resignation, and the Duke of Welling-
ton was once more called to form a new government, while political agitation 
grew so much that a revolution was sometimes feared. The Duke being unable to 
form a ministry, William IV was eventually forced to call back Lord Grey and to 
consent to the creation of Whig Lords, but such a drastic measure was in the end 
unnecessary, as the King circulated a letter among Tory peers, warning them of 
the consequences of insisting in their opposition to the Bill.
On 7th June 1832 the Reform Bill became law. Nomination boroughs were re-
duced, and franchise was extended, although a few rotten boroughs remained 
and bribery of voters was still a problem. The Great Reform Act encompassed the 
middle classes in the ruling elite: as a whole the number of those entitled to vote 
rose in England and Wales37 from around 439,000 (12.7% of adult males) to more 
than 652,000 (18%),38 but working classes were still cut out from voting. Surely 
the Act had not been intended as a step towards democracy: on the contrary, its 
end was to hinder it and, as a compromise, it aimed to get the utmost that could 
be obtained from Parliament, and the minimum that could satisfy the country.39 
37 In the same year similar Reform Acts were passed for Scotland and Ireland, too.
38 evans, The Great Reform Act, Appendix 2, p. 75.
39 ‘The role of public opinion during the Reform Crisis can hardly be overestimated’: o’Gorman, 
The Long Eighteenth Century, p. 364.
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Many MPs had believed that a measure of parliamentary reform was necessary in 
order to prevent a violent revolution. The Reform Act was not meant to be a mile-
stone in the constitutional history of the country: it was a compromise dictated 
by a serious crisis. As such, it was very successful: the dangerous riots that had 
taken place before the passing of the Bill disappeared from the British political 
scene of the century; probably the procedures that led to the passage of the Act 
themselves, more than its circumscribed contents, harbingered a new idea of de-
mocracy. Afterwards, the pre-reform society was perceived as part of a lost, nearly 
forgotten world, to which there could be no return.40 For all its faults, the Reform 
Act had opened a door on a new political world.41
5 – The Dogmas of the Constitution
If in his Preface J. J. Park was at pains not to show a position either for or against 
the Bill, the final pages of the Dogmas are a straightforward appeal against the 
Reform. Nonetheless, the aim of his work is not an opposition to the reform. On 
the contrary, what Park really wants is to highlight the wide gap existing between 
theoretical and actual Constitution.42
Park’s main point is quite clear: any theory of the Constitution is doomed to fail 
as far it is built too much on abstract ideas, and not on the perusal of what actu-
ally happens in the relations between powers and institutions. This is especially 
true in a country like the United Kingdom, whose constitution is unwritten and 
a few acts with constitutional value (such as Magna Charta or the Bill of Rights 
– that are not even mentioned in Park’s book, anyway) are overshadowed by con-
stitutional conventions and practices developed in the last century and a half. 
Where there is no written Constitution, principles can only be inferred by the 
observation of facts.43 It is quite telling that, as the epigraph of his book, Park 
40 cLark, English Society, p. 554.
41 evans, The Great Reform Act, p. 67. A door feared by some who had opposed the Bill, as in Peel’s 
words: ‘I was unwilling to open a door which I saw no prospect of being able to close’ (quoted 
ibid., p. 3).
42 ‘The traditional theory of the Constitution is either right or wrong. If it be right, the Consti-
tution is practically obliterated by corrupt usage; and ought to be restored. If it be wrong, the 
practical corruption may be either the only mode, or one of several modes, of escaping from the 
theoretical fallacy. […]’ (Park, The Dogmas, p. X).
43 ‘Gentlemen, I can conceive that, in a country which has a written constitution, the writing 
may still, in one sense, be denominated the constitution, although, by process of time and grad-
ual departure, a different and undeclared mode of carrying on the government may prevail in 
practice; but in a country which has no written constitution, the constitution of that country 
can only be learnt by ascertaining the real mode in which, from time to time, the government 
has been carried on, the powers by which it has been effected, and the checks which have been 
brought into action’ (ibid., pp. 30-31).
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chose a quote by Auguste Comte, ‘Les savants doivent aujourd’hui élever la politique 
au rang des sciences d’observation’. 
Facts, and just facts, are therefore the only evidence of what the English Con-
stitution really is, whereas historians as well as politicians and jurists keep on 
describing a Constitution that has not changed for the last six centuries. Further-
more, there is a linguistic problem as well: everybody has been accustomed for 
too long to speaking a language of constitutional courtesy that does not correspond 
to the truth of things. Powers and relations between them have consequently 
been constantly described in a ceremonious language that gave the wrong im-
pression of a static Constitution, whereas beneath the use of the same officious 
words reality had altered: the use of such language can just lead to further mis-
understanding on the nature of the constitutional settlement and to dangerous 
confusion in the country.
According to Park, the Constitution is similar to a living being: a plant, or even an 
animal.44 Since 1688, it has radically changed, despite the fact that many did not 
perceive it, because they thought that every change was just depending on spe-
cific circumstances. Alterations were therefore considered the contingent fruit of 
necessity, or an aberration of the correct constitutional settlement: were they re-
garded as the positive exception to the rule, or as a distasteful event that it was best 
soon forgotten, those alterations were never accepted for what they really were, i.e. 
lasting elements of the new constitutional settlement. Park emphasized that this 
was especially true for the heart of the British Constitution, namely the relation-
ship between Crown and Parliament and the consequent balance of power.
Park shows how a system previously governed by a balance between the three 
powers of State was transformed into another, in which the House of Commons 
grew absolutely predominant. He therefore denies the dichotomy between leg-
islative and executive power and points out the fact that the Ministry actually 
controls legislative power as far as political relevant laws are concerned, Parlia-
ment being dominated by parties.45 In evidence of that, Park alleges the fact that 
rejection of an important Bill brought in by the Ministry usually leads to their 
resignation. The royal prerogative, on the other hand, drastically declined.
According to this interpretation, the balance of power is still an essential ele-
ment of the English constitution, but it moved into the House of Commons.46 
44 Quoting Sir John James Mackintosh, Parker wrote: ‘government […] is better illustrated by 
comparison with vegetables, or even animals, which may be, in a very high degree, improved by 
skill and care, which may be grievously injured by neglect, or destroyed by violence, but which 
cannot be produced by human contrivance’ (ibid., p. 85).
45 This was, at least, Park’s perception: today some historians find this idea premature.
46 ‘For the last 150 years at least […] the powers of government, which were previously carried 
on principally by force of the prerogative, have been essentially and substantially exercised and 
carried on in the House of Commons […] which has thus come to take a part, and exercise a 
voice, in every act of the cabinet; – that, as a necessary condition to the concurrent preservation 
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Park shows the decisive implications of his analysis, not merely pointing out the 
factual interference between the theoretical competences of legislative and ex-
ecutive powers, but also recognizing that this shift of the balance creates a new 
constitutional system: ‘this is acknowledged here and there, now and then, by 
many; but no writer will broadly lay down this ground, and follow it out in all 
its innumerable consequences, although it is as capable of demonstration as any 
proposition in Euclid’.47
It is not surprising that in his challenge to the received idea of the Constitution, 
Park found in William Blackstone (1723-1780), the author of the Commentaries on 
the Laws of England (1765-1769), his bête noir. The Commentaries had been a very suc-
cessful book, and were part of the education of lawyers and jurists: Blackstone’s 
approach to Constitution had been a little peculiar, and for instance he neglected 
the use of the locution ‘constitutional law’ and expounded the powers of King 
and Parliament while dealing with the rights of individuals. In the Dogmas, Park 
completely refused Blackstone’s celebrated ideas of the English constitution as a 
nearly ideal mixed constitution, of the division of powers and of the balance.
Blackstone had described the Constitution in terms of:
– a mixed constitution (monarchy: Crown; aristocracy: House of Lords; de-
mocracy: House of Commons, freely elected by the people);
– division of powers (Legislature: Parliament + Crown; Executive: Crown; 
Judiciary: judges are independent from executive power, although not 
completely from the legislative, at least as far as the House of Lords retains 
competence);
– balance granted by the royal assent and by the role of impeachment.
Although he was aware of the reduced role played by the royal prerogative, Black-
stone still gave great importance to the executive power of the Crown, and to the 
royal veto, but he forgot that the role of the Crown in the legislative power was 
then just a formal one (this was Park’s opinion, at any rate).
It is noteworthy that Blackstone did not even mention:
– Whigs and Tories;
– the role of the Cabinet;
of the theoretic constitution, in which the supreme power is supposed to reside in three co-equal 
elements, of the crown, the aristocracy, and the commonalty, each of those elements has come 
to be represented […] in the Commons’ house of parliament, in which the supreme power had 
concentrated; and that, as a consequence, collision between these several elements, out of the 
house, has no longer happened, except on extraordinary occasions, because their battles have 
been fought, and their trials of strength made, in the house’ (ibid., pp. 7-8).
47 Ibid., p. 9.
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– the role of the opposition and the instruments used (motions, debates on 
budget…);
–  powers and duties ‘of his Majesty’s great officers of state’, whereas he dealt 
with sheriffs, constables and petty officials… 
Park can therefore easily attack Blackstone on the ground that the Constitution 
he described was far away from reality:
– whereas Blackstone stated that there is a merely executive, or law-execut-
ing government, called to carry into effect what was decided by the legis-
lature, or law-making government, the Ministry ‘by some strange miscon-
ception of their functions’ always resigns when there is a strong contrast as 
to the contents of laws to be approved;
– Blackstone maintained that the legislative power of the Crown resides in 
the veto, but it has not been exercised for a very long time;48 on the other 
hand, many bills are introduced by officers of the Crown in their official 
character and on their responsibility as such;
– instead of a legislative power governed by fluctuating majorities, the Par-
liament displays a highly organized system, based on parties;
–  a strict separation of King, Lords and Commons is only formal.49
The Constitution had been completely transformed in the last century and a half, but 
its forms were in many instances rigidly preserved, therefore such a great alteration 
went nearly unobserved, and sometimes it was thought that the original Constitu-
tion still existed, and that the deviations from it were casual corruptions only. 
According to Park, there was a new system of checks and balances, which had 
moved into the House of Commons, because it is necessary for the balance to be 
preserved where the whole power is exercised. This accounts for Park’s opposition 
to the Reform Bill, since he thought that it could put the balance in real danger. 
Moreover, Park does not think that a strict division of powers is necessary; on 
the contrary, it would have the serious drawback of hindering or at any rate delay-
ing the action of the State.50 Anyway, freedom can be protected in other ways, and 
48 The last monarch to withhold royal assent to a Bill passed by the Parliament was Queen Ann, 
on the Scottish Militia Bill in 1708. During George III’s reign recourse to the royal veto had been 
contemplated. See above, § 2.
49 Park quotes Blackstone’s claim that ‘if ever it should happen that the independence of any 
one in the three branches of the legislature should be lost, or that it should become subservi-
ent to the views of either of the other two, there would be an end of our constitution’, and then 
proceeds to sharp criticism: ‘now, gentlemen, if «there would be an end of our constitution», 
there HAS been an end of our constitution long before the time when Mr. J. Blackstone wrote; 
for no such essential independence then existed, or has ever since existed, except in physical or 
external form’ (ibid., p. 41).
50 Ibid., pp. 115 ff.
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it is in this perspective that Park highlights the role of public opinion. The role 
of separation of powers in the British Constitution having long depended on the 
interpretation of Montesquieu and De Lolme, today widespread belief that their 
ideas were the result of a misunderstanding can endorse Park’s opinion on the 
matter. Far from being a model of separation of powers, the English Constitution 
entails in fact their integration and even union through the constitutional bal-
ance. The organic relationship between government and parliamentary majority 
is anyhow mitigated by the possibility of its dissolution: on the one hand, Parlia-
ment can unseat the Cabinet with a vote of no confidence; on the other hand, the 
Cabinet can always ask the monarch to dissolve Parliament.
Park maintains also that two difficult goals have to be reached. First of all, stabil-
ity in the State must be assured, without resorting to low tricks, such as corrup-
tion – if his opposition to parliamentary reform hints at Toryism, his vehement 
denunciation of political corruption is in the purest Whig tradition. Besides, 
people’s freedom must be established, but prejudices of the mass cannot be al-
lowed to overcome scientific truths. With the benefit of hindsight, it can be said 
that such a balance was probably more difficult to achieve than the one between 
powers in the English constitution… 
Overall, Park’s position was in some way curious: he lined up with the most con-
servative Tories in their strong opposition to the Reform Bill; on the other hand, 
his interpretation of the Constitution was strictly indebted to Whig historians. 
Clearly, he was proud of his independence of thought, proved by the attacks he had 
to face both from Tories and from Whigs, which he mentions in the dignified clos-
ing speech in the last lecture of his course.51 But such a detachment, in the turmoil 
of the crucial year 1832, perhaps decided the fate of his thesis, which met little suc-
cess. Anyhow, although not a very successful book when it was written, The Dogmas 
of the Constitution succeeded in demonstrating that the English Constitution of the 
time did not date back to the Middle Ages, but had evolved since 1688. Inciden-
tally, Park destroyed also the myth of the ancient Constitution, which had been a 
weapon in the political and historical debate at least since the Glorious Revolution, 
and showed how the constitutional order in the 1830s (the same order he fears 
the Reform Bill would overthrow) was largely indebted to an evolution that had 
brought forth a new balance, new institutions, and a new relationship between 
them. In many ways, Park’s readings anticipated those included in a more popular 
book written a generation later, Walter Bagehot’s The English Constitution (1867).52
51 ‘In what I have offered you, I have consulted no man’s pleasure, – I have performed no man’s 
bidding. By Whigs I have been called Tory, – by Tories I have been called Whig; – perhaps the 
best proof that I am independent of either. Like an honest man, I have perhaps offended both 
parties’ (ibid., p. 124).
52 Cf. vareLa suanzes, Estudio preliminar, pp. 50-51 (it is important to bear in mind that Bagehot 
attended King’s Collge ten years after the appearance of The Dogmas of the Constitution).
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Abstract
The rejuvenating approach to Roman law taken by the German Pandectist School in the 
19th century exerted a great influence far beyond the boundaries of Germany. This phe-
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an increasing gap between the various legislations issued by European countries. Within 
Europe, the influence of the Pandectist School was particularly strong on Italian legal 
culture. The development of translations of German legal handbooks was particularly 
encouraged by Italian Romanistic scholars after the national unification, as an emblem-
atic component of a general project for the diffusion of German legal culture in Italy. The 
translations were increasingly directed to original works, especially due to the multitude 
of notes provided by translators, which contributed to the critical revision of German eru-
dition, namely by comparing it to Italian legislation. Especially the version of the Leh-
rbuch der Pandekten by Carl Ludwig Arndts, written by Filippo Serafini, and the one 
of Bernhard Windscheid’s Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, carried out by Carlo Fadda 
and Paolo Emilio Bensa, played an important role in the development of the studies of 
Roman and private law in Italy.
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Introduction
In the 19th century the German Pandectist School, which represented the leading 
authority of German legal science at that time, took a rejuvenating approach to 
Roman law, in order to construct a system of contemporary private law suitable 
for the particular needs of the modern society. This methodology exerted a great 
influence far beyond the boundaries of Germany. In fact, the success of this ap-
proach, and especially its international influence, can be considered as one of the 
“centralising forces” of European legal history. 
This particular connotation becomes even more significant considering the 
simultaneous emergence of national codifications as the opposing “decentralis-
ing force”, which led to an increasing gap between the various legislations issued 
by European countries. This produced a break in the centuries-old tradition of 
continuity represented by the Roman-Canon ius commune. 
As first important consideration, we have to notice that the success of Ger-
man Pandectist School and the development of national codifications are concur-
rent phenomenons. At first sight the codification of private law could be consid-
ered as the end of the direct application of Roman law in legal practice. We refer 
above all to well-known Art. 7 of the Act Promulgating the Code Napoléon, dated 
21 March 1804, which abrogated formally the roman sources. 
This wasn’t the case of Germany: as the well-known Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
came into force only in 1900, in the meanwhile the leading source of law was rep-
resented by German Pandectists. The great success of their methodology all over 
Europe can be considered as an important sign: Roman law still represented an 
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unavoidable source to interpret the new codes, to resolve doctrinal disputes, and 
to fill gaps in the law too. In other words, Roman law remained «an indispensa-
ble tool», and not only a historical introduction to modern private law: therefore, 
we cannot exclude a «substantial continuity» between the tradition of the ius 
commune and the Civil codes.1
1 – The influence of german pandectist school on italian legal science
Within Europe, the influence of the German Pandectist School was particularly 
strong on Italian legal science, especially after the promulgation of the first Ital-
ian Civil Code in 1865. It is well known that this Code was mostly influenced 
by the French model of the Code Napoléon. However, the methodology offered by 
German Pandectists became soon very useful to Italian jurists. A dual issue has to 
be dealt with, namely how to elaborate suitable interpretative tools for the new-
born Civil Code, and how to provide cases and materials for legal practice, that 
were not yet developed directly upon the promulgation. 
As second fundamental consideration to our reflection, we have to remember 
that the founding fathers of Italian private law were at the same time the most 
influential Romanistic scholars and had been trained in Germany by Pandectists. 
Therefore, they emphasized the value of Pandect-science as one of the best sourc-
es of principles for the Italian interpreter.
The development of Italian translations of German legal handbooks, as an em-
blematic component of a general project for the diffusion of German legal culture 
in Italy, was particularly encouraged by Italian Romanistic scholars. These trans-
lations were increasingly directed to original works especially due to the multi-
tude of notes provided by translators. These annotated translations meant to help 
the Italian jurist both on the doctrinal side, by integrating the domestic literature 
(which seldomly reached remarkable scientific levels at that time), and even more 
on the practical side, by providing cases and materials to Italian lawyers. 
Many authors acknowledge a real «strategic attack» launched by Italian Rom-
anistic scholars to promote the German Pandectist model immediately upon 
promulgation of the national Civil Code, which could result in «the sad burial of 
Roman law as the current branch of knowledge and teaching».2 Especially Paolo 
Grossi identifies «an indissoluble link between Italian Risorgimento and the re-
vival of Roman law».3 The full weight given to this discipline in study plans of the 
faculties corresponded not only to «a remarkable scientific production» but also 
to a public office (Vittorio Stella uses the expression munus), in order to defend 
1 Zimmermann, Roman Law, Contemporary Law, European Law. The Civilian Tradition Today, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2001, 3.
2 grossi, Scienza giuridica italiana. Un profilo storico 1860–1950, Giuffrè, Milano, 2000, 40.
3 Ibidem.
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the civil unity against the unavoidable disturbances after the first Italian political 
crisis, which followed the fall of the right-wing government in 1876.4 Therefore, 
we can assert that in the second half of 19th century, by teaching Roman law, Ital-
ian jurists «meant to educate professional men in general and to elevate the legal 
culture of the Nation».5
2 – The strategy of Filippo Serafini
In this “struggle” for the survival of Roman law, as a branch of research and teach-
ing, in a time in which private law was mostly regulated by the Civil Code, we 
have to remember especially one Italian Romanistic scholar. The revival of Rom-
anistic scholarship was greatly strengthened by the «revitalizing strategy» of 
Filippo Serafini (1831-1897).6
He was born in Preore, a village near Trento, then a part of the Austro-Hun-
garian Empire, and taught at the universities of Pavia, Bologna, Rome and, in the 
end and for the longest period of time, Pisa. Thanks to his knowledge of German 
language, he could keep in touch with the most influent German-speaking Euro-
pean legal science. In 1881 he took part in the commission convened in Bern for 
the compilation of the Swiss Federal Code of Duties, the year after in the commis-
sion of coordination for the Italian Code of Commerce, then in the one convened 
in 1889 for the compilation of the Swiss Federal Law of Enforcement and Bank-
ruptcy, which came into force in 1892. 
In 1869 Serafini had taken over the management of the law journal Archivio 
giuridico from Pietro Ellero, who had founded it only one year before in Bologna. 
From the first year of publication, Serafini had already begun with editing the 
comparative column Rivista mensile del movimento giuridico in Germania in the 
journal. It was dedicated to the review of the most important German publica-
tions regarding civil and criminal law, as well as legal history. For a long time it 
had been one of the steadiest sources of information in Italy about German legal 
science, in particular concerning the Romanist branch of the Historical School. 
In 1869, in the fourth volume of the journal Archivio giuridico, Serafini signifi-
cantly urged Italian students to compensate for the poorness of Romanistic teach-
ing, especially by studying «the best handbook of Roman law», namely that of the 
famous professor Windscheid (1817-1892), who had become the most influential 
4 stella, Giuristi, pensatori politici, sociologi, economisti, in Balduino (cur.), Storia letteraria d’Italia, 
new edn, L’Ottocento, 3rd Volume, Piccin-F. Vallardi, Padova-Milano, 1997, 1655. 
5 lanDUcci, Filippo Serafini (10 aprile 1831-10 aprile 1931), (1931) XXI (CV of the complete collection) 
4th Series, Archivio giuridico “Filippo Serafini”, Società tipografica modenese, Modena, 123.
6 grossi, Scienza giuridica italiana, cited above, 41.
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exponent of German Pandectist School.7 Together with the study of Roman law, 
Serafini strongly recommended that students pay attention to legal history, being 
aware of the lack of thorough scientific examinations with regard to this subject. 
As many Italian students decided to study abroad at that time, not being satis-
fied with the purely professional purpose of their undergraduate studies, Serafi-
ni had also promoted a legal history seminar at the University of Pisa. This legal 
history seminar had to be different from academic courses, though similar and 
connected with them. It was aimed at the training of «real scientists, suitable 
for teaching and to increase their national legal literature with original works».8 
Further, it soon won praise abroad, persuading professors at the legal faculty of 
the University of Zagreb to inaugurate a similar one in 1880. In fact, this can be 
considered as another important proof of the circulation of methodologies in Eu-
ropean legal science during the whole XIX century, together with the diffusion of 
translations of foreign legal works.
According to Serafini, whose thinking was to be further developed by his 
followers Biagio Brugi (1855-1934), Francesco Ferrara (1810-1900) and Alfredo 
Rocco (1875-1935), the translation into Italian of the works written by foreign 
legal scholars could be divided into two successive periods. The first had devel-
oped before the unification of Italy and was characterized by a simple outward 
knowledge of foreign doctrines, without remarkable effects on the local legal sci-
ence. On the other hand, we could talk about the second in terms of complete 
reception, which meant real scientific maturity and, finally, the beginnings of an 
independent doctrinal production.
As well as an increasing interest in German works, the main turning point 
was therefore the meaning given to translations, noticed by Serafini himself. 
However, the French influence, which had prevailed in Italy since the promulga-
tion of the Code Napoléon, was still far from extinction. The parallel development 
of the two trends can be nicely illustrated in two ways. Firstly, by comparing the 
titles of the works translated from French and from German in the period be-
tween 1830 and 1865 (when the majority of Italian translations was written). Sec-
ondly, by considering - as decisive proof - the Italian Civil Code of 1942, which is 
a compromise between these two different foreign models. 
The Italian translation of the Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts by Bernhard Wind-
scheid was written by Carlo Fadda (1853-1931) and Paolo Emilio Bensa (1858-
1928) and published in instalments between 1886 and 1902. Therefore, it places 
itself in the second period of complete reception of foreign literature mentioned 
by Serafini, during the “turning-point of the eighties”, which determined the de-
7 serafini, Rassegna d’opere giuridiche tedesche, (1869) IV Archivio giuridico, Tipi Fava e Garagnani, 
Bologna, 342.
8 BUonamici, scolari, serafini, Programma, Statuto e Discorso inaugurale del Seminario storico-giuridico 
di Pisa, (1877) XVIII Archivio giuridico, Tipi Fava e Garagnani, Bologna, 561. 
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cisive transition from the «exegetic» methodology and teaching imported from 
France to the systematic and scientific one of German origin.
Though this period can definitely be considered as the apogee of Italian 
translations of the masterworks written by German legal science, and therefore 
should be rendered a fair tribute to masters like Serafini, Fadda and Vittorio Scial-
oja (1856-1933), we should not forget that this period of intense reception was 
preceded by a slow cultural preparation. Its seeds can really be found in the excel-
lent tradition of studying German legal literature, which started around thirty 
years before Italian political unification. 
In any case, a decisive contribution to the expansion of the Pandectist trend 
all over Italy was surely made by Filippo Serafini, who had hoped for a better and 
deeper knowledge of German juridical culture in Italy. He had studied it since his 
time at the universities of Vienna, Innsbruck, Berlin and Heidelberg, where he 
had attended the courses of Karl Joseph Anton Mittermaier (1787-1867), as well 
as the ones of the most famous Pandectists, like Karl Ludwig Arndts (1803-1878), 
Karl Adolf von Vangerow (1808-1870), Adolf Friedrich Rudorff (1803-1873), Frie-
drich Ludwig Keller (1799-1860). 
Furthermore, Filippo Serafini used to correspond regularly with Rudolf von 
Jhering (1818- 1892). While German legal science was still mostly under the domi-
nating influence of the “Savigny cult”, the author of the famous book Der Kampf 
ums Recht was trying to adapt the old methodologies to the new exigencies of con-
temporary society, by building up a system of “natural jurisprudence”. Maybe it is 
no exaggeration to say that, in the second half of the 19th century, the reputation of 
Jhering was as high as that of Savigny (1779-1861) in the first half. Their methods 
were almost diametrically opposed: Savigny and his school represented the con-
servative, historical tendency, while Jhering believed in a philosophical conception 
of jurisprudence, as a science to be utilized for the further advancement of the mor-
al and social interests of mankind. He had also a vision of a universal comparative 
legal science, that is the most important element to our considerations.
In a letter addressed to Serafini in 1872, Jehring was delighted about the first 
Italian Legal Congress because it not only consolidated the unity of Italy, but it also 
offered the opportunity to realize the important task which history now had en-
trusted to the European peoples, more than ever: «the great conquest of a law in 
common».9 Jehring was glad to notice the leading position assumed in interna-
tional relations by the German and Italian nations, sharing similar political events 
and cultural interests. Above all, they acted as go-betweens by settling the «antago-
nism between the Latin and Germanic races», and therefore they were first in the 
way to the «universality of law, against the triumph of national selfishness».10 
9 Jehring, Lettera n. 19, Rudolf von Jehring a Filippo Serafini, Vienna, settembre 1872, in Behrends (ed.), 
Rudolf von Jehring, Beiträge und Zeugnisse aus Anlaß der einhundertsten Wiederkehr seines Todestages am 
17.9.1992, 2., erweiterte Auflage mit Zeugnissen aus Italien, Wallstein, Göttingen 1992, 136.
10 Ibidem. 
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Jehring gave a really high regard to Filippo Serafini. He noticed himself that 
the Italian scholar had been seen for many years as a kind of «intermediary be-
tween Italian and foreign jurisprudence», «one of the most powerful and tire-
less representatives of foreign legal science in Italy».11 In fact, Serafini gave an 
important contribution to the cancellation of a kind of «ideological mortgage» 
prevailing in Italy toward German-speaking countries at that time, which had 
linked German literature with the Austrian enemy until the Risorgimento.12
Filippo Serafini can really be considered as the «connecting link» between 
German and Italian literature.13 Especially thanks to him, the knowledge of the 
systematic and scientific methodology and of the masterpieces of the Histori-
cal School began to spread copiously in Italy, spurring the revival of Romanistic 
studies by following the example of the improvement which had occured in Ger-
many. By translating German Pandectist literature, Serafini’s “school” therefore 
pleaded the Romanistic cause, spreading «the example of a vigorous and vital 
Roman law, transformed and distorted by the new demands but still developed 
from the same legal, technical and cultural platform presented by the remote 
Pandects of Justinian».14
3 –The opinion of contemporary italian historiography on the issue 
 
Some influential contemporary Italian historiography has noted how, after the 
promulgation of the Italian Civil Code in 1865, under the emphasis of their open-
ing lectures, the great Italian Romanists tried to hide their worries about a pos-
sible loss of topicality for Roman law.
Above all, Paolo Grossi has highlighted the special meaning given to opening 
lectures at Italian universities around the Eighteen Eighties. Gulio Cianferotti 
considers especially the lectures Del diritto positivo e dell’equità, read by Vittorio 
Scialoja in Camerino in 1880, and I criteri tecnici per la ricostruzione giuridica del 
diritto pubblico, given by Vittorio Emanuele Orlando in Palermo in 1889, as the 
main moments in which Italian academic science became aware of its «predomi-
nance plan» over practice as a legal source.15 This plan was to be carried out «by 
11 Ibidem.
12 BeneDUce, Il «giusto» metodo di Emanuele Gianturco. Manuali e generi letterari alle origini della 
«scienza italiana», in Mazzacane (ed.), L’esperienza giuridica di Emanuele Gianturco, Liguori, Na-
poli, 1987, 301.
13 lanDUcci, Filippo Serafini (10 aprile 1831-10 aprile 1931), cited above, 4.
14 grossi, Scienza giuridica italiana, cited above, 41.
15 cianferotti, La prolusione di Orlando. Il paradigma pandettistico, i nuovi giuristi universitari e lo stato 
liberale, (1989) 4 Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico, 998. 
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adopting the Pandectist paradigm», which was realized in fact at least until the 
promulgation of the Italian Civil Code of 1942.16
Franca De Marini Avonzo, on the one hand, acknowledged Bensa’s credit for 
translating and annotating the Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts by Windscheid into 
Italian, and more generally the Pandectists’ one for creating modern Law. On the 
other hand, she criticized the confusion they made between historical and creative 
work, as they passed off the real renewal of law as a simple re-exposition of already 
existing law. In other words, although Pandectists played a leading role in the updat-
ing of positive law hoped for by legislators on the doctrinal side, their attempt to 
justify the introduction of new ideas by disguising them as the habitual revitaliz-
ing use of Roman sources would be open to criticism. But above all, De Marini con-
sidered the traditional reference to Roman law as an excuse for legal policy choices.
We have to notice that the same argument has been put forward to justify 
Savigny’s opposition to codification: according to most of the historiography, the 
founder of the Historical School was forced by the oppression of codification to 
promote a great cultural operation whose aim was «to confirm the necessity of a 
renewal of legal studies by a re-evaluation of Roman Law».17
In Italian jurists’ case, the usual reference to Roman law could be especially a 
way to avoid the “Social Question” emerging between the 19th and 20th centuries, 
which hoped for a revision of liberal codes in favour of the poorer classes. Con-
sequently, the Pandectists tried to use the power of tradition to argue against the 
need for renewal.
According to Antonio Mantello, the functionality of these behaviours to legal 
policy choices becomes even more verifiable nowadays, thanks to a critical as-
sessment of modern codifications. By analysing the doctrinal contribution given 
by Pandectists to positive law, it would be possible to reconstruct their reaction 
to the “Social Question” at that time. In confirmation of the fact that the revival of 
Roman law hid a plan much more complex than a simple defence by Romanists 
of their own subject against codification, Mantello emphasizes the contribution 
also made by Italian experts in private law to «the battle for Roman law».18 
4 – Filippo serafini and the lehrbuch der pandekten by Karl Ludwig Arndts
The translations of the handbooks by German Pandectists, written by the most 
influential scholars of Roman law and private law in Italy, can surely be consid-
ered as an important part of their operation of legal culture.
16 Ibidem. See also p. 1020.
17 tromBetta, Savigny e il Sistema. Alla ricerca dell’ordine giuridico, Cacucci, Bari, 2008, 23.
18 mantello, «Il più perfetto codice civile moderno», a proposito di BGB, diritto romano e que-
stione sociale in Italia, (1996) XCIV(1) Rivista del diritto commerciale e del diritto generale delle ob-
bligazioni, 1105. 
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The first one to remember is the Lehrbuch der Pandekten by Karl Ludwig Arndts, 
which was translated into Italian by Filippo Serafini himself. The first edition 
of Arndts’ masterpiece had been published in Munich in 1852, soon followed by 
several new ones and was reviewed in Italy by Vittorio Scialoja.
Karl Ludwig Arndts was born in Arnsberg, a town of Westphalia, in 1803 and 
died in Vienna in 1878. After three years of legal studies at the universities of 
Bonn and Heidelberg, he attended Savigny’s lessons in Berlin, which struck him 
strongly. He started his academic career in Bonn and in 1838 refused a position as 
full professor in Breslau to teach in Munich, where he reached the top of his liter-
ary production by composing the famous Pandekten. He took also the chance to 
take part in the Bavarian legislative commission between 1844 and 1847, and in 
the Parliament of Frankfurt between 1848 and 1849. In 1855 he moved to Vienna, 
where he taught until 1874, as he had been chosen for the divulgation in Austria 
of methodology and works by the Romanist branch of the Historical School.
Surely were the Pandekten by Arndts widely renowned, but why did Serafini 
choose to translate them among all the masterworks written by German Pandectists?
First, because he believed they were the most suitable to the Italian legal situa-
tion. They could serve especially as a guidebook for those, among Italian scholars, 
who wanted to rise from sheer practice to the «magnificent theory», as Italian le-
gal literature was still backward at that time. On the one hand, Serafini acknowl-
edged the praiseworthy results of Italian legal practice, as a fruit of that special 
kind of judgement which had also enabled the promulgation of the Civil Code of 
1865. On the other hand, he blamed the shortage of «systematic and colossal» 
doctrinal works, able to embrace all private law like the huge masterworks writ-
ten by German Pandectists.19 
Secondly, the fact that Serafini had already become acquainted with Arndts was 
surely an important factor in his choice to translate Lehrbuch der Pandekten. In 1857 
Serafini had been appointed professor in Pavia by a commission in which Arndts 
himself took part, together with Vangerow, Keller, Rudorff, and Mittermaier. 
Arndts had allowed Serafini to translate his masterwork without asking for any re-
muneration and he also worked together with him on the revision of the translation. 
This fact gives us the opportunity to focus on another important element to 
our consideration: the collaboration offered by German authors to Italian jurists 
on the translations of their own works. Previously, Savigny had co-operated with 
the Italian translators of his masterpieces too, in order to assure the accuracy of 
their work. We remember especially the Italian version of Das Recht des Besitzes 
by Pietro Conticini (1805-1871), which was completed in Berlin under Savigny’s 
guidance and published in 1839, and the translation of Geschichte des römischen Re-
chts im Mittelalter realized by the Turinese Emanuele Bollati (1822-) between 1854 
19 serafini, Trattato delle Pandette del Cav. Lodovico Arndts, Professore di diritto romano dell’università 
di Vienna, Prima versione italiana sulla settima edizione tedesca arricchita di copiose note, appendici e 
confronti, Volume I, Tipi Fava e Garagnani, Bologna, 1872, Prefazione del traduttore, V-VI.
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and 1857. Savigny’s interest in translations of his works is well-known: Laura 
Moscati has pointed out how he usually was in correspondence with those who 
showed an interest in his teaching.20
It is interesting to note that Antonio Salvotti (1789-1866), the well-known 
judge of the Austrian government, who is sadly famous for the political trials 
taking place in Lombardo-Veneto between 1820 and 1821 and involving Silvio 
Pellico too, and who had been in his youth Savigny’s follower in Landshut, took 
a special interest in the accuracy of both translations. Besides taking part in the 
transcription of the manuscript of Institutiones by Gaius, Salvotti strove for the 
diffusion of Savigny’s thinking and works in the Austrian-ruled Lombardo-Vene-
to and in Austria. In 1838 he revised part of the Italian translation of Das Recht des 
Besitzes by Conticini, and took interest in the diffusion of Geschichte des römischen 
Rechts im Mittelalter too, being involved by Savigny in the events of the translation 
made by Bollati.
This special co-operation between authors and translators exemplifies the 
cosmopolitan feature of 19th century European legal science, despite the chal-
lenges that national codifications could mean for legal doctrine. Serafini himself 
attached even more importance to the intellectual exchanges between the dif-
ferent European peoples in the period of national codifications than in the age 
of the ius commune, in which these intellectual exchanges were customary. To 
testify the importance of translations to European legal culture as a considerable 
opportunity for exchange, we think it convenient to remember a translation into 
modern Greek of Lehrbuch der Pandekten by Arndts, published in 1889. What is 
surely remarkable is the fact that the Greek translator Kiriakos, although he was a 
great expert of the German language and literature, declared he had taken «great 
advantage» of the Italian translation.21
In almost a decade, different and subsequent editions of the Italian transla-
tion of Arndts’s Lehrbuch der Pandekten were published. It is interesting to notice 
that they grew very different one from each other. In the «Preface to the fourth 
edition» of his translation, published in 1882, Serafini clarified that he especially 
had expanded and elaborated the notes, in order to turn the translation into an 
original work. Therefore, it was no longer a work by Arndts, but a new one, due 
to all the legal literature which had been incorporated: both ancient and modern, 
Italian and foreign. 
No less important is the fact that Serafini changed the reference to the us-
ers of his work, too. Instead of talking about a «book meant for scholars», as he 
had done in the «Preface to the first edition», ten years later he noticed how his 
20 moscati, Da Savigny al Piemonte. Cultura storico-giuridica subalpina tra la Restaurazione e l’Unità, 
Carucci, Roma, 1984, 150.
21 Bollettino bibliografico, 2. Arndtss. Ρώμαικον δίκαιον ἐκ τῆς δεκάτης τρίτης γερμανίκης ἐκδοσέως 
τῆς γενομένης έπιμελεῖα L. Pfaff καὶ F. Hofmann μετάθραστεν καὶ πολλᾶις σημεῖωσεσιν αὐξητεν ὑπο 
I. Th. Kiriakos. – Ἐν Ατῆναις, Κάρολος Βίλμπεργ 1889, (1890) XLIV Archivio giuridico, Tipi Fava e 
Garagnani, Bologna, 596.
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translation could not only be used by scholars but also by legal practitioners, 
which he initially might not have expected.22 To make his work more suitable 
for legal practice, Serafini enriched the notes by citing decisions of Italian courts 
and compared them to legal doctrine. In fact, one of the reasons why he chose 
to translate the work by Arndts, among all the masterworks written by German 
Pandectists, was the evident merit to expose the current law, instead of its his-
torical development: Serafini intended to give a practical style to his translation.
Similarly, he wanted to ensure for his law journal Archivio giuridico the widest 
co-operation especially by lawyers and judges, in order to get not only ideal con-
tributions but also a steady financial support. Windscheid showed his perplexity 
about the «typically Italian» purpose to deal with different subjects in the same 
law journal, although he viewed the joining of theory and practice for «the cul-
tural and scientific unification of the Italian nation» positively.23
The increase of the work and the amplification of the prospects made it im-
possible for Serafini to edit new editions by himself. For the first edition he 
could already avail himself, not only of Arndts’s suggestions, but also those of his 
young follower Vito Perugia as well as his legal and philological competence. In 
any case, the fourth edition grew different from the first, being practically con-
sidered a team-work: many famous jurists took part in it, like Vittorio Scialoja, 
Carlo Fadda, Pietro Cogliolo (1859-1940), Biagio Brugi, and many others. It was 
clearly the beginning of a kind of «ample intellectual project», to which Paolo 
Grossi refers in order to explain how Serafini especially encouraged the cultural 
influence of the German model around about the 1880s, also by training an in-
creasing number of young followers to seriously study German legal science.24 So 
Serafini urged everyone who was writing monographs or other kinds of publica-
tions about the law of contracts and the law of torts to take part in producing the 
new editions, by asking them heartily not to hesitate to share useful improve-
ments to the Italian version of Lehrbuch der Pandekten. 
All in all, it is especially important to note that Serafini’s plan represented not 
simply a passion for German things, but that it was a way to restore the study of 
Roman law in Italy. According to the senator Francesco Buonamici (1832-1921), 
who commemorated Serafini’s death, this was exactly the leading thinking of his 
entire life. It is admitted that the revival of the study of Roman law was closely 
linked to the renewal of a civil society, which distinguished this period in the 
history of Italy. 
22 serafini, Trattato delle Pandette del Cav. Lodovico Arndts, cited above, Prefazione del traduttore, VII.
23 Testimonianze-Zeugnisse, [84], in Behrends (ed.), Rudolf von Jehring, cited above, 128.
24 grossi, Scienza giuridica italiana, cited above, 41-42.
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5 –Paolo Emilio Bensa, Carlo Fadda and the lehrbuch des pandektenrechts by 
Bernhard Windscheid
There are significant analogies between Serafini’s translation and the Italian ver-
sion of Windschied’s Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts created ten years later by Fadda 
and Bensa: they both have a lot of notes, which aroused even more interest and 
success than the translation itself. In fact, especially thanks to the notes written 
by these two great Italian scholars to give a commentary on the German original 
text, their translation became surely the one which contributed the most, not 
only to the diffusion of German erudition in Italy, but also to its critical revision, 
namely by comparing it to Italian legislation. As the notes range over various 
legal subjects, such as private law and public law, and general theory of law and 
legal practice, we can gather from this that Fadda and Bensa had great erudition 
and capacity to excel in all these different disciplines. 
Carlo Fadda was born in Cagliari in 1853 and died in Rome in 1931. He be-
came one of the most eminent Romanistic scholars in Italy halfway between the 
19th and 20th centuries, by teaching Roman law at several universities and finally 
in Naples. Being a connoisseur of the trends of German legal science, he joined 
the Pandectist methodology and encouraged its reception in Italy. At the same 
time he distinguished himself at the Bar and in several public positions, being 
appointed senator of the Kingdom of Italy in 1912 and member of the committee 
for the revision of Italian codes in 1924. 
According to Vincenzo Arangio-Ruiz (1884-1964), one of the main followers 
of his, Fadda had conceived the idea of a work suitable not only for the teaching 
of Roman law, but also for the creation of a sound starting point for the study of 
private and commercial law in Italy.25 It had to be based on the huge scientific 
production by German Pandectist School, which Fadda had already thorough 
examined. 
Just when Fadda started to conceive this project at the University of Genoa, 
Bensa was teaching there too. This was a lucky coincidence, as Bensa had attended 
Windscheid’s lessons at the University of Leipzig during the summer semester 
in 1877, being therefore particularly qualified for the translation of Lehrbuch des 
Pandektenrechts. In 1878 he had also published a review of Windscheid’s research 
Wille und Willenserklärung. 
The young scholar was born in Genoa in 1858, and died there in 1928. Besides 
being a well-educated man in philosophical, historical and literary subjects, he 
taught private law at the University of Genoa for forty-four years and practised 
the legal profession for his entire life. Like Fadda, he was appointed senator of 
the Kingdom of Italy in 1908 and member of the committee for the revision of 
Italian codes in 1924. After he had fought as a volunteer during the First World 
25 arangio-rUiZ, In memoria di Carlo Fadda, in Congresso giuridico nazionale in memoria di Carlo Fad-
da (Cagliari-Sassari 23–26 maggio 1955), Giuffrè, Milano, 1968, 3–21.
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War, he took part in the committee of enquiry on the causes and responsibilities 
of Caporetto in 1918. 
The importance of the work by Fadda and Bensa rests on the original notes they 
added to their translation. In fact, they opened the scientific debate especially on 
matters of which, unlike German Pandectists, most Italian scholars were still una-
ware. Therefore, these notes show their intent to develop from the sheer reception 
of foreign legal science to its adaptation to the legislation in force in Italy, which 
was a typical trend of that time. To tell the truth, providing notes in the margin 
of the translation was not a peculiarity of these two Italian jurists. This kind of 
notes can also be found in the Italian translations of French works written right 
after the Restoration, when the influence of French models was at its height. These 
notes had a decidedly comparative purpose, in order to search for similarities and 
differences between the various legal systems. For example, in that period new 
translations of the masterpieces by Domat and Pothier into Italian were realized, 
complete with notes comparing French legislation with Italian law, in order to em-
phasize their «common Roman background».26 Therefore, we can assert that the 
real aim of these translations consisted not in a mere respect for foreign models, 
but in a reunion with the native tradition of Roman law, by means of legal com-
parison. Later, the drafters of the first Italian Civil Code of 1865 were still trying to 
justify the choice of Code Napoléon as a model for Italian codification by referring to 
the topos of the substantial continuity between the latter and Roman law.
The real peculiarity of the notes by Fadda and Bensa consisted in their hav-
ing been written at a turning point in the development of Italian legal studies. 
Thanks to the contribution made respectively by the Roman law scholar Fadda, 
and by the private law expert Bensa, at the same time the notes represent the 
completion of the previous period of expansion of Romanistic studies as well as 
the sound starting point of the new scientific study of Italian private law.
Although the great interest and success aroused by the Italian notes can be 
considered as a similarity shared by the Italian translations of Arndts’s and Wind-
scheid’s masterworks, the working procedure chosen respectively by Serafini and 
by Fadda and Bensa is really much different. In their translation, Fadda and Bensa 
chose to keep as close as possible to Windscheid’s thinking, while they used their 
notes to develop a kind of “active reaction” to the translation, an explanatory 
commentary to the original version, feeling themselves free from all ties of ac-
curacy which distinguishes their translation instead. By presenting their notes 
at the end of every book, clearly separated from the translation of the original 
text, they made it easy for the reader to distinguish their personal opinions from 
Windscheid’s thinking. 
This working procedure is actually very different from the one chosen by 
Serafini to traslate Lehrbuch der Pandekten by Arndts. First, even in the translation 
26 napoli, La cultura giuridica europea in Italia, Repertorio delle opere tradotte nel sec. XIX, I. Tendenze e 
centri dell’attività scientifica, Jovene, Napoli, 1987, 41.
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of the original text by Arndts, Serafini felt himself freer than Fadda and Bensa, 
who always tried to find the Italian word expressing the same meaning of the 
original in the most literal way. Beyond the greater or lesser accuracy of the trans-
lation, the main difference between their modus operandi consists in Serafini’s 
choice to juxtapose his own contribution to the translation of the original notes 
written by Arndts. In this way, he made it really difficult for the reader to distin-
guish between his notes and Arndts’s thinking. In the fourth edition of the Italian 
version of Lehrbuch der Pandekten even more than in the first, it is very difficult to 
compare the original notes added to the text by Arndts himself to the translation 
provided by Serafini. Without always distinguishing his own additions from the 
original content, Serafini also changed the order of the notes written by Arndts, 
enlarged them by providing new citations of foreign and Italian doctrine and his 
own observations, and even added many new notes. 
In the «Preface» of the second edition of the second volume, which was pub-
lished in 1875 (only three years after the first edition), Serafini himself informed 
the reader about the alterations he had made in the translation, by adding refer-
ences to the more up-to-date monographs, new comparisons with Pandects, pro-
visions of the Italian Civil Code and the judicial decisions of Italian law courts. In 
this way he emphasized once again the possibility to make the theoretical teach-
ing suitable for legal practice too. Sometimes Serafini took the opportunity of 
these juxtapositions to pay attention to the Italian context, which was not exam-
ined at all by Arndts. For example, regarding the concept of law of the Pandects, 
whose value is confirmed by Arndts in spite of codification, Serafini cites the Ital-
ian Civil Code of 1865 too, emphasizing its decidedly Romanistic background. 
Instead, on the matter of codification, Arndts had mentioned only Austrian and 
German Codes (such as the Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht des Königlisch-Preussis-
chen Staaten of 1794) besides the Code Napoléon.
While they managed to complete the translation of the original text of the 
Pandects and Windscheid’s notes, Fadda and Bensa didn’t finish their work of 
annotation and commentary. This operation was carried on by another two able 
Romanist scholars, Pietro Bonfante (1864-1932) and Fulvio Maroi (1891-1954): 
anyway, their notes seem to stop at the third book of Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 
on the subjects of property and possession. 
Nonetheless, we can assert that the main purpose of the hard work under-
taken by Fadda and Bensa had already been done. In fact, they had succeded in 
realizing the essential basis for the development of an Italian science of private 
law, by elaborating a wide-ranging “General Part” of Italian private law, which 
inspired all later scientific production. Therefore, it is admitted that Fadda and 
Bensa elaborated the general theory of Italian law, taking inspiration from the 
methodology of the German Pandectist School, but mitigating the excesses of 
dogmatic abstraction, thanks to the references to the legislation in force in Italy. 
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Conclusion 
This short reflection upon the most important Italian translation of German 
Pandectist literature illustrates what probably were the main functions of the re-
ception of German legal science in Italy. 
First, it is admitted that this phenomenon coincided with a main turning 
point for Italian legal history. In the second half of the 19th century, the work of 
assimilation and comparison with foreign cultures, mainly represented by Ger-
man and French models, contributed to make the “newborn” Italian people aware 
of their national characteristics. This can be seen, for example, in the multiple 
references to the Italian legal context in the notes written by Fadda and Bensa in 
their translation of the Lehrbuch of Windscheid. 
The comparative method which gained ground thanks to the translation, and 
especially thanks to the annotation of foreign legal literature, accustomed Italian 
jurists to comparing the laws of the various European nations, in order to search 
for similarities and differences, and above all to develop a passion for scientific 
research. It is admitted that German legal science played an important role by 
spreading methods of research, and in developing the habit and passion for it. 
Consequently, this influenced how the mission of the Italian jurist was con-
ceived: it was hoped that he could play an active role in Italian society as “jurist-
scientist”, personally devoted to show politicians the way to a new legislation. 
The application of the German scientific method therefore guaranteed a signifi-
cant presence of jurists in Italian society, and the value of this method was pro-
moted in comparison with the French method of «Exégèse». In short, by coming 
into contact with the German Pandectist School, Italian jurists were encouraged 
to deepen the scientific approach to legal matters. 
Therefore, the Pandectist methodology can surely be considered an impor-
tant stage -though later overcome- in the development of legal culture in Italy, as 
well as in Germany and in the other countries which went through it. 
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Abstract
The increasing convergence of law, particularly private and commercial law in the We-
stern legal systems is among the most debated issues in comparative law studies. This pa-
per analyzes legal integration of private (and commercial) law in the U. S. and in the EU 
legal systems, and aims at comparing – in a nutshell – actors, methods, strategies and 
outcomes of this phenomenon in the two different institutional settings. Legal integra-
tion initiatives are part of a coherent plan to support economic transactions with a legal 
structure that encourages enterprise and reduces costs. The motivation for these changes 
is economic, but the engine driving legal integration is essentially political and cultural, 
and therefore is closely linked to the institutional setting and the legal tradition(s) in 
which legal integration takes place.
Keywords
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1. Legal integration of private law: comparing two models
The issue of the increasing convergence of law, particularly private and commer-
cial law in the Western legal systems is among the most debated questions in 
comparative law studies1. In Europe this phenomenon is strictly interconnected 
with the existence of a sui generis supra-national organization like the European 
Union. In order to create an internal market – which is the central aim of the 
EC/EU since the beginning – it has exercised its legislative competence in many 
fields of member States’ private and commercial law, thereby accelerating the ap-
proximation of member States’ national laws. The increasing bulk of EC/EU law 
is one of the main causes of the creation of a European private law and this phe-
nomenon of “Europeanization” of national laws lies at the very core of European 
legal integration which happens through the interplay among many actors, par-
ticularly EU and national legislators, EU and national judges, law professors. The 
role played by scholars has been particularly prominent in recent years. Their 
engagement at the EU level has led in 2009 to the drafting of a sort of European 
civil code, named “The Draft Common Frame of Reference” (DCFR)2. Although 
this product has not been adopted so far by the EU institutions as binding leg-
1 merryman, On the Convergence (and the Divergence) of the Civil Law and the Common Law (1987) 17 
Stanford J of Int L 357; GordLey, “Common law” v. “Civil law”. Una distinzione che va scomparendo?, in 
Cendon (cur.), Scritti in onore di Rodolfo Sacco: la comparazione giuridica alle soglie del 3° millennio, 
I, Giuffrè, Milano, 1994, 559 ff. 
2 study GrouP on a euroPean civiL code/research GrouP on ec Private LaW (eds), Principles, Defi-
nitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference (Full Edition), 
Sellier, Munich, 2009.
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islation3, it certainly is the most notable step of the EU private law integration 
project. Besides the traditional actors, new ones are emerging, such as the Euro-
pean Law Institute (ELI), an independent organization set up in 2011 that aims to 
enhance the quality of the European legal integration process. 
At first glance, there seems to be a similarity of actors, trends and possibly re-
sults of EU legal integration with the similar process that has developed in the 
U.S.A., especially in the Twentieth century. There, the allocation of legislative and 
judicial competences, divided between federal and state level, formally attributes 
competence in private law matters to the states. However, many factors, such as 
the extensive interpretation by the federal Supreme Court of the constitutional 
clauses relating to competences impinging on private and commercial law; the ex-
istence of a common legal education that creates a homogeneous mentality among 
lawyers throughout the nation; the unity of the legal language; the “restating” ac-
tivity successfully carried out by the American Law Institute (ALI) under the initia-
tive of prominent law professors and practitioners; and many other factors have 
led to a very high degree of harmony in the field of private and commercial law. 
We believe that a comparison between the two experiences of legal integra-
tion – pointing out similarities and differences – can be extremely useful in order 
to understand the current issues and future perspectives of the legal integration 
process in the EU as well as in the rest of the world. This paper analyzes legal inte-
gration of private (and commercial) law in USA and EU and aims at comparing – in 
a nutshell – actors, methods, strategies and outcomes of this phenomenon in the 
two different institutional settings. The general assumption is that legal integra-
tion initiatives are part of a coherent plan to support economic transactions with 
a legal structure that encourages enterprise and reduces costs. The motivation for 
these changes is economic, but we will show that the engine driving legal integra-
tion is essentially political and cultural, and therefore is closely linked to the insti-
tutional setting and the legal tradition(s) in which legal integration takes place4. 
3 Yet, on 26 April 2010 the EU Commission set up an Expert Group on a Common Frame of 
Reference in the area of European Contract Law. This Group was entrusted with the task of car-
rying out a Feasibility Study exploring the possibility of a future European contract law instru-
ment, using the DCFR as the starting point. This Feasibility Study was published on 3 May 2011. 
On this basis the EU Commission drafted a Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European 
Sales Law (COM/2011/635 final), which was presented on 11 October 2011. This proposal for 
an Optional Instrument contains rules applicable to cross-border transactions for the sale of 
goods, for the supply of digital contents and for related services, in cases where the parties to a 
contract agree to do so. As such, the proposal represents a significant scaling back of the origi-
nal DCFR proposal, thus limited to a significantly narrower spectrum of transactions. 
4 rosett, Unification, Harmonization, Restatement, Codification, and Reform in International Commer-
cial Law (1992) XL Am.J.Comp.L. 683 f.
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2. The idea of legal integration: historical overview
In these pages the expression “legal integration” is used as a “locution valise” apply-
ing to different forms of production of legal rules, by which similar, convergent or 
uniform legal solutions have historically emerged in the field of law, private and 
commercial, among different legal systems. As such, legal integration has been the 
response to the need to overcome the unavoidable fragmentation of the law among 
the world’s people and nations throughout history. Indeed, the diversity of the law 
governing different societies is a fact which relates to the essence of any legal order 
and is supported by a variety of driving forces such as tradition, history, the speci-
ficity of each national culture, the absence of a supra-national legislative authority 
in the international community, the absence of a universal legal language. 
The need to develop common ways to handle practical problems of people 
from different countries, regulated by different laws, has been felt since ancient 
times and was once dealt with by making recourse to Roman law. In the Middle 
Ages, jus commune developed from Justinian texts was used throughout Europe as 
common law, overcoming local diversities of the law, as well as a basis for trans-
national commercial law. 
The call for legal approximation has been subsequently further fostered by 
the formation of the nation States in Europe. The first efforts to contrast nation-
al diversities in the law started in the Nineteenth century and were focused on 
the approximation of the conflict of law rules. Indeed, in a context of growing le-
gal nationalism, the only way to handle international legal problems was to find 
the right national rule applicable to the case. In a cultural context dominated 
by legal positivism, any activity of legal integration was eminently focused on 
legislative law5. 
At the turn of the Nineteenth and at the beginning of the Twentieth century 
the growth of trans-border commercial relationships, facilitated by technical 
progress in communication and transport, made the quest for legal uniformity 
among nations more pressing. The first relevant steps in this direction were 
a series of international conventions on intellectual property (1883 and 1886), 
carriage of goods by rail (1890), collisions between vessels (1910), conflict of 
law rules concerning marriage (1902) and divorce (1902), the guardianship of 
minors (1905), etc. Supported by faith in the progress of humankind, which 
prevailed in positivistic ideology, legal integration was regarded as an aim in 
itself and some scholars even advocated the drafting of a universal codification 
of private law, envisaged as “Weltprivatrecht” (Zitelman) or as “droit commun leg-
silatif” (Lambert). 
World War I swept away these utopian visions, but not the need for legal in-
tegration and unification of private law. This idea regained importance when rel-
evant international bodies, existing before the first World War, like the Hague 
5 ferreri, Unificazione, Uniformazione, in Dig. IV, Disc. Priv., Sez. civ., XIX, Utet, Torino, 1999, 504 ff. 
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Conference on Private International Law (1893) or the Comité Maritime Interna-
tional (1897), resumed working on it, supported by the newly set up League of 
Nations (1919) to which at that time belonged both the International Labour Or-
ganization (ILO, 1919) and the Institut international pour l’unification du droit privé 
(UNIDROIT, 1926). 
It was only after World War II that the legal integration activities became 
more difficult. The international context was radically changed. The U.S. A. sub-
stituted Europe as the leading world’s economy. The ideological opposition be-
tween East and West, together with the economic contrasts between the rich 
North and the poor South of the world, reshaped the contours of the concept of 
legal integration of private law. The latter could be now conceived only with ref-
erence to international relations between the Western capitalistic economies, 
sometimes taking into account the special needs of the developing countries, 
and with a much stronger involvement of the U.S. (who had stepped out of the 
negotiations in previous uniform laws). When later on socialist legal systems 
were added to the scope of legal integration activities, these had to take into ac-
count many political issues beside the technical ones. As a consequence, the lim-
its of legal integration and uniformation activities became more evident. 
These problems are well reflected in the preparation of a uniform law for the 
international sale of goods, one of the most important topics in the perspective 
of the international business. This enterprise started in 1929 under the initiative 
of Ernst Rabel and culminated first with two uniform laws in 1964 (Uniform Law 
for the International Sale of Goods, ULIS and Uniform Law of the Formation of 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, ULFIS). These were dominated by 
the problem of overcoming divergences between the civil law and common law 
traditions. The dissatisfaction with these two conventions that were not widely 
adopted led to the UN Convention for the International Sale of Goods of Vienna 
(CISG, 1980), drafted by the United Nations Commission of International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL, set up in 1966). This time the preparatory works of the conven-
tion took place with the socialist and the developing countries. In the UN con-
vention many traces have been left of the political questions underpinning the 
convention and relating to the necessity to combine the needs of widely different 
legal traditions – questions that could not be solved in a always clear-cut way, 
such as the principle of freedom of form, or the requirement of the determina-
tion of the price for a valid contract and many others6. 
The end of the Twentieth century has witnessed the fall of the Berlin wall and 
the failure of the socialist political and economic systems. The opening of the 
former socialist countries (China is one of the prominent examples) to a market 
economy – a phenomenon which is related to globalization in its manifold forms 
– has boosted legal integration as never before. In the field of private and com-
6 BoneLL, Comparazione giuridica e uniformazione del diritto, in Alpa et alii, Diritto privato compara-
to, 3rd edn, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2004, 63 ff.
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mercial law, legal integration fostered by globalization implies a spontaneous 
phenomenon of imitation of Western legal models by non-Western legal tradi-
tions. This circulation of legal models is not radically different from the one that 
took place in the Nineteenth and Twentieth century with reference to the Euro-
pean codifications or doctrines. The French civil code or German Pandectistic doc-
trine have been transplanted in many European and non-European countries by 
way of political imposition (e.g., Napoleonic conquests, colonialism) or because 
of their intrinsic cultural prestige (Germanic pandectistic school in Western Eu-
rope, Eastern Europe and Russia, U.S. A., Latin America, etc.; Code Napoléon in 
Italy after the end of the Napoleonic domination)7. Despite the wide-spread rhet-
oric centred on the need for a democratization of non-Western nations, today the 
driving forces of the current global legal integration are far more economic than 
political or cultural, and are centred in the efforts of imitation of a economic ver-
sion of the “rule of law” concept by many non-Western legal cultures8. 
3. Advantages and drawbacks of legal integration
We have anticipated that the motivation of legal integration has always been eco-
nomic: the need to govern economic transactions between people regulated by 
different laws pushed towards legal integration. Today, global legal integration 
purpose uniformation of the law is highly considered. Legal differences are de-
creasing even between Western and non-Western systems, at least in economi-
cally sensitive topics. In addition, many lawyers around the world think that legal 
integration and uniformation is the natural end of comparative law. The advan-
tages of legal integration have clearly an economic nature. Yet, faith in this process 
is no longer absolute, as the critical eyes of the legal anthropologist have guarded 
against the risks that may derive from uniformation of the law. Law as a cultural 
product of human societies is not only different in every society, but changes and 
evolves continuously, just as language and culture do. Its living dimension is vari-
ety and change, and this holds true also for harmonized or uniformed legal rules 
and models. In order to fulfil their goal of encouraging international business, 
they need to be open to modifications. Legal variety and change necessarily imply 
competition of legal models in the global arena. This is an asset for legal evolution, 
because it facilitates the prevalence of the rule or model that better fits the chang-
ing needs of law users. The risk of an increasing and all-encompassing uniforma-
tion of the law is that it reduces the models available for legal competition and de-
velopment. In addition, any imposed uniformity bears the risk that the dominant 
rule be that of the stronger culture, with an evident (but unjustified) sacrifice of 
7 sacco, Introduzione al diritto comparato, in Trattato di diritto comparato diretto da Sacco, Utet, 
Torino, 1992, 147 ff.
8 Bussani, Il diritto dell’Occidente. Geopolitica delle regole globali, Einaudi,Torino, 2010, 48 ff. 
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the weaker ones. It must be noted that these risks have not only a cultural value, 
but also a technical one: A ‘poor’ uniformation (because grounded on a limited set 
of competing models, or imposed without sufficient attention to the cultural tra-
dition in which it should apply) may lead to a misunderstanding of the uniform 
rule and thereby to its operative failure9. 
4. Forms and formants of legal integration
First of all, the many forms of legal integration and their specific terminology 
need to be distinguished10. The word “unification” refers to forms of legislative le-
gal integration in which usually a supra-national body with regional geographic 
relevance produces rules that shall be applied uniformly in a plurality of national 
systems. This uniformity of operational outcomes is guaranteed by the activity of 
a supra-national body, whose decisions shall be binding in all the domestic sys-
tems under consideration. As such, legal unification is the most powerful means 
of legal integration, whereby the risk of diverging application of the single rule 
in the different legal systems is reduced. A noteworthy example is given by the 
EU legislative competence to issue Regulations that “shall be binding in [their] 
entirety and directly applicable in all member state” (Art. 288 TFEU). The uniform 
judicial application of Regulations is guaranteed by the European Court of Justice. 
The operational result is not the same when other legislative integration 
techniques are used. When it comes to “uniformation”, uniform legal rules are 
produced by a supra-national body, or voluntarily by a multiplicity of States be-
longing to the international community, but the application of the rules is left 
to national courts. Therefore, the application of the same rule can vary from one 
jurisdiction to another. This is mostly the case of the international conventions 
that are stipulated between nations: after ratification they become binding do-
mestic law of the contracting States and are applied by national courts. 
Finally, “harmonization” technically refers to a law-making activity establish-
ing only a general uniformity of legal rules among different legal orders which 
allows some variations between jurisdictions, but the differences are not so deep 
as to alter the basic, harmonized legal model. The classical example of harmoni-
zation is represented by the EU legislative competence to issue Directives that 
“shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each member state to 
which [they are] addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice 
of form and methods” (Art. 288 TFEU)11. 
9 sacco, Antropologia giuridica, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2007, 59 ff.; id., Introduzione al diritto compa-
rato, cited above, 132 ff.
10 Benacchio, Diritto privato della Unione Europea, 5th edn, Cedam, Padova, 2010, 15 f. 
11 Differently from Regulations, Directives need to be implemented by national legislations. 
However, if they are badly implemented or not implemented, and if they are framed in a par-
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Legal unification, uniformation and harmonization presented so far refer to 
positive law rules (legislative legal integration). However, these techniques do not 
represent the entire legal integration process, as much as positive law does not 
represent law as a whole. Comparative law studies show that convergence or di-
vergence of legal solutions does not depend only on black-letter rules, but rests 
on other legal formants. Among them, judges and scholars play a major role. The 
activity of these subjects is determined by (and is a product of) the scholarly tradi-
tion of each legal system that impacts on the interpretation of positive law12. There-
fore, we can also distinguish judicial legal integration and scholarly legal integration. 
Judicial legal integration is crucial especially in the EU institutional setting, be-
cause it guarantees uniform application of EU law not only through the activity of 
the European Court of Justice, but also through the duty imposed upon national 
judges to apply its principles when interpreting both EU and national law13. The EU 
system is also influencing the convergence of the legal cultures of national judges14. 
The importance of judicial legal integration is felt also with reference to national 
judges and international arbitrators applying international uniform law conven-
tions. They are entrusted with the task of interpreting international conventions 
in a uniform way. Yet, in this case the judicial assignment is more difficult, because 
only in few cases court or arbitral decisions on international conventions are re-
ported and therefore available to the international judicial community15. 
Scholarly contribution to legal integration can be measured not only in the 
drafting activity of international conventions and uniform laws, but also in the 
preparation of restatements or bodies of principles of the law, deemed to be used 
as harmonizing tools by legislators or practitioners, as well as in the field of legal 
education. The U.S. Restatements of the Law, sponsored by the American Law 
Institute (starting from 1923), in Europe the Principles of European Contract Law 
written by the Lando Commission (2000, 2003), and later the Principles of Euro-
pean Law by the Study Group on a European Civil Code (from 1998), the DCFR 
(2009) as well as, at international level, the UNIDROIT Principles of Internation-
al Commercial Contracts (1994, 2004, 2010), are only some of the most notable 
products of scholarly legal integration.
ticular way so as to confer autonomous rights to citizens and other requirements are met, they 
can have direct vertical effect according to the case law of the European Court of Justice: craiG, 
de Burca, EU Law: Texts, Cases and Materials, 5th edn, OUP, Oxford, 2011, 139 ff., 178 ff. 
12 sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law; Inst. I (1991) 39(1) Am.J.Comp.L., 
1 ff.; Inst. II (1991) 39(2) Am.J.Comp.L., 343 ff. 
13 rössLer, Interpretation of EU Law, in J. Basedow, K.J. Hopt, R. Zimmermann (eds), Max Planck 
Encyclopaedia of European Private Law, II, OUP, Oxford, 2012, 979-982.
14 mattei, Il modello di common law, 3rd edn, Giappichelli, Torino, 2010, 82 ff.
15 Yet, for the UN Convention for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention, CISG, 
1980) reports of case law and arbitral awards are available on-line: see UNILEX database, set up 
by Pace University (http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu), which also contains bibliographical refer-
ences and scholarly writings on case law interpretation. 
81legal integration of private law
Another important source of spontaneous legal integration is international 
business practice. It works in an unofficial way, without any endorsement by na-
tional authorities, through the development and use of uniform contractual forms 
and customs tailored on specific business transactions, or standardized so as to 
fit the need of delocalization of international contracts. Notable examples of this 
private law-making are the model contract terms elaborated by UNCITRAL, or the 
banker’s rules dealing with documentary letters of credit (Uniforms Customs and 
Practice for Documentary Credits, International Commercial Chamber, last edn 2006) 
or the International Commercial Terms dealing with the delivery and risks in sales 
contracts (INCOTERMS, International Commercial Chamber, last edn 2010). This 
kind of harmonization can be termed contractual legal integration. As it happens 
with international conventions or uniform laws, also the text of the international 
contracts needs to be interpreted by national judges or international arbitrators, 
therefore the same remarks as for the judicial legal integration apply. 
Finally, and in addition to the four dimensions of legal integration mentioned 
so far (i.e. the legislative, judicial, scholarly and contractual ones) other meta-legal 
factors deserve attention because they have a powerful impact on law, such as policy 
considerations, economic and/or social factors, the social context and values, and the 
structure of the legal process in each institutional setting. Therefore, the process of 
legal integration is a complex interplay of different levels that must be analyzed tak-
ing into account the practical and cultural dimension in which positive law operates. 
5. Legal integration in the United States:  
institutional and cultural factors
Legal integration in the United States cannot be approached without a prelimi-
nary sketch of the institutional setting which characterizes this important com-
mon law system. First of all (and differently from England and from the EU), the 
U.S. are a federal system. In the U.S. federalist organization, federation and states 
have been assigned by the federal Constitution (1787; Bill of Rights, 1791) differ-
ent spheres of competence, the boundaries of which, however, are not complete-
ly clear-cut. The major synthesis of the allocation of powers between federation 
and states is stated in the X Amendment of the federal Constitution: “the powers 
not delegated to the United States [i.e. the federation] by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the peo-
ple”. Consequently, the competence of the states is the rule, whereas federal com-
petence is the exception. This is true with reference to both legislative and judi-
cial competence. The legislative competence of the federation (Congress; see Art. 
I) covers matters related to tax law, common defence and general welfare of the 
U.S.A., the power to coin money, maritime law, interstate and foreign commerce 
(commerce clause). In these matters, Congress shall have the power to “make all 
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the […] pow-
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ers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States” (necessary 
and proper clause). In U.S. history, the extensive interpretation of the “necessary 
and proper clause” and the “commerce clause” have been a powerful instrument 
to enlarge the legislative competence of the federation. To our purposes, it must 
be stressed that, in accordance with this constitutional construction, most of pri-
vate law is a competence of the states (statutes and case law), and not of the feder-
ation (as it is, e.g., in Germany). However, determining what competence belongs 
to the states and what is left to the federation, needs closer examination also with 
regard to the allocation of the judicial competences between federal and states 
courts. Federal courts have limited jurisdiction, i.e. only when the Constitution 
explicitly recognizes it. According to Art. III of the Constitution, there is federal 
jurisdiction in two instances: (i) “federal question”, i.e. when the judge shall apply 
the federal Constitution or other federal law; and (ii) “diversity jurisdiction”, i.e. in 
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or in cases of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, in controversies to which the United States 
shall be a party and to controversies between two or more states, between a state 
and a citizen of another state and between citizens of different states. Also the prob-
lem of the delimitation of judicial competences is in fact much more complex 
than the letter of the constitutional text, if one only considers that – according 
to the case law of the federal Supreme Court – federal courts can apply also state 
law (statutory and case law) and that this has been frequent especially in matters 
relating to “diversity jurisdiction”. Without going into the details of this com-
plicate system, suffice here to point out that federal courts also play a role in in-
terpreting and applying state laws (statutes and case law), and that this adds to 
the legal integration of private law throughout the nation, counterbalancing the 
image of a U.S. private law highly fragmented in 50 jurisdictions. 
Besides these institutional aspects, a series of cultural factors have been fos-
tering legal integration of private law in the U.S. In this perspective, the emer-
gence of a common legal education based on the universities must be first ac-
knowledged. This phenomenon is linked to the name of Christopher Columbus 
Langdell, who in the second half of the Nineteenth century adapted to the U.S. 
context the Blackstonian legacy of the need for academic teaching of the law. 
Langdell elaborated a method for the academic analysis and teaching of the law 
based on the case books, named case method. In these books (that started a new 
literary genre typical of the U.S. legal education system) a selection of relevant 
cases is offered by the author, together with a brief presentation of the facts and 
the full opinion. No personal comment or interpretation of the court decision 
was added by the author. Thereby students were educated to the first-hand work 
on cases. This method emphasized the influence of case law for legal education 
(not only for practice, which was obvious in a common law system) and to assign 
to law schools a leading role in legal education throughout the U.S. Appointed as 
Dean of the Harvard Law School in 1870, Langdell reformed its teaching method; 
on this model all other U.S. law schools have been shaped. Law professors play a 
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crucial role for the success of this method. To be sure, this technique is centred 
on case law, but it cannot work without the critical contribution of the scholar 
who selects from a bulk of cases those having scientific relevance, which can be 
regarded as “making the law”. In this way, also the student is trained to a critical 
use of case law and, more in general, to a critical way of thinking. 
A common legal education is the reason for the development of a common 
legal literature that, beside the case books, is based on a successful law reporting 
system. The latter is a particularly relevant factor in the formation of a legal men-
tality, because it influences the approach of lawyers to cases and, indirectly, also to 
the other types of legal literature. Before the Nineteenth century, in the U.S. there 
were relatively few courts, and even fewer published reports. In 1819 there were 
18 volumes of American case reports. By 1848 they had grown to 800, and to 3.800 
in 188516. During the last quarter of the Nineteenth century a commercial publish-
er, the West Publishing Company, created a system for reporting and indexing in 
an economical and accessible way the court decisions from all the states. Since the 
full text of court decisions is reported, the success of the system depends on an in-
genious indexing, known as “key number”, that, coupled with recent technologi-
cal electronic development, enables lawyers to find quickly cases on a particular 
point of law from all jurisdictions. This of course increases the knowledge of any 
lawyer about other states’ law. Communication among jurisdictions is certainly a 
key strategy for creating a harmonized approach to the common law.
Another relevant factor that has pushed U.S. private law towards convergence 
is connected with (and is a consequence of) the common legal education, namely 
the emergence of a common legal profession. In theory, any question relating to 
the legal profession is, again, competence of the states. However, the American 
Bar Association (ABA), a private, non-governmental organization representing 
lawyers in the whole nation has a strong role in defining professional regula-
tions. Usually the rules proposed by the ABA are approved by states’ Supreme 
Courts with no objection by their judges. This is due to the high degree of ho-
mogeneity between lawyers and judges, who feel they belong to the same group. 
Furthermore, the ABA carries out its activities together with the Association of 
American Law Schools (AALS), another private organization gathering the law 
schools. In this way, the U.S. legal practice has a strong impact on the university 
curricula and gives prestige to the academy (rather than the other way round). 
It is ABA that grants accreditation to the law schools for the bar exam. This is 
the state-based exam that all graduate students (after three years of law school) 
have to pass in order to become lawyers (attorneys at law). Despite the state 
competence on the bar examination, and the diversity of states’ private laws, it 
is an exam based on the “general principles of the law” that are taught at any law 
school in the U.S. 
16 rosett, Unification, Harmonization, Restatement, Codification, and Reform in International Com-
mercial Law, cited above, 691 f.
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Last but not least, the existence of a common legal education and literature 
implies a common legal language throughout the U.S., which is of course highly 
facilitated by the use of English as the national language. 
6. Legal integration in the United States: forms and formants
We have already mentioned that by the end of the Nineteenth century the growth 
of case law and the consequent confusion caused by the increasing difficulty in 
solving contradictions between different decisions needed to be countered in or-
der to preserve legal certainty. This happened through the use of the case method 
in legal analysis and education, but also by setting up in 1923 an institution spe-
cifically designed to promote clarification and simplification of U.S. common law 
and law reform: the American Law Institute (ALI)17. Membership in the ALI is lim-
ited to 4000 judges, lawyers and legal scholars from all the United States. Since its 
creation the ALI contributes to the harmonization of U.S. private and commercial 
law with three types of activity: Restatements, Model Laws and Principles. 
Restatements. Restatements are “codification-like” bodies of written law that 
seek to inform judges and lawyers about general principles of common law in 
different areas of private and commercial law. The first series of Restatements 
appeared between 1923 and 1944 on topics such as Contracts, Torts, Property, 
Restitution, Agency, Suretyship, Judgments and Conflict of Laws. In 1952 the 
Restatement Second was started (covering subjects not included in the first Re-
statement, as well as new updated editions of the original Restatements), and in 
1987 the Restatement Third, which is still going on. Theoretically, purpose of the 
Restatements is to state private and commercial law how it is in reality, without 
any modifications, distilling commonalities among the decisions of the various 
jurisdictions. However, reality has sometimes been rather different. Since state 
laws are different, sometimes the drafters have chosen the “best rule”. With re-
gard to the style of the Restatements, the first of them consisted of a series of 
abstract statements on the law (while the current generation of restatements 
comprises comments and notes that do not always add to clarity which was the 
original raison d’être of the work). Because of this abstract style and their system-
atic organization the (especially first) Restatements resemble continental codi-
fications – some authors have called them “unofficial codifications”.18 Yet, their 
role in the system of the U.S. sources of law is not comparable to that of the Eu-
ropean civil law codifications. Being essentially a product of scholars and practi-
tioners, i.e. a private law-making product, they cannot have official authority as 
source of the law. Yet, in practice they enjoy a degree of authority, because they 
17 See: www.ali.org/.
18 von mehren, The U. S. legal system: between the common law and the civil law legal traditions, Centro 
studi e ricerche di diritto comparato e straniero, Roma, 2001, 11.
85legal integration of private law
are often applied by courts “as if” they were sources of the law. In its turn, this 
practical authority rests of a widespread consuetudo and opinion necessitatis that 
they represent the actual law or rules that are acknowledged to be “good law”. 
Model laws. While Restatements codify the law “how it is”, model laws represent 
the law “how it should be”. Model laws represent the efforts of ALI towards law re-
form: They seek merely to inform and provide a model for states legislatures. The 
latter are encouraged to consider it, but are not obliged to adopt it, not to adopt it 
without modifications. A classic example is the Model Penal Code of 1962 (and its 
subsequent reforms), which has been adopted almost in toto in only four states, 
but whose influence is clearly evident in the penal code reforms of most states. 
Principles. They are the result of the ALI efforts of analysis of legal areas thought 
to be in need of reform and consist of recommendations for change in the law 
published in the form of principles of the law. They have been issued for subjects 
such as Aggregate Litigation, Corporate Governance, Family Dissolution, Soft-
ware Contracts, Transnational Civil Procedure, Transnational Insolvency, and 
Transnational Intellectual Property. Principles aim at stating “the law as it ought 
to be” and this explicit purpose differentiate them from the Restatements, repre-
senting “the law as it is”. 
Besides the ALI, since 1892 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
States Law (NCCUSL)19, composed by states’ representatives, drafts Uniform Laws 
as well as legislation that aims to lead to clarity and stability in crucial areas of 
state statutory law. Differently from model laws, uniform laws are specifically de-
signed for state legislative adoption. As such, they have a significant harmoniz-
ing potential, but also some problems. In fact, despite the large number of laws 
that have been produced so far, they have led to few uniformity, and sometimes 
they have been a failure. Many of them have been adopted by few, if any, states. 
In some cases they have been influential for state law reforms, where legislatures 
have picked up selectively some aspects of them. The reasons for such failure are 
sometimes related to state legislatures and governments which often lack a pro-
fessional staff or a group of trained civil servants able to draft well-conceived 
laws on private law matters; sometimes there is a lack of the political will to con-
form to the choices made in the uniform laws. 
The best example of both the potential and problems with uniform laws in 
the U.S. is certainly the Uniform Commercial Code (1952, and subsequent amend-
ments), which contains a comprehensive regulation of interstate commercial 
law, covering transactions such as sale of goods, contracts, leases, security inter-
ests, etc. It is a joint product of the ALI and the NCCUSL, not federal law, but it has 
adopted by all 50 jurisdictions, although sometimes with state variations. The 
UCC has been of tremendous significance in reforming the law. Proof of this is 
the case of Article 9 of the UCC, dealing with security interests over movable as-
sets. The original text was a brilliant and innovative product in the 1950s of one of 
19 See: http://www.uniformlaws.org/.
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the central drafters of the UCC, Prof. Karl Llewellyn, which completely reshaped 
the legal categories and taxonomies in a crucial topic for business transactions, 
where legal certainty and uniformity are essential. Yet, the process of state adop-
tion of the code had just started when the Permanent Editorial Advisory Com-
mittee started working for the revision of Art. 9. Its new version was completed 
in 1972 and it has taken 15 year to be adopted by the states. In the meantime, two 
versions and a number of local variations have been in force. 
All these elements are part of a top down process of legal integration of pri-
vate and commercial law which has certainly been influential. Yet, it does not 
represent the entire picture, nor can it be regarded as the only driving force of 
legal harmonization in the U.S. A. The substantive harmony without uniformity 
of U.S. private and commercial law rests above all in a shared commercial cul-
ture, which moves bottom up. The common national economic market and the 
high mobility of the U.S. population have favoured an harmonious development 
of the law. In this context, any success of top down harmonization efforts is due 
to the homogeneity of the business practice, as much as to the technical qual-
ity of uniform and model acts or to concepts and choices of the legal profession. 
American lawyers are positively aware of this: “Whatever we do, the process of 
harmonization appears inexorable, precisely because of the power of the forces 
for expansion and coordination of commercial markets within our nations”20. 
7. Legal integration in the EU: legal traditions and institutional factors
 
Legal integration in Europe is a recent phenomenon that builds on the creation 
of the European Community in the 1950s and cannot be analyzed separately from 
it. Indeed, as far as private law is concerned, the European landscape at that time 
was more fragmented than that of its U.S. counterpart. To be sure, the European 
civil law legal tradition has been developed on the grounds of the common foun-
dations of Roman law as it had been worked out in the age of the jus commune. Yet, 
the formation of the national states was based on a (at least) formal, proud parti-
tion from the common heritage, represented in the crystallization of variations 
in the national codifications of civil and commercial law. Political fragmentation 
in the nation states implied a variety of institutional and cultural elements that 
strongly impacted on the style of each legal system. It is true that differences in 
style and in declaration of principles did not affect the deep layers of the common 
Roman law tradition, but the impressions of an observer approaching the private 
laws of Europe were puzzling. First of all, the diversity of languages did not help 
the understanding of the legal languages developed in the different legal tradi-
tions: common law in England; civil law on the Continent, in its variations of Ro-
20 rosett, Unification, Harmonization, Restatement, Codification, and Reform in International Com-
mercial Law, cited above, 695.
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man and Germanic traditions; the Nordic legal traditions. For each of these tradi-
tions, a variety of sources of the law could be found. Even though the codification 
was the centripetal legal source on the continent, different styles and languages of 
codifications existed and their interpretation and application was left to different 
judicial organizations and styles. In the same period of national codifications le-
gal education systems in Europe also began to diverge. The European nation states 
wanted to break off from the past, therefore abandoned the unity of the university 
teaching method developed in the jus commune age on the basis of the study of the 
Roman sources, setting up their own university model. Diverse legal education 
systems necessarily led to the development of different legal literatures. 
This was the background of legal fragmentation in which the EC was created 
with economic motivations, but aimed in the long run at creating political inte-
gration in Europe in order to guarantee stability and peace in the region. The first 
economic goal for the EC was the setting up of a common economic market – the 
single, now internal market. This was fostered by competition, increasing the 
general wealth of the people living in this region. The pattern of legal integration 
of private law in the EU is strongly linked to the policy of the internal market, 
which has always been a cornerstone of the EC/EU21. 
The creation of an internal market by the EC/EU institutions implies the al-
location of competences between Community/Union and member States. The 
EC/EU Treaty formally establishes that the Community/Union has attributed 
competences, i.e. it can act only when the Treaty specifically confers power to it, 
linked to the objectives set by the Treaty (art. 5(1) TEC, now art. 5(1)(2) TEU). If this 
principle is taken literally, there is no EU competence to legislate generally on 
private law. Yet, numerous legislative acts that are related to contract and private 
law have been enacted, based on the need to establish the internal market and 
make it work. The argument goes that the existence of different national rules in 
areas related to the internal market (such as contract law) may hinder the work-
ing of the internal market, and consequently legal harmonization is needed in or-
der to overcome these obstacles. Although this choice is usually seen as a merely 
technical move, in fact it implies shaping of a species of “European private law”. 
This harmonization process has been based on arts. 94 and 95 TEC (now arts. 115 
and 114 TFEU) concerning the internal market, whose scope is so wide as to make 
it virtually impossible to set definite and rigid boundaries. In fact, they have also 
been employed to justify the expansion to “bordering” areas, which were linked 
but not amenable to the internal market: this has been the case, for instance, of 
consumer law, where the member States have been willing to shift their regu-
latory competence to the EC/EU by using the legal base related to the internal 
market. This has determined a creeping erosion of national competences, which 
is not easily reconciled with the principle of enumerated competences of the EU. 
21 antonioLLi in antonioLLi, fiorentini (eds), A Factual Assessment of the Common Frame of Reference, 
Sellier, Munich, 2011, Introduction, 28 ff. 
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In spite of the fact that EC/EU legislation is selective, i.e. it only addresses spe-
cific issues, leaving the general legal framework at the national level, this affects 
the way in which member states regulate these areas. A very broad reading of 
the Treaty rules related to the internal market can encroach on subject matters 
which are external to it, but which may interfere with it, thereby reshaping the 
scope of action for the states. The conflicts of competences between EC/EU and 
member states have been addressed also by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), 
as in the area of free circulation of goods, where its very broad reading of arts. 
28 and 30 TEC (now arts. 34 and 36) in the 1970’s and 1980’s has determined a 
situation where theoretically any national rule potentially affecting the circula-
tion of goods (such as e.g. rules on opening hours of shops) could be considered 
as infringing EC law. In the 1990’s, with the leading decision Keck and Mithouard 
(C-267, 268/91 [1993] ECR I-6097), the ECJ has tried to limit this encroachment 
to rules that are directly related to the free circulation of goods and the internal 
market and have a discriminatory nature. It means that states can argue that na-
tional rules related to social needs can be justified even though they may affect 
the way in which the internal market works. The definition of the boundaries 
between what member states can legitimately do and what is prohibited because 
it contrasts with EC/EU rules is defined by the EC/EU institutions themselves, 
not by the member states. In the famous Tobacco advertising case of 2000 (Ger-
many v. Parliament and Council, C-376-98 [2000] ECR I-8419) the ECJ held that legal 
diversity per se does not justify harmonization by EC institutions, unless it is suf-
ficiently proven that different national legal rules create an obstacle to the work-
ing of the internal market, and that the harmonized rules are needed to cure the 
problem. This means that EC institutions do not possess a general law-making 
power related to the internal market, but must specifically show the obstacles 
to it that the EC rules aim to remove. When applied to the private law context, 
this reasoning seems to imply that the EC/EU institutions cannot harmonize the 
whole of private law, but rather must limit their intervention to selective issues 
in which it is demonstrated that regulatory differences adversely affect the in-
ternal market. This seems also to be in line with the principle of subsidiarity, 
according to which in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, 
the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states, either at central level or 
at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved at Union level (Art. 5(3) TEU).
The existence of shared competences of the EU and member states in the area 
of private law implies the existence of a multi-level system, where the EU and States 
must cooperate in order to reach a satisfactory regulatory framework. One way 
in which this is done is through the use of the mechanism of minimum harmoni-
zation: EC/EU directives often provide for a minimum level of harmonization, 
which can be lawfully increased by member states, for reasons related, e.g., to 
social justice considerations. This is what has happened in the area of consumer 
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protection, but it must be emphasized that at the moment the Commission has 
shifted its strategy and decided that in order not to hamper the working of the 
internal market, maximum harmonization is required (see infra, n. 10, with regard 
to the new directive on consumer rights). Again, this is motivated purely on the 
basis of technical considerations (the need to provide for proper harmonization 
and to avoid fragmentation), but in fact it has an important “constitutional” ef-
fect, since internal market considerations become paramount, and may impede 
the pursuit of other legitimate and relevant interests at national level, such as, 
e.g., those related to social justice .
Within this complex framework of allocation of competences between EC/
EU and member States there has been a gradual, but constant increase of EU law-
making activity through Regulations and Directives (see supra, n. 4) in the core 
fields of private law, such as contract and tort law – as well as labour and com-
pany law. This has promoted an approximation of national legal systems that, al-
though far from being complete and systematic, could not have been anticipated 
at the time when the European Communities were established. 
Yet, the making of EU law suffers from well-known limits that may impair 
its performance. Not only is EC/EU legislation sectoral and fragmented in its 
contents and form, and limited by the narrow institutional boundaries sketched 
above, but it is placed upon – and often overlaps with – a variety of national and 
local legislations that are related with local social patterns. Moreover, also case 
law is fragmented. Indeed, the ECJ is far from being a Supreme Court of the Euro-
pean Union, since its intervention is only interstitial in guaranteeing the appli-
cation of EU law, and its action is consequently inadequate to produce uniform-
ity in all relevant areas. In addition to that, legal doctrine in Europe is still largely 
limited to traditional municipal law and legal education and legal literature are 
still mainly concerned with national law. 
These limits have not stopped the progress of Europeanization of the law and 
the academic debate on the building of a “European” private law. From a struc-
tural point of view, lurking behind the debate on the development of European 
private law is a fundamental issue of policy, i.e. determining who should be in 
charge of defining the content and the contours of this emerging “common” law. 
As mentioned above, formally it is the EU institutions who have the task to estab-
lish new binding rules, a process which is dialectically linked to the definition of 
the scope of the EU competencies in relation to the member States, which retain 
residual competencies outside the areas devolved to the EU. Yet, the substance of 
European private law, particularly in the last decade, has been deeply influenced 
by the academic debate developed by European scholars. This process has con-
tributed to the strengthening of a class of scholars that everywhere in Europe had 
gradually lost its social prestige starting from the age of national codifications.
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8. Legal integration in the EU: forms and formants. “European” scholars
 
The EU legal integration process develops along two tracks: on the one side, “hard 
law” and officially produced by the EU institutions; on the other side, “soft law”, 
mainly related to the scholarly activity. What deserves attention is the role played 
by these two formants, and the products of their activity. Beginning with the aca-
demic side, since the 1980’s scholars coming from different European countries 
have embarked on the study of national private laws of Europe with the aim of 
fostering legal harmonization. They gathered initially in research groups that 
were the result of the private initiative of academics, which had different work-
ing methods and tried to give substance each to their own idea of harmoniza-
tion, but shared the opinion that harmonization had to be carried out through 
the creation of a set of European black letter rules. 
The first enterprise of this kind has been the so-called “Lando Commission”, 
set up in 1982 under the direction of Prof. Ole Lando of the University of Co-
penhagen to prepare a body of rules on general contract law and, partially, the 
general law of obligations: the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL). These 
Principles have reached a remarkable degree of success as an authoritative ref-
erence for the development of national legal systems in Europe. In the mind of 
their authors, the PECL were deemed to serve a variety of goals, such as being the 
initial basis for a European Civil Code, or a model law to be referred to by national 
legislators aiming to modernize their law; they could be also used as model both 
for future EU legislation and for judges and arbitrators in the adjudication of le-
gal disputes, or as the governing law which could be chosen by the parties in pri-
vate agreements, according to the applicable rules of international private law. 
Later, the Study Group on a European Civil Code has been established in 1998 
as the successor of the “Lando Commission”, under the leadership of Prof. Chris-
tian von Bar of the University of Osnabrück. The name itself of this Group shows 
that its initial goal was to develop the idea expressed by the European Parliament 
to foster the creation of a European Civil Code. The comprehensiveness of the 
codification scheme led this undertaking to enlarge the scope of the research 
from the general law of obligations and contracts to most of private patrimonial 
law. Therefore, the work of the Study Group includes not only specific contracts, 
but also benevolent intervention in another’s affairs, unjustified enrichment, 
tort law, and some matters relating to property law, such as transfer of movables, 
security rights over movables and trust. The overall aim is to elaborate a basic set 
of rules for Europe, composed of principles deriving from comparative research 
and distillation of the best rules by way of scholarly analysis. At the root of the 
project is the belief that European law can emerge only as Professorenrecht, a belief 
that is reflected in the method of the Study Group’s work, developing a shared 
legal culture in Europe.
The codification idea has been adopted also by another academic group, the 
Académie des Privatistes Européens. Since 1992 this Group is working on a Code Eu-
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ropéen des Contrats, under the coordination of Prof. Giuseppe Gandolfi of the Uni-
versity of Pavia. The Académie chooses the traditional concept of codification used 
in continental Europe, as a set of specific rules, intended to leave less scope to 
interpretative activity. The provision of the Code Européen des Contrats employ as 
a starting point the Italian Civil code, but are sometimes open to solutions com-
ing from other civil law systems and the common law tradition. Also the official 
language of the text is peculiar: English, now working as a global language, is 
superseded by French.
Beside these major enterprises targeted at legislation, another aspect of the 
academic debate and activity on European private law has grown significantly, 
focusing on broader cultural aspects of this process. The starting point of many 
European scholars is that there is not yet sufficient comparative knowledge of le-
gal systems to form a sufficiently solid ground for a legislative endeavour, particu-
larly if intended as a codification in the continental meaning. In this vein, the pri-
macy of legal research (at least in terms of timing) over legislative drafting should 
be acknowledged, the building of a European legal culture being a prerequisite for 
a European legislation aspiring to be uniformly applied. Without a truly shared 
common culture, no black letter rule approach could really serve the purpose of 
convergence of legal systems. Moreover, a significant number of scholars not only 
deems that a Civil code is not feasible at present, but also that it is not desirable, 
because legal pluralism enriches, rather than limit, European law. Though with 
different nuances among the various groups, this “cultural” perspective is advo-
cated by several leading projects. The Common Core of European Private Law is a 
project that has been launched in Trento in 1995 under the direction of Prof. Bus-
sani (University of Trieste) and Mattei (University of Torino and Hastings, USA), 
which brings together nearly two hundred scholars coming from all the EU mem-
ber States, Eastern European and Mediterranean countries, and from the US and 
Canada. It seeks to unearth the “common core” of European private law, i.e. what 
is already common among the different legal systems of Europe, subdividing the 
research area in the general categories of contracts, torts and property. The Society 
on European Contract Law (SECOLA) has been founded in 2001 by Prof. Bianca 
(university of Rome), Collins (London School of Economics) and Grundmann 
(Humboldt University of Berlin) in order to foster research and academic debate 
in the area of contract law; to this purpose it has also set up a journal, European 
Review of Contract Law”. The Social justice group is a looser group of European 
scholars, whose work is often connected to some of the European comparative 
law projects, who advocate for a more socially-oriented development of European 
law. Finally, the “Ius Commune Casebooks for the Common Law of Europe”, whose 
project leader is Prof. van Gerven (University of Leuven), gathers a network of 
scholars working on a series of textbooks devoted to specific areas of European 
law, which are meant to be used in University teaching and as reference materials, 
thus fostering the development of a common European legal culture. 
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9. Legal integration in the EU: forms and formants. The EU institutions
 
Simultaneously to the developments in legal doctrine, from the end of the 1980’s 
also the European Community institutions started expressing their interest for 
the harmonization of private law as a means to achieve a single market among 
member States. Initially, at the end of the 1980’s, the driving force was the Euro-
pean Parliament, which voted a number of Resolutions (which are politically, not 
legally, binding) advocating the start of a process which could lead to a codifica-
tion of European private law. The Commission joined to the Parliament initiatives 
in a series of Communications between 2001 and 2004, and it finally decided to 
finance research activities for the elaboration of a Common Frame of Reference 
within the Sixth Framework Programme for Research and Technological Devel-
opment. Under that call, the “Joint Network on European Private Law - Network 
of Excellence” (CoPECL) started working in 2005, the widest research network 
ever created in Europe. This group gathered two among the most prestigious 
academic research groups in Europe, the Study Group on a European Civil Code 
and the Research Group on the Existing EC Private Law (‘Acquis Group’), together 
with the Project Group on a Restatement of European Insurance Contract Law and 
some other supporting groups. The task of the Network was to deliver to the EU 
Commission the “Common Principles of European Contract Law” (CoPECL), that 
would constitute a possible basis for a future Common Frame of Reference of Eu-
ropean Union law. These Principles have been published in 2009, and their draft-
ers called them the “academic” Draft (i.e. not final) Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR), in order to distinguish the results from what was termed the “political” 
(and final) Common Frame of Reference (CFR), i.e. the tool – whatever its form, 
scope and purpose – that the EU institutions could possibly adopt in the future, as 
a consequence of a political decision. The DCFR is in all but name a codification-
like effort. Other features aside, it is sufficient to look at its scope, which is as wide 
as that of many national codifications, covering contractual and non contractual 
obligations, specific contracts and some matters relating to property of movables. 
Yet, shortly after its completion it has become apparent that the DCFR would 
not constitute the last step nor the final word in the EU legal integration pro-
cess. Indeed, the EU Commission made clear that after many years of elaboration 
and after having spent a large amount of European research funds, the political 
agenda changed to a much more limited scope of intervention. In April 2010 the 
EU Commission set up the Expert Group on a Common Frame of Reference in the 
area of European Contract Law which was entrusted with the task of carrying out 
a Feasibility Study and making further progress on the development of a possible 
future European contract law instrument, starting from the DCFR. This Feasibil-
ity Study was published on 3 May 2011 and from it the EU Commission made 
a Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law (COM/2011/635 
final), which was presented on 11 October 2011. This proposal for an Optional In-
strument contains rules applicable to cross-border transactions for the sale of 
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goods, for the supply of digital contents and for related services, if the parties 
to a contract agree to do so. From the wide scope of the DCFR, the path towards 
European legal integration in the field of private law has now led to a much more 
limited spectrum of transactions, making thus clear that in this phase most of 
the DCFR will not become European legislation. 
10. Inconsistencies in EU law-making activity.
The new directive on consumer rights
In the field of consumer contracts the Commission proposed in 2008 an impor-
tant directive which would merge and reform some of the most important di-
rectives concerning consumer contracts (COM (2008) 614 fin.). The aim of the 
proposed directive was to eliminate some discrepancies and gaps in the existing 
directives and to update them, but the most significant feature was that, in line 
with the most recent position of the Commission, the proposal was based on a 
maximum harmonization model, which was considered as a necessary element in 
order to make the internal market work (see supra, n. 7). This choice was criti-
cized in many quarters, and the discussion among the stakeholders, the member 
States and the EU institutions lasted for several years. Finally, a compromise so-
lution was found in October 2011, when directive 2011/83/EU was approved. The 
directive, which must be transposed by December 2013 (but the new rules will 
apply from June 2014), employs an approach of selective maximum harmonization, 
which means that some elements are now fully harmonized, while for others 
member states can still keep more protective national rules. Yet, in spite of the 
compromise choice for selective (targeted) full harmonization, the fundamen-
tal structure is still formulated according to it: art. 4 states that “Member States 
shall not maintain or introduce, in their national law, provisions diverging from 
those laid down in this Directive, including more or less stringent provisions to 
ensure a different level of consumer protection, unless otherwise provided for 
in this Directive”. Full harmonization concerns consumer information and the 
right of withdrawal in distance and off-premises contracts. These are clearly very 
important issues, yet the final result is far from the comprehensive application 
of maximum harmonization that was initially envisaged by the Commission. 
In the Commission’s view, full harmonization increases legal certainty, because 
both consumers and traders can rely on a single unified regulatory framework, 
thereby eliminating the barriers to the working of the international market 
stemming from the fragmentation of legal rules. Yet, it must be remembered 
that all aspects that are not specifically addressed by the directive remains under 
national law, so harmonized rules, even those which are fully harmonized, must 
still be inserted in a legal framework concerning the rules applicable to contracts 
and obligations (such as validity, conclusion, remedies, representation, etc.) 
which is fragmented according to national lines. 
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The structure of the new directive reveals a striking lack of coordination with 
the DCFR, which is not even mentioned in the document, and whose solutions 
have not been employed in the new rules. Since the establishment of the CoPECL 
network and the drafting of the DCFR was officially motivated by the need to 
provide the EU institutions with a set of principles, definition and solutions (the 
“frame of reference”), a task which involved considerable work and money, this 
result is hard to explain and indeed puzzling. 
Also in relation to the proposal on an Optional instrument for European sales 
law, there is a significant difference: the Directive achieves maximum harmoniza-
tion only for some aspects, namely pre-contractual information and right of with-
drawal, while important elements of consumer protection remain under a mini-
mum harmonization standard, which means that the states can still keep more 
protective rules. On the contrary, the idea behind the Optional instrument is that 
the choice is only on the contractual parties: once they have opted for the Europe-
an regime, the level of consumer protection is uniform and cannot be derogated 
by national law, which implies a sort of “optional full harmonization” decision. As 
a consequence, ensuring that the consumer makes an informed choice in opting 
for the European sales law becomes crucial, since it may imply renouncing to a 
higher level of protection guaranteed by the otherwise applicable national law22.
11. The European Law Institute
The incoherencies and contradictions that characterize European legal integra-
tion are important materials for the scholarly discussion. It is indeed the scholar-
ly circuit which is best equipped to analyze these problems and suggest solutions. 
Taking into consideration that European private law, particularly in the last de-
cade, has been deeply influenced by the academic debate developed by European 
scholars, which in recent times have been directly involved in the drafting of the 
materials from which the EU institutions have derived new legal instruments, it 
is hardly surprising that scholars have advocated the creation of the European Law 
Institute (ELI)23 in June 2011, as an independent non-governmental organization 
aiming at technical and cultural guidance of European legal development. For the 
time being, membership to ELI covers, beside distinguished legal scholars, also 
members of the legal profession coming from different EU member states. The 
ELI aims “to improve the quality of European law, understood in the broadest 
sense. [...] it seeks to initiate, conduct and facilitate research, to make recommen-
dations, and to provide practical guidance in the field of European legal develop-
22 antonioLLi, The evolution of European contract law: a brand new code, a handy toolbox or a jack-in-
the-box?, in Reifner, Nogler (eds), Social Long-Term Contracts in European Law, EuSoCo, forthcom-
ing 2012.
23 See: http://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/. 
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ment” [...] ; it “will study and stimulate European legal development in a global 
context”. “Building on the wealth of diverse legal traditions, its mission is […] the 
enhancement of European legal integration” 24.
It is not difficult to see behind this initiative the model of the American 
Law Institute. Yet, it is difficult to predict today whether the ELI will be able to 
achieve a role in European legal integration comparable to that of the ALI in the 
U.S. Moreover, both institutions are basically in the hands of law professors (al-
though the ALI is also strongly influenced by practitioners), but one must bear 
into mind the different degree of unity of lawyers in the U.S. A. and in Europe. 
European lawyers are much more divided among themselves than their U.S. 
counterparties (language and cultural difference are deeply rooted in European 
lawyers’ mentality), therefore they are a much less strong and cohesive class of 
“stakeholders”, and much less influential in forging the EU legal development 
according to their visions. These are the main reasons why the resemblance be-
tween these institutions can only be superficial.
ELI activities are divided in Projects, Instruments and Statements. 
Projects. The ELI governance system decides what projects to carry out. Any 
project must be at the service of the European citizen by improving the law or 
facilitating its application; it has to strive for practical impact through rules, 
comments on rules or guidelines; it must be produced through the cooperation 
between jurists working in academia and legal practice; and take a genuinely 
pan-European perspective, as well as taking into consideration the achievements 
of the various legal cultures.
Instruments. Projects carried out under the auspices of the ELI will often take 
the form of medium- to long-term projects, the added value of which is to pro-
vide, through the independence, excellence and diversity of the project teams 
and the on-going critical guidance by a very broad constituency of jurists, well-
founded solutions that are supported by the European legal community. ELI will 
appoint one or more reporters, either on its own initiative or after having carried 
out a call for tender. It will normally appoint advisors or consultants and estab-
lish a Members Consultative Committee. 
Statements. Projects carried out under the auspices of the ELI may also take the 
form of short-term reactions to current developments, the added value of which 
is to coordinate, and so far as possible to reconcile, the views taken by various 
European constituencies. If a quick reaction of the ELI is required, the ELI will 
appoint a project team, as well as advisors or consultants25. 
The establishment of this institution is relevant because it can be seen as a 
potential tool in the hands of the European law professors and practitioners in 
24 See: http://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu and its Manifesto available there. 
25 So far only two Statements have been published, the S-1-2012 “Statement on Case Overload at 
the European Court of Human Rights” of July 2012 and the S-2-2012 “Statement on the European 
Commission’s Proposal for a Common European Sales Law” of September 2012. 
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order to strengthen their role as leading actors of European legal development. 
It is a role that they had gradually lost everywhere in Europe, after the age of na-
tional codifications. Yet, the relationship between scholars and the bureaucratic 
technocracy in the EU legal process is complex, and far from linear: in this situa-
tion legal doctrine is clearly a very important player, but its role in the creation of 
legal rules is variable and sometimes ambiguous.
12. Legal integration in the U.S. A. and in the EU: 
similarities and differences
This short overview enables us to sketch some comparative observations on legal 
integration in the two institutional settings of the EU and U.S. Despite the signif-
icant differences existing between them (a federal nation vs a supra-national sui 
generis organization like the EU), in both private and commercial law is formally 
a competence of the states, and this pushes towards legal fragmentation. Yet, 
in both cases the mise en oeuvre of the constitutional allocation of competences 
in private and commercial law has led to a substantial level of convergence. Of 
course, the ways used to reach this result are significantly different in the U.S. A. 
and in the EU, but this does not diminish the relevance of the outcome. If the 
institutional setting certainly directs the main lines of legal integration in any 
system, their analysis alone is not sufficient to explain the complexity of the phe-
nomenon. The impact of cultural factors, such as legal language and mentality, 
the characteristics of legal education, the relevance of law reform, are only some 
of the most important cultural elements that may determine the success or fail-
ure of legal integration. It is exactly in the cultural dimension that the two expe-
riences of legal integration that are most heterogeneous. 
We have shown that the existence of a shared common and legal language 
in the U.S., coupled with the development of a unique legal education system, 
immensely facilitated the mutual understanding among lawyers of the differ-
ent states. Thereby a common legal mentality, based on a common approach to 
the sources of law and on a strong homogeneity of lawyers (scholars, judges and 
practitioners), leading to the perception by U.S. lawyers of a common private and 
commercial law. The historical impact of cultural factors in the European region 
has been different. There, the cultural factors before the creation of the EU were 
dividing the national legal traditions: different (legal) languages, different legal 
education systems, a wider variety in the spectrum of the sources of the law and 
– above all – in their approach made the legal integration enterprise more dif-
ficult. The institutional impetus to the start in this direction has been the EC/
EU internal market policy. The new institutional, supra-nation setting created in 
the 1950s pushed towards legal integration of private and commercial laws, be-
cause it conceived of legal diversity among member States’ law as an obstacle to 
the economic and political goals of the EC/EU. The new institutional momentum 
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represented by the EC/EU for European legal integration has, in its turn, fostered 
and reinforced also the cultural factors that may enhance harmonization of pri-
vate law in Europe. It is the case of scholarly activity, which thanks to the en-
dorsement by the EU is increasingly sensitive to the “Europeanization” of private 
law and focused on a variety of “restatement-like” projects. Slowly, but steadily, 
European private law is emerging as a new discipline and gaining momentum in 
some of the more advanced university curricula throughout Europe. 
This is the general context in which institutional and cultural factors operate 
in the two legal integration experiences, and a closer look at the technical means 
that have been used in the U.S. and in Europe in order to support legal harmo-
nization reveals some differences that must be underlined and that may prove 
useful for further analysis. One of these is the different meaning and use of codi-
fications and restatements of private law in the two analyzed areas. In the U.S., 
Restatements have been a powerful factor of unification: they clearly aim at stat-
ing “the law as it is”, and not “the law as it ought to be” (and this holds true despite 
of the difficulty of a clear-cut delimitation between the two approaches). For this 
reason, and also on the basis of the prestige of their drafters, Restatements have 
gained the role of de facto authority among the sources of law, thereby produc-
ing legal integration. Differently, in Europe the most relevant Restatement-like 
work, i.e. the DCFR of 2009, has adopted both the “common rules” approach (i.e. 
a selection of the rules shared by the member States’ laws) and the “best rule” ap-
proach (i.e. the formulation of a new rule by the drafter, regarded by them as the 
rule better fitting European needs). This has added to the ambiguity of the results 
of the DCFR with regard to its suitability to become “hard law”. On the one hand, 
it is apparent that if a “Restatement” or a “Common Frame of Reference” does not 
reflect the commonalities existing in the region, it is not apt to gain a sufficient 
degree of acceptance vis-à-vis its addressee. On the other hand, if this instrument 
should be designed as model for law reform, then the rules selected on the basis 
merely of their existence in the EU states would not necessarily guarantee the 
selection of the “best” rule. This is why it has been voiced that Europeans should 
learn for the Americans that a clearer distinction of legal integration activities 
between initiatives aiming to state “the law how it is” and those aiming to state 
“the law how it should be” would be beneficial to EU legal integration. This holds 
true especially for the future ELI activities26. 
As for the relationship between codification and legal integration in Europe, 
it can be pointed out that codes have never been a successful means to reach legal 
integration; rather, they performed the function of crystallizing the legal diver-
sity that had been emphasized by the Nineteenth century’s legal ideology. 
Another diversity in legal integration in the U.S. and the EU emerges if we 
consider the degree of involvement of scholars and other legal professionals in 
26 schuLte-nöLke, ‘Restatements’ in Europe and in the US: Some Comparative Lessons, in Brownsword, 
Micklitz, Niglia and Weatherill (eds), The Foundation of European Private Law, Hart, Oxford, 2011, 11 ff.
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these activities. In the U.S., practitioners have taken the leadership together with 
law professors. In Europe it is the scholars who are currently playing a major role 
in legal harmonization. Yet, a more significant involvement of the legal profes-
sions and of other stakeholders would be advisable (and could be fostered in the 
newly created ELI), especially given the lower degree of homogeneity existing 
among European scholars, and in general in the legal professions, if compared to 
that of their U.S. colleagues. 
In conclusion, in both Europe and U.S. there is a general assumption that 
legal integration initiatives are part of a coherent plan to support economic 
transactions with a legal structure that encourages commercial transactions and 
reduces costs. The reasons for these changes is economic, but the engine driv-
ing legal integration is essentially political and cultural, and therefore is strictly 
linked to the institutional setting in which legal integration operates. Moreover, 
it cannot be overlooked that in both the U.S. and the EU systems it is nowadays 
the globalized financial and business practice that really drives legal integration, 
moving beyond the variety of institutional settings and cultures. Especially the 
financial interconnection existing among the worlds’ economies – recently vis-
ible in the global financial crisis – makes it clear that the new frontier of Western 
legal integration of private and commercial law cannot be confined to the classic 
regional dimensions of the U.S. and the EU, but urgently calls for a supra-region-
al dimension, able to promote regulations that cross the national boundaries be-
tween West and East, North and South of the world. 
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Summary 
1. Effective judicial protection as a general principle and a fundamental 
right in the EU legal order – 2. The role of national courts in the EU 
decentralised system of judicial protection – 3. The impact of the principle 
of effective judicial protection on national rules – 4. Conclusive remarks: 
current issues and future perspectives.
Abstract
The complex features of the EU system of judicial protection and its effectiveness on the 
side of the individual have been raising over time more and more interest among scholars. 
Effective judicial protection is an essential element in all legal orders, in so far as it allows 
individuals to enforce their rights and obtain redress. The European Union is no excep-
tion. Conferring of an increasing number of rights liable to be claimed by individuals 
and being characterised by a rather complex system of legal remedies, construed upon a 
complementary role of the Court of Justice of the European Union and national courts, 
the EU faces an urgent need of finding a way to ensure effectiveness of judicial protection 
within its legal order. Against this background, the present contribution aims at addres-
sing the consistency and the relevance of the EU general principle which should fulfil this 
need. The principle of effective of judicial protection was drawn by the Court of Justice 
from a fundamental right enshrined in the common constitutional principles of Member 
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States and protected by Articles 6 and 13 ECHR, as well as by Article 47 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. As interpreted and applied by the Court, such principle is intended as 
imposing on both Member States and EU institutions an obligation to provide the claims 
with adequate procedural tools, against or beyond those provided, respectively, by national 
and EU law. The study offers an insight on the consistency of the principle with particular 
reference to its impact on national law, and proposes a reconstruction where its nature as 
expression of a fundamental right of the individual is enhanced. After having illustrated 
the sources and the scope of application of the principle in general terms, the analysis turns 
to its various applications , elaborated over time by the Court of Justice. The core part of the 
contribution offers a crytical analysis of selected case–law of the Court of Justice, paying 
particular attention to the judicial scrutiny that the different applications of the principle 
may entail. The purpose is pointing out a certain evolution towards an approach where 
the principle of effective judicial protection seems to be intended by the Court as the source 
of a fundamental right of the individual, protected as such by the EU legal order. On these 
grounds, the conclusive remarks will point out the advantages and the challenges that this 
approach may imply, in terms of providing for adequate remedies for the individual while 
granting, at the same time, effectiveness of EU law and coherence within the different levels 
of judicial protection.
Keywords
EU legal order – General principles – Judicial protection – Effectiveness – 
Fundamental rights
1. Effective judicial protection 
as a general principle and a fundamental right in the EU legal order
The right to an effective judicial protection is a fundamental right recognised 
at international level as well as by the majority of national legal orders, and 
an essential element of democratic accountability1. This right refers to a broad 
concept which generally encompasses various core elements, including access 
to justice, the right to an effective remedy and the principles of fair trial and due 
process of law2. 
1 Solemn declarations of judicial protection as a core fundamental right may be found since 
the Magna Charta Libertarum of 1215 (“[40] Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus rectum 
aut justiciam”) in almost all the constitutional texts based on the rule of law. For a comparative 
analysis, see CAPPELLETTI, GARTH, Access to justice. A world survey, Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alphen 
aan den Rijn, 1978 and BYRNES (ed.), The right to fair trial in international and comparative perspec-
tive, Centre for Comparative and Public Law, Hong Kong, 1997.
2 Provisions variously related to one or more of those elements may be found in most of 
the human rights instruments existing at international level, and notably in Article 8 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in Articles 2, 9 and 14 of the International Covenant 
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As such, the right to an effective judicial protection is recognised in the Eu-
ropean Union by means of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, which shall be regarded, in the light of Article 6(1) TEU as 
reworded by the Treaty of Lisbon, as a binding provision of primary law in the 
EU legal order3. Article 47 of the Charter is included in the chapter concerning 
“Justice” and provides for the “Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial”. In 
particular, the first limb of Article 47 protects the right to an effective remedy 
of every individual whenever their rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law 
are violated, as a result of a failing of one of the duties related to such rights on 
the part of a Member State, the institutions or another private party; the second 
limb guarantees the right to a fair trial and the principles of due process of law, 
including the requirement of reasonable length of proceedings; while the third 
limb establishes the right to be defended and the right to obtain legal aid, with 
reference to the need to ensure effective access to justice. 
However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter ‘Court of 
Justice’) has attributed special relevance to the right to an effective judicial protec-
tion, long before the adoption of the Charter in 20004. The issue of effective judi-
cial protection of the rights that the individual may derive from the EU legal order 
soon emerged in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, being regarded from an 
early stage as one of the constitutive elements of a community based on the rule of 
law, which the EU (at the time the European Community) ought to respect. While 
this approach was first established in relation to the need to ensure review of le-
gality of measures adopted by the institutions5, it was with reference to the role of 
national courts – in providing for an adequate protection of rights conferred upon 
the individuals by EU law – that the Court of Justice accepted the principle of ef-
fective judicial control as a general principle of EU law: a principle “which must be 
taken into consideration in Community law”, as it “underlies the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States and [...] is laid down in Articles 6 and 13 
of the European Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamen-
on Civil and Political Rights and, at regional level, in Articles 6 and 13 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights as well as in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union. For an overview, FRANCIONI (ed.), Access to justice as a human right, OUP, 
Oxford, 2007.
3 According to Article 6(1) TEU “the Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set 
out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union […] which shall have the same 
legal value as the Treaties”.
4 The charter was drawn up by a convention consisting of a representative from each EU coun-
try and the European Commission, as well as members of the European Parliament and na-
tional parliaments. It was formally proclaimed in Nice on 7 December 2000 by the European 
Parliament, Council and Commission, before being amended and proclaimed a second time in 
December 2007, with the view of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
5 The seminal case was ECJ, Les Verts v European Parliament, case C-294/83, judgement of 23 April 
1986, [1986] 1339.
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tal freedoms”6. According to the Court, the requirement that individuals should 
enjoy the opportunity to obtain judicial protection of the rights they derive from 
EU law pertained to a fundamental right of the individual and thus reflected a 
general principle of EU law7. Drawn from the constitutional traditions common 
to the Member States8 and from Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for 
the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms9 (hereinafter ‘ECHR’), 
the content of the principle has been determined over time by the Court of Justice 
through its interpretative function. To that extent, the Court would use as a basis 
6 ECJ, Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, case C–222/84, judge-
ment of 15 May 1986, [1985] 1651, paragraphs 1 and 2. The case related to a litigation between 
Mrs. Johnston and the British police corps of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, with regard to an 
alleged sex discrimination against the applicant. Mrs. Johnston had lodged an application chal-
lenging the decision contending that she had suffered unlawful discrimination prohibited by 
the British Sex Discrimination Order. In the context of the proceedings, the Chief Constable 
had produced a certificate issued by the Secretary of State in which the Minister himself con-
firmed that the decision challenged was in accordance with the Sex Discrimination Act, since 
it had the purpose of safeguarding national security and protecting public safety and public 
order. The certificate signed by the Minister under British law had to be taken as a conclusive 
evidence and its content could not be challenged. In this respect, Mrs. Johnston argued that 
this was in contrast with certain provisions of the Equal Treatment Directive (Council Directive 
76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions); 
in particular, she assumed that national law on evidence procedure infringed the provision ac-
cording to which all persons which considered themselves wronged by discrimination ought 
to be able to pursue their claims by judicial process.
7 In the Johnston case, cited above, the Court of Justice referred to the right to an effective judi-
cial remedy, stating that the the EU Directive required a judicial control which reflected a gen-
eral principle of law underlying the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. 
According to the Court, it was the same principle laid down in articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR, 
which must be taken into consideration in EU law. Interpreting the Directive in the light of 
this general principle, the Court ruled for the incompatibility of the challenged provision. The 
principle was subsequently re-affirmed in the same terms in all relevant case-law.
8 Among the common traditions of Member States, the right to an effective judicial protection 
is commonly intended as a fundamental right as it is linked to the principles of the rule of law. 
Obviously, there are differences as to its recognition and its content: it is either contained in 
an express provision of the Constitution (Article 19(4) of the German Constitution, or Section 
24 of the Spanish Constitution), or derived from a group of provisions, relating to due process, 
independency and impartiality of the judiciary, rights of defence (see for example Articles 24, 
111 and 113 of the Italian Constitution, and Articles 36 to 38 of the Constitution of the Czech 
Republic); or being regarded as as a general principle, which informs the national legal order 
without being enshrined in a written constitution (as in the United Kingdom). For an over-
view, STORSKRUBB, ZILLER, Access to justice in European comparative law, in FRANCIONI, Access 
to justice as a human right, cited above, 177 ff.
9 In the ECHR, which is the main instrument for the protection of human rights at regional 
level, the right to an effective judicial protection results from the combination of Articles 6 
(1) and Article 13. Article 6(1) protects the principles of due process, whereas Article 13 is an 
enabling provision which provides for the right to an effective remedy in the context of the 
enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms protected by the substantial provisions of 
the Convention. 
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either the common principles enshrined in the constitutional orders of Member 
States, or it would refer to the specific content of Articles 6 or 13 of the ECHR, as 
interpreted by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights10 (hereinaf-
ter ‘ECtHR’). In general terms, the principle has been construed quite broadly as 
comprising: access to justice11, including the right to judicial review and access to 
an effective remedy with reasonable time–limits12; the right to a fair trial and the 
principles of due process13, including the right to reasonable length of proceed-
ings14; the right of defence15, including the right to evidence16 and the right to be 
represented17. The Court of Justice has always underlined the fact that effective 
judicial protection must be more than a mere formal possibility, as it must also be 
feasible in practical terms. Therefore, the concrete application of the principle of-
ten consisted in establishing the procedural rule which may in concrete serve as a 
means for strenghtening judicial protection of the individual, as to render the EU 
system of legal remedies overall complete and effective: either at national level, 
when domestic courts exercise their competences for the enforcement of rights 
and rules derived from EU law18; or in a global perspective, in order to ensure a 
fruitful interaction between EU and national remedies19.
The general principle of effective judicial protection is not recognised in the 
terms referred to by the Court of Justice by any provision of the Treaties. The only 
provisions which partly deal with the principle are, on the one hand, Article 19(1) 
TEU, which refers to the horizontal dimension of the principle, establishing a 
duty upon Member States to provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal 
protection in the fields covered by EU law; the provision serves, in this sense, the 
10 For an overview of ECtHR’s case–law on Article 6 and 13, see MILANO, SUDRE, Le droit à un 
tribunal au sens de la Convention européenne des droit de l’homme, Dalloz, Paris, 2006, or refer to the 
commentaries contained in HARRIS, O’BOYLE, BATES, BUCKLEY, Law of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, OUP, Oxford, 2009, WHITE, OVEY (eds.), The European Convention of Human 
Rights, 5th edn, OUP, Oxford, 2010, BARTOLE, DE SENA, ZAGREBELSKY (cur.), Commentario breve 
alla Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo, Cedam, Padova, 2012.
11 ECJ, Heylens, case C–222/86, judgement of 15 October 1987, [1987] 4097, ECJ, Oleificio Borel-
li SpA, case C–97/91, judgement of 3 dicembre 1992, [1992] I–6313 and ECJ, Safalero, C–13/01, 
judgement of 11 settembre 2003, [2003] I–8679 .
12 ECJ, Pontin, case C–63/08, judgement of 29 October 2009, [2009] I–10467.
13 ECJ, Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophones, case C–305/05, judgement of 26 June 
2007, [2007] I–5305.
14 ECJ, Baustahlgewebe, case C–185/95 P, judgement of 17 December 1998, [1998] I–8417.
15 ECJ, Corus UK, case C–199/99 P, judgement of 2 October 2003, [2003] I–11177.
16 ECJ, Compagnie Maritime Belge, joint cases C–395 and 396/96 P, judgement of 16 March 2000, 
[2000] I–1365.
17 ECJ, Krombach, case C–7/98, judgement of 28 March 2000, [2000] I–1935.
18 ECJ, Peterbroeck, case C–312/93, judgement of 14 December 1995, [1995] I–4599.
19 ECJ, Jégo Quéré, case C–263/02 P, judgement of 1 April 2004, [2004] I–3425.
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main function of granting enforcement to rights and obligations deriving from 
EU law, rather than protecting a fundamental right of the individual. On the 
other hand, references to the need to ensure effective access to justice to the indi-
viduals are contained in some provisions concerning the action of the EU in the 
field of judicial cooperation in civil matters, particularly Articles 67 and 81 TFEU. 
On the contrary, the content and the scope of the principle of effective judicial 
protection has been widely acknowledged by secondary law, as a result of a mutu-
al interaction between the EU legislator and the Court of Justice. While on some 
occasions, judicial trends of the Court of Justice were incorporated in secondary 
law 20, on other occasions it was the legislator the one who first established proce-
dural guarantees and remedies for the individual to seek protection for the rights 
conferred by the legislative act, especially in sectors of EU law where there was a 
particular need of protection of sensitive categories of people (such as consum-
ers21) or a particular need of harmonisation of standards of protection (for exam-
ple public procurement legislation22).
Even in the absence of an express recognition of the principle in primary or 
secondary law, the guarantee of the right to effective judicial protection, as a gen-
eral principle of EU law, was able to enjoy from the beginning a ‘constitutional’ 
status23. Firstly, as a major source of interpretation of EU primary and secondary 
law, as well as of national provisions which may be linked to the scope of appli-
cation of EU law. Secondly, as a grounds for conducting review of legality of EU 
provisions of secondary law or national law implementing it. Thirdly, as a princi-
ple binding on both EU institutions and Member States, meant to be observed in 
the context of the remedies before the Court of Justice as well as remedies before 
national courts for the enforcement of rights derived from (or connected to) EU 
law, as to render the system of legal remedies available for the individual within 
the EU legal order overall complete and effective.
20 A notable example is the Free Movement Directive (Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members 
to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States), which enshrines in its Article 31 
some “Procedural safeguards” already established by the Court of Justice in its earlier case-law, 
providing for every person “access to judicial and, where appropriate, administrative redress 
procedures in the host Member State to appeal against or seek review of any decision taken 
against them on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health”.
21 See for example Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts.
22 See for example Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award 
of public supply and public works contracts.
23 TRIDIMAS, The general principles of EU law, OUP, Oxford, 2007, 4.
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2. The role of national courts in the EU decentralised system of judicial 
protection
The EU general principle of effective judicial protection is bound to be applied 
within a decentralised system of remedies, based on the complementary coop-
eration of the Court of Justice and the national judge24. In fact, while the Court 
of Justice dictates the principles to be followed in order to ensure the individu-
als an effective protection of their rights, a system based on a significant decen-
tralisation of the judicial protection instructs in first place the national judge to 
construe national remedies efficiently, so as to make claims of European citizens 
available and effective. 
Long before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which formalised this 
structure in the wordings of Article 19 TEU, the Court of Justice had developed a 
role for the national judicial systems as part of a supranational EU judicial system, 
as to secure enforcement of EU law at national level25. The system was conceived 
on the basis of a quite wise separation of functions, where the Court of Justice was 
charged with a number of specific tasks under the Treaties26, while national courts 
were first in line to enforce and apply EU law within the Member States, where ap-
propriate after obtaining a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice itself27. As a 
result, two levels of judicial protection were provided for, characterised by the fact 
of having a different scope and of being basically independent one from the other. 
Ever since Van Gend en Loos28 the Court has consistently held that EU law cre-
ates rights which national courts must protect, upon the duty of sincere cooper-
24 A consistent study on the subject shall be found in SCHERMERS, WAELBROECK, Judicial 
protection in the European Union, 7th edn, Kluwer Law International,The Hague, 2006.
25 In its seminal judgement ECJ, Costa v. ENEL, case 6/64, judgement of 15 July 1964, [1964] 1129, 
the Court held that the Treaty (former TEC) had created “its own legal system which […] became 
an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts are bound to 
apply” (paragraph 7). See in this regard ADINOLFI, L’applicazione delle norme comunitarie da parte 
dei giudici nazionali (2008) Dir. Un. Eur. 617 ff.
26 Without going into details, it may be recalled that the main competences of the Court of 
Justice refer in broad terms to the control over the validity of EU acts (action for annulment, 
Article 263 TFEU and plea of illegality, Article 277 TFEU), the rulling upon failures to act by the 
institutions under EU law (action for failure to act, Article 265 TFEU), as well as to the civil li-
ability of EU institutions (action for damages, Article 340 TFEU) and to the control over the in-
fringements of EU law by the Member States (infringement action, Article 258 TFEU). These are 
the so–called direct competences, which refer to actions which can be directly brought before 
the Court, even by individuals at certain conditions.
27 The preliminary reference procedure, established in Article 267 TFEU, allows the Court of 
Justice to exercise an indirect competence, aimed at ensuring the correct and uniform applica-
tion and interpretation of EU law in all Member States and exercise a control over the validity 
of acts of institutions through the cooperation of national courts. This mechanism implies that 
where a national court is in doubt about the interpretation or validity of an EU provision, it 
may – and sometimes must – ask the Court of Justice for advice.
28 ECJ, Van Gend en Loos, case 26/62, judgement of 5 February 1963, [1963] 3.
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ation set out in Article 4(3) TEU and the principles which rule the effectiveness 
of EU law in the national legal systems. The judicial authorities of the Member 
States were soon entrusted with the responsibility to ensure that EU law was 
applied and enforced in the national legal system and that no measures were 
taken which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the Treaties. 
This appeared since the beginning a natural solution, as the effet utile of EU law 
implies not only that EU law must itself be applied, but also that national law 
is made in implementation of EU obligations: the result is that often national 
law contains elements of EU law, or implies a connection with EU law – and 
inevitably such national law would come before national courts. Accordingly, 
the obligation placed upon national courts to provide for “remedies sufficient 
to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law”, as it is 
today established by Article 19(1) TEU, was inherent in the doctrine of direct ef-
fect, holding Member States responsible to ensure effective judicial control as 
regards respect and enforcement for the rights conferred by EU law upon indi-
viduals and compliance with relevant EU provisions and with national legisla-
tion intended to give effect to them. 
In the absence of general provisions on remedies and procedures imposed 
by EU law on Member States, a general rule was framed so that national courts 
should fulfil their duty to grant effectiveness to EU law and judicial protection 
to individuals in the fields covered by EU law in accordance to their domestic 
legal procedures, remedies and sanctions. Early in its case law the Court of Jus-
tice ruled that national legal systems should determine the procedural condi-
tions governing actions and remedies intended to grant legal protection of the 
interests of a person adversely affected by an infringement of EU law: such a rule 
was enshrined in the principle of procedural autonomy, which was based on the 
assumption that national remedies and procedures were basically sufficient and 
adequate for granting the enforcement of EU law and the protection of rights 
conferred upon individuals29. 
As this reconstruction implied the risk that in such a system the rights which 
individuals may derive from EU law would differ from one Member State to an-
other, the Court of Justice soon started to interfere with national procedures and 
remedies, establishing certain limits to the principle of procedural autonomy: 
national legal order ought to comply with the principle of equivalence, or non–
discrimination, on one side30; as well as with the principle of effectiveness, or 
29 The seminal judgement where this principle was first established is ECJ, Rewe, case 33/76, 
judgement of 16 December 1976, [1976] 1989. 
30 The principle of equivalence is a specific application of the broader principle of non-dis-
crimination, imposing an obligation upon Member States to provide for equivalent remedies 
in case of infringement of EU law as in case of infringement of national law. In other words, 
the same procedural treatment must be given to claims based on EU law as is given to similar 
claims based on national law. Of course it is first necessary to properly identify similar actions 
and the procedural rules applying to them: the principle does not imply necessarily that actions 
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practical possibility, on the other side31. In the light of these two principles, the 
Court of Justice started assessing the compatibility of national legal norms on 
procedural and jurisdictional issues which had the effect of causing a prejudice 
to the enforcement or rights and obligations derived from EU law. Over time, 
the approach of the Court on procedural autonomy has yielded from an abstract 
test to a stronger insistence on the effectiveness principle, which had a deeper 
and deeper influence on national procedural remedies: on some occasions by 
requiring the importance of the EU right to be weighed against the scope and 
purpose of the national rule32; and on other occasions by adopting a case by case 
approach, which could ensure the effectiveness of the relevant EU rule involved 
with the result of prevailing over important national principles33. This affected 
a range of national remedies and procedural and jurisdictional conditions, such 
as domestic time limits and limitation periods, rules of evidence and the burden 
of proof, locus standi rules, national conditions for reparation of loss and damage 
and many other remedies and sanctions; sometimes leading national courts to 
have great difficulties adapting existing rules34.
The notable development in the application of the limits to the principle 
of procedural autonomy, with particular reference to the effectiveness clause, 
based on EU law always should benefit from the most favourable procedural regime to be found 
in national law; it only implies that comparable claims should be treated equally, prohibiting 
straightforward discrimination based on the origin of the claim (national or European). Inter-
esting applications of this principle may be found for example in ECJ, Saldanha, case C–122/96, 
judgement of 2 October 1997, [1997] I–5336 and ECJ, Transportes Urbanos, case C–118/08, judge-
ment of 26 January 2010, [2010] I–0635.
31 The effectiveness principle derives from the general duty of cooperation contained in Ar-
ticle 4 TEU, and it implies that the conditions set out in national law could not be so framed 
as to render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU 
law. When assessing the respect of the effectiveness principle, the Court of Justice takes into 
account the role of the national provision in the whole national procedural system, in order 
to grant a balance between effectiveness of EU law and the principles which rule national pro-
cedural autonomy: see in that regard, for example, ECJ, Van Schijndel, joint cases C–430 and 
431/93, judgement of 14 December 1995, [1995] I–4705.
32 As it happened with reference to national time–limits (see for example ECJ, Emmott, case 
C–208/90, judgement of 25 July 1991, [1991] I–4269).
33 Such as the principle of res judicata (see in this regard ECJ, Fallimento Olimpiclub, case C-2/08, 
judgement of 3 September 2009, [2009] I–7501).
34 The most peculiar applications of the limits of equivalence and effectiveness attracted great 
interest among the scholars, raising a debate which instensified over time on whether Member 
States could still be regarded as possessing procedural autonomy, or rather this principle was 
bound to be overruled. See, in this regard, HIMSWORTH, Things fall apart: the harmonisation of 
Community judicial procedural protection revisited (1997) Eur. Law. Rev. 291 ff., KAKOURIS, Do the 
member states possess procedural ‘autonomy’? (1997) Com. Mar. Law. Rev., 1389 ff., BIONDI, The Euro-
pean Court of Justice and certain national procedural limitations: not such a tough relationship (1999) 
Com. Mar. Law. Rev. 1271 ff., DOUGAN, National remedies before the Court of Justice: issues of harmoni-
sation and differentiation, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004, ARNULL, The principle of effective judicial 
protection in EU law: an unruly horse (2011) Eur. Law. Rev. 51 ff.
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shows the close connection existing between the effective protection of the 
rights of the individual and the effective enforcement of EU law: the obligation 
placed upon national courts, intended as a means for ensuring effectiveness of 
EU law at national level, turned out to be an indirect instrument for granting 
judicial protection to individuals, whose concern for their rights constitutes an 
important additional form of enforcement of EU law.
This aspect, in whose regard the preliminary reference procedure plays an 
important role35, represents a core element of the role of national courts in the 
EU legal order from the point of view of the judicial protection of the individual: 
accordingly, national courts actually became the ‘natural forum’36 where indi-
viduals should seek for judicial protection of their interests in situations where 
the enforcement of EU law is involved, whenever their rights of freedoms are 
violated as a result of a failing of one of the duties generated by such rights on 
the part of another private party, a Member State or even the EU institutions37. 
35 Despite the features which make the preliminary reference procedure a mechanism of co-
operation between judges rather than a remedy for the individual, long established case–law of 
the Court of Justice addressed this instrument as an indirect remedy which could fill the gaps 
left by the set of legal remedies available to the individual. In the Court’s view, the entitlement 
of individuals to have their rights protected is mostly guaranteed, whenever EU law is involved, 
through the preliminary reference procedure, as it provides individuals with indirect access to 
the Court of Justice whenever other direct avenues are precluded. This approach, which was 
partially confirmed even by the ECtHR in a recent judgement on access to justice and due pro-
cess of law (ECtHR, Ullens de Schooten v Belgium, No. 3989/07 and 38353/07, judgement of 20 
September 2011) led to some important developments: the Court of Justice soon maintained 
that the effectiveness of the preliminary reference procedure should not be prejudiced by any 
national rule, even of a procedural nature, which has the effect of restricting the powers of the 
national judge to raise a preliminary question to the Court of Justice (see ECJ, Mecanarte, case 
C–348/89, judgement of 27 June 1991, [1991] I–3277, and, more recently, CJEU, Melki, joint cases 
C–188 and 189/10, judgement of 22 June 2010, [2010] I–5667 and CJEU, Elchinov, case C–173/09, 
judgement of 5 October 2010, [2010] I–8889); also, the Court ruled that the principle of State 
liability for the breach of EU law may also apply when claiming responsibility of the national 
judges who disregard the duty imposed upon them by Article 267 TFEU (the principle was first 
affirmed in ECJ, Köbler, case C–224/01, judgement of 30 September 2003, [2003] I–10239 and 
then re-affirmed in ECJ, Traghetti del Mediterraneo, case C–173/03, judgement of 13 June 2006, 
[2006] I–5177 and, more recently, in the context of an infringement procedure in CJEU, Italy v. 
Commission, case C–379/10, judgement of 24 November 2011, not yet published).
36 TESAURO, The effectiveness of judicial protection and the co–operation between the Court of Justice 
and National Courts, in Festsknift til Ole Due: Liber Amicorum, Gad, Copenhagen, 1999, 355 ff.
37 With regard to the latter, see ECJ, UPA, case C-50/00 P, judgement of 25 July 2002, [2002] 
I–6677 and ECJ, Jégo-Quéré, case C-263/02 P, cited above.
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3. The impact of the principle of effective judicial protection on national rules 
As a general principle binding upon EU institutions as well as upon Member 
States, the principle of effective judicial protection has been increasingly applied 
both in its vertical and in its horizontal dimension. In the first sense, it was used 
as a parameter to conform proceedings before the ECJ to the various fundamen-
tal rights which constitute its essence38, as well as to render the whole set of legal 
remedies available to the individual in the EU legal order overall complete and 
effective39. In the second sense, it was used as a basis for judging national legal 
norms on remedies and procedures in order to ensure a correct enforcement of 
rights and obligations arising from EU law with respect to individuals. It is in 
this latter application that the principle showed its potential, producing a nota-
ble impact on national procedural rules as well as on the obligations placed upon 
national courts, and limiting procedural autonomy far beyond the common lim-
its of equivalence and effectiveness.
A brief clarification on this point appears necessary, as the difference existing 
between the equivalence and effectiveness test and the effective judicial protec-
tion test is at the core of the reconstruction which follows. Both the mentioned 
tests have as their object the conformity to EU law of national procedural rules, 
which are established under a competence which exclusively pertains to Mem-
ber States; however, they move from a different starting point. According to pro-
cedural autonomy, national rules are, in principle, neutral with respect to EU law, 
as they become significant only as a means for the enforcement of EU provisions 
at national level; therefore, they may be deemed incompatible with EU law only 
in the event that they fail to grant such enforcement: this is the case where the 
provisions concerned do not comply with the principles of equivalence or effec-
tiveness as interpreted by the Court. Conversely, the same procedural rules, even 
without representing an obstacle to the enforcement of EU law before national 
courts, may be still regarded as a substantive infringement of the principle of 
effective judicial protection, when their application determines a restriction to 
one of the rights enshrined in the principle: such restriction shall be regarded as 
unlawful, unless it can be justified by objective and legitimate reasons. 
In fact, the limits to procedural autonomy and the principle of effective judi-
cial protection have a different scope: the former are intended to avoid obstacles 
to the correct enforcement of EU law, and the rights and obligations derived from 
its provisions; while the latter is rather intended to ensure respect of a general 
rule of law, reflecting a fundamental right of the individual. Accordingly, the 
38 See for example ECJ, Masdar, case C–47/07 P, judgement of 16 December 2008, [2008] I–9761 
and CJEU, Deutsche Post AG, joint cases C-463/10 P and C-475/10 P, judgement of 13 October 2011, 
not yet published.
39 See for example ECJ, Der Grüne Punkt, case C–385/07 P, judgement of 16 July 2009, [2009] 
I–6155.
112
principle of effective judicial protection shall find application irrespective of its 
effects on EU law, even in the event that the justification for the limitation caused 
by a national procedural rule were based upon an EU-based interest.
This difference in perspective affects the test itself: with regard to procedural 
autonomy, the test consists in principle in the abstract control on equivalence 
and effectiveness, and Member States should be generally entrusted with quite 
a wide margin of discretion; on the contrary, the test on effective judicial pro-
tection is ruled by a human rights-based approach, and consists in a balance be-
tween the right of the individual and the justification laid down for that particu-
lar provision under the principles of necessity and proportionality40.
This reconstruction is also supported by case–law of the Court of Justice: in 
the judgement issued in the case Alassini41, the Court applied separately the test 
of procedural autonomy and the test of effective judicial protection, reaching 
opposite solutions with respect to the compatibility of the same national pro-
cedural rule. The case concerned an Italian legislation under which an attempt 
to achieve an out-of-court settlement was a mandatory condition for the admis-
sibility before the courts of actions in certain disputes between providers and 
end-users under the EU Universal Service Directive42. The references were sub-
mitted in the context of four disputes brought by a number consumers against 
certain mobile companies, regarding alleged breaches of the contracts binding 
the parties. In all actions brought by the applicants in the proceedings before the 
referring court, the defendants had argued by way of a preliminary objection that 
under Italian law the actions were inadmissible because the applicants had not 
first initiated the mandatory attempt to reach a settlement of the dispute before 
the competent body. In order to assess whether the establishment of a manda-
tory settlement procedure as a condition for the admissibility of actions before 
the courts was to be considered compatible with the right to effective judicial 
protection, the Court of Justice tested the respect of both the limits of procedural 
autonomy (equivalence and effectiveness) and of the principle of effective judi-
cial protection43. While founding, in principle, no violation of the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness, provided that certain conditions were respected44, 
40 As “it is settled case-law that fundamental rights do not constitute unfettered prerogatives 
and may be restricted, provided that the restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of gen-
eral interest pursued by the measure in question and that they do not involve, with regard to 
the objectives pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference which infringes upon 
the very substance of the rights guaranteed”. This approach, first established in landmark case 
Hauer, case 44/79, judgment of 13 December 1979, [1979] 3727, was often referred to also with 
regard to the principle of effective judicial protection.
41 CJEU, Alassini, joint cases C-317 to 320/08, judgement of 18 March 2010, [2010] I-2213.
42 Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal 
service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services.
43 CJEU, Alassini, cited above, paragraph 47.
44 CJEU, Alassini, cited above, paragraphs 50 to 60.
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the Court conversely recognised the existence of a restriction to the principle of 
effective judicial protection, maintaining that national legislation introduced an 
additional step for access to the courts which might prejudice judicial protection 
of the individuals. Such a restriction was nevertheless found admissible in the 
light of the principles of necessity and proportionality45.
Unfortunately, the differences which have just been outlined, that may appear 
so sharp in abstract terms, are often faint in the case-law of the Court of Justice. 
The concrete application of the principle of effective judicial protection could 
not avoid in quite a number of cases producing an interaction with the limits of 
equivalence and effectiveness: as a result, the principle has been applied in dif-
ferent ways, being the test, on some occasions, very similar to that of procedural 
autonomy, while following, on other occasions, the different path of a human 
rights-based approach, with different results in terms of protection of the indi-
vidual and impact on national procedural rules. This reconstruction is supported 
by the analysis which has been conducted on relevant case-law of the Court of 
Justice, where it was possible to identify, with respect to the role and consistency 
of the principle of effective judicial protection, four co-existing main approaches 
of the Court of Justice, which shall be briefly outlined as follows.
A first approach regards the principle of effective judicial protection merely 
as an additional means for ensuring the effet utile of EU law in Member States. 
As such, the principle is not used in order to protect a fundamental right of the 
individual, but rather to grant a minimum standard of effectiveness of EU law 
at national level, and as a ground to strenghten the limits of equivalence and ef-
fectiveness against procedural autonomy. A notable example of this approach 
may be found in the Unibet case46, where the Court of Justice referred to the gen-
eral principle of effective judicial protection as a parameter for determining the 
content of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. The facts of the case 
may be summarised as follows. Unibet was an English company offering gaming 
and betting services on the web. In November 2003, it had purchased advertising 
space in a number of different Swedish media with a view to promoting its gam-
ing services on the internet. However, in accordance with the Swedish law on 
45 CJEU, Alassini, cited above, paragraph 63. According to the Italian Government, the aim of the 
national provisions at issue was the quicker and less expensive settlement of disputes relating to 
electronic communications and a lightening of the burden on the court system, representing le-
gitimate objectives in the general interest. Those objectives were shared also by EU law, since the 
directive itself fostered the prevision of alternative mechanisms for the out-of-court settlement 
of consumer disputes so as to reduce the cost of settling consumer disputes and the duration of 
the procedure. According to the Court of Justice , the imposition of an out-of-court settlement 
procedure such as that provided for under the national legislation at issue, did not seem – in the 
light of the detailed rules for the operation of that procedure – disproportionate in relation to 
the objectives pursued: no less restrictive alternative to the implementation of a mandatory pro-
cedure existed, since the introduction of a merely optional out-of-court settlement procedure 
would not be as efficient in achieving those objectives.
46 ECJ, Unibet, case C-432/05, judgement of 13 March 2007, [2007] I–2271. 
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lotteries, all activities relating to games in which the possibility of gain is based 
on chance, such as betting, bingo games, slot machines and roulette machines, 
required an administrative licence issued by the competent authorities at local 
or national level; without this licence, it was not permitted, in commercial op-
erations or otherwise for gain, to promote participation in unlawful lotteries or-
ganised domestically or in lotteries organised abroad. In accordance to this law, 
the Swedish State took a number of measures, including obtaining injunctions 
and commencing criminal proceedings, against those media which had agreed 
to provide Unibet with advertising space. No administrative action or criminal 
proceedings were brought against Unibet, which, before being addressed by any 
measure, brought an action against the Swedish State claiming its right, pursu-
ant to Article 56 TFEU (freedom to provide services), to promote its gaming and 
betting services in Sweden, and claiming damages suffered as a result of that pro-
hibition on promotion as well as interim relief for the measures and sanctions 
applied by Sweden to its media partners. However, all claims were bound to be 
rejected in the absence of a specific legal relationship between Unibet and the 
Swedish State, as seeking for an abstract review of a legislative provision was 
not admissible under Swedish law. Doubting on the compatibility of this inter-
pretation of national law with EU law, the Swedish judge referred to the Court 
of Justice, asking in essence whether the principle of effective judicial protec-
tion of an individual’s rights under EU law required it to be possible to bring a 
free-standing action for an examination as to whether national provisions are 
compatible with the EU freedom to provide services, considering that there were 
other legal remedies which permitted the question of compatibility to be deter-
mined as a preliminary issue. The Court moved from the consideration that the 
need to ensure effective judicial protection, read in the light of the principle of 
procedural autonomy and its limits, is not intended as to create new remedies in 
the national courts to ensure the observance of EU law, other than those already 
laid down by national law; this would be the case “only if it were apparent from 
the overall scheme of the national legal system in question that no legal remedy 
existed which made it possible to ensure, even indirectly, respect for an individ-
ual’s rights under Community law”47. Accordingly, the content of the principle of 
effective judicial protection should essentially consist in imposing on national 
courts an obligation “to interpret the procedural rules governing actions brought 
before them […] in such a way as to enable those rules, wherever possible, to be 
implemented in such a manner as to contribute to the attainment of the objec-
tive […] of ensuring effective judicial protection of an individual’s rights under 
Community law”48. The test on the respect of the right to effective judicial protec-
tion was therefore modelled on the application of the principles of equivalence 
and effectiveness, as to ensure a minimum standard of protection under which 
47 ECJ, Unibet, cited above, paragraph 41. 
48 ECJ, Unibet, cited above, paragraph 44. 
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national procedural rules should not preclude any reasonable opportunity for the 
individuals to claim their rights derived from EU law at national level49. 
A different interpretation of the principle of effective judicial protection re-
sults from the analysis of certain cases where the Court of Justice applied the 
principle on a case-by-case basis, in the light of a need to provide for a special pro-
tection to the rights of the individual, by virtue of the specific circumstances of 
the claim or considering the particular features of the sector of EU law involved. 
Two judgements may be recalled as examples of this approach.
Impact50 is a case where the application of the principle of effective judicial 
protection was very much influenced by the specific circumstances of the claim. 
The judgement arose from a preliminary reference which was made in proceed-
ings brought by the Irish trade union Impact, acting on behalf of Irish civil serv-
ants, against the government departments were these servants were employed. 
The litigation concerned conditions applied to fixed-term workers which, ac-
cording to Impact, were discriminatory in nature with respect to the conditions 
applicable to permanent workers and so incompatible with certain provisions 
of a EU Directive51. Among other grounds of review, Impact had claimed that na-
tional law infringed the principle of effective judicial protection: national law 
implementing (late) the EU Directive, while transposing incorrectly some of its 
provisions, had created a special Commissioner but had limited its jurisdiction 
to adjudicating on complaints based on domestic law; as a result, individuals 
could not directly rely upon provisions of the Directive before this Commission-
er, even if they were unconditional and sufficiently precise (meaning that they 
had direct effect), but they could only bring a proceedings before the ordinary 
judge, but with higher costs and obstacles to bring the action. The alleged viola-
tion in the specific case was due to the fact that some of the claims brought by the 
49 Specifically, the fact that Swedish law did not provide for a self-standing action seeking pri-
marily to dispute the compatibility of a national provision with EU law did not infringe the 
principle according to the Court, provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness 
were observed in the domestic system of judicial remedies by virtue of the existence of other 
rules. The Court found no violation of the equivalence principle, since Swedish law did not 
provide for such a free-standing action, regardless of whether the higher-ranking legal rule to 
be complied with was a national rule or a EU rule (paragraph 48); neither it found violation of 
the effectiveness principle, because of the existence of other remedies for the purpose of chal-
lenging the validity of the provision under EU law, particularly the possibility to file a claim for 
damages before the ordinary courts, where Unibet would have the opportunity to dispute the 
compatibility of those provisions with EU law (paragraph 53). Considering all the above, the 
Court of Justice maintained that Unibet had legal remedies available which ensured effective 
judicial protection of its rights under EU law. A different solution would be required only if, on 
the contrary, Unibet had been forced to undergo administrative or criminal proceedings (and 
any penalties that may result) as the sole form of legal remedy for disputing the compatibility 
of the national provision at issue with EU law.
50 ECJ, Impact, case C-268/06, judgement of 15 April 2008, [2008] I–2483.
51 Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term 
work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP.
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applicants were based upon situations which took place in the period between 
the deadline for transposing the directive and the date on which the transposing 
legislation entered into force: as a result, according to national law, they should 
have brought at the same time an action before the Commissioner based on na-
tional implementing legislation, and a separate action before an ordinary court, 
in order to assert the rights which they could derive directly from the EU Direc-
tive for the period preceding the date on which the national implementing leg-
islation entered into force. In this case, the Court of Justice linked the principle 
of effective judicial protection to the responsibility of national courts under arti-
cle 4 TEU to provide for the legal protection which individuals may derive from 
provisions of EU law and to ensure that those rules are fully effective52. Stress-
ing the importance of effectiveness of judicial protection of rights derived from 
EU law allowed the Court to consider that in this case the existence of a remedy 
available to the individual to invoke provisions of the EU Directive was not suf-
ficient. The Court therefore suggested the opportunity of extending the special 
Commissioner’s jurisdiction, as to avoid that individuals in the situation of the 
complainants would suffer from procedural disadvantages, in terms, inter alia, of 
cost, duration and respect of the rules of representation, that would render exces-
sively difficult the exercise of their rights. 
This approach is likely to be adopted by the Court of Justice also in cases 
where in special fields of EU law more or less detailed procedural guarantees 
are provided for by the applicable legislation, as a result of a choice of legisla-
tive policy. The Boxus case53 concerns the sector of environmental law, which is 
a field where a standard of judicial protection, aimed at establishing procedural 
rights which ensure the participation of individuals in the definition of poli-
cies which may have an impact on the environment, is imposed at international 
level54 and then transposed in EU law. The case originated in the course of pro-
ceedings brought by persons living near Liège-Bierset and Brussels South Char-
leroi airports and the Brussels to Charleroi railway line against the Région Wal-
lonne (Walloon Region). The applicants had challenged before the Conseil d’État 
a series of authorisations adopted by the competent administrative authorities 
concerning the carrying out of works or the operation of installations in connec-
52 ECJ, Impact, cited above, paragraphs 42 and 43.
53 CJEU, Boxus, joint cases C-128, 131, 134 and 135/09, judgement of 18 October 2011, not yet 
published.
54 In particular by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention 
on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental 
matters, signed at Aarhus in 1998. All Member States are part of the Convention, which was 
officually ratified by the EU in 2005. The Convention lays down a set of basic rules to promote 
citizens’ involvement in environmental matters and improve enforcement of environmental 
law. In particular, it grants public access to environmental information, provides for participa-
tion in environmental decision-making, and allows the public to seek judicial redress when 
environmental law is infringed.
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tion with those airports and transport links to them. While those actions were 
pending before the Conseil d’État, a Decree of the Walloon Parliament of 17 July 
2008, which is a legislative act adopted by the Walloon Parliament and approved 
by the government of the Walloon Region, ‘ratified’ those authorisations, mean-
ing that they validated them on the basis of ‘overriding reasons in the general 
interest’. After the issue of the Decree, the applicants argued that, since an act of 
a legislative nature had replaced the contested administrative acts and that leg-
islative act could be challenged only before the Cour constitutionnelle, the effect of 
the adoption of the abovementioned decree deprived the Conseil d’État of jurisdic-
tion and deprived them of their interest in the annulment of the administrative 
acts. According to the applicants, the only possible action against that legislative 
act, which would be an action for annulment before the Cour constitutionnelle, did 
not comply with their rights to be heard, inasmuch as the Cour constitutionnelle 
had only a limited power of review, and was therefore unable to assess compli-
ance with all the provisions of national environmental law, and of the applicable 
procedural rules. The claim was based upon some provisions of a EU Directive 
on ‘Environmental Impact Assessment’ (EIA)55, interpreted in the light of the 
principles embedded in the Aarhus Convention, according to which each person 
having sufficient interest should have access to a review procedure before a court 
or another independent and impartial body established by law, to challenge the 
substantive and procedural legality of any decision, act or omission affecting the 
rights conferred upon them by the Convention itself. The preliminary reference 
raised by the national court essentially concerned the question whether Article 9 
of the Aarhus Convention and certain provisions of the EIA Directive were com-
patible with the choice to implement a project by a legislative act against which, 
under national law, no substantial review procedure was available. In this case, 
in order to ensure the procedural rights granted to individuals, the Court found 
it necessary to entrust any national court of the power of exercising a review on 
the legislative act contested by the applicants, although this power was not envis-
aged by national law56. 
55 Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and 
private projects on the environment, which requires Member States to carry out assessments of 
the environmental impact of certain public and private projects before they are allowed to go 
ahead. The aim of the Environmental Impact Assessment process is to ensure that projects 
which are likely to have a significant effect on the environment are assessed in advance so that 
people are aware of what those effects are likely to be.
56 According to the Court of Justice “Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention and Article 10 of Direc-
tive 85/337 would lose all effectiveness if the mere fact that a project is adopted by a legislative 
act […] were to make it immune to any review procedure for challenging its substantive or pro-
cedural legality within the meaning of those provisions” (paragraph 53). The Court therefore 
did not hesitate to draw the conclusion that “if no review procedure of the nature and scope set 
out above were available in respect of such an act, any national court before which an action fall-
ing within its jurisdiction is brought would have the task of carrying out the review described 
in the previous paragraph and, as the case may be, drawing the necessary conclusions by disap-
plying that legislative act” (paragraph 55). 
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This solution shows that the existence of an EU legislative provision granting 
certain procedural rights to individuals may expand the impact of the principle 
of effective judicial protection on national procedural law: in such cases, the 
application of the principle, whose content is autonomously determined by the 
Court, may go to the extent of requiring the existence in each Member State of 
a remedy able to grant the specific standard of protection imposed by EU law. 
The cases examined so far represent applications of the principle of effective 
judicial protection which appears mainly linked to the effectiveness of EU law: in 
other words, they reflect the principle embedded in art. 19(1) TEU, under which the 
obligation to ensure effective remedies is placed upon national courts as a means 
to grant effectiveness of EU law – or rights and obligations originated from such 
law – at national level. This reconstruction stays steady irrespective of the impact 
that the principle may have on national rules: either a simple limit, beyond equiv-
alence and effectiveness, to national procedural autonomy, or a means for grant-
ing success to the specific claim of the individual or the effectiveness of an specific 
rule of procedural nature which may be derived from EU law. Even when the test 
is more penetrating and may have a more relevant impact on national rules, with 
the possible consequence of improving the level of judicial protection of the in-
dividual, the principle serves mainly the effectiveness of EU law57 and is far from 
being applied as pertaining to a fundamental right of the individual – not to men-
tion the fact that in those cases where the Court of Justice chooses a case-by-case 
approach, this entails the risk of undermining legal certainty. 
However, in a number of recent judgements where the principle of effective 
judicial protection was applied, the Court appeared to be more committed to 
grant effectiveness of the right of the individual to judicial protection as such, 
rather than linking its reasoning to the effectiveness of EU law. In such cases, the 
application of the principle was linked to a fundamental right and implied a bal-
ance between competing interests. 
In this respect, different situations may be outlined, variously affecting the 
consistency of the principle.
The first scenario relates to a conflict between a right derived from EU law 
opposed to a national procedural rule which has the effect of denying it. This 
situation occurred in the DEB case58, which concerned the compatibility with the 
principle of effective judicial protection of a national rule granting legal aid to 
legal persons and entities only in such cases where the failure to pursue or de-
fend the action would run counter to the public interest. The issue was raised by 
a company seeking to bring an action to establish that Germany had incurred in 
57 E.g. freedom to provide services in the Unibet case, equal treatment directive in the Impact 
case, EIA directive in the Boxus case. 
58 CJEU, DEB, case C-279/09, judgement of 22 December 2010, [2010] I–13849.
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State liability under EU law59. Being uncertain on whether the refusal of legal aid 
to DEB for the pursuit of an action seeking to establish State liability under EU law 
was consistent with the principles of that law, the national appeal court raised a 
preliminary reference to the Court of Justice. The object of the reference was, in 
a nutshell,  whether the fact that a legal person was unable to qualify for legal aid 
rendered the exercise of its rights impossible in practice and precluded its right of 
access to a court. The Court solved the question on the basis of the right of a legal 
person to effective access to justice and interpreted the principle of effective judi-
cial protection in the light of the scope of application and the wording of Article 
47 of the Charter, taken in conjunction with the constitutional traditions of Mem-
ber States and ECtHR’s case-law on Article 6 ECHR. In the absence of a common 
principle, from all these provisions the Court drew, adopting a “constitutional” 
approach, some criteria on how the right to be granted legal aid to have effective 
access to justice might be extracted and interpreted: leaving to the national court 
the duty “to ascertain whether the conditions for granting legal aid constituted a 
limitation on the right of access to the courts undermining the very core of that 
right, whether they pursued a legitimate aim and whether there was a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the legitimate 
aim which it is sought to achieve”60; and establishing at the same time some crite-
ria which could be taken into consideration in the light of this assessment61. 
The second scenario may refer, conversely, to a case where a right related to 
judicial protection granted by national law has the effect of limiting the effec-
tiveness of EU law. An interesting example is the recent case Belvedere Costruzioni62. 
The case concerned an Italian legislation adopted in 201063, under which pro-
ceedings that had been pending before the Central Tax Court (Commissione 
59 In particular, the company was seeking reparation from Germany for the delay in the trans-
position of certain directives concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas, 
intended to make non-discriminatory access to the national gas networks possible (Directive 
98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 concerning common rules for 
the internal market in natural gas and Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing 
Directive 98/30/EC). DEB submitted that, as a result of that delay, it was unable to obtain access to 
the gas networks of the German network operators and was therefore obliged to forgo profits 
amounting to approximately EUR 3.7 thousand million under contracts with suppliers for the 
supply of gas. Owing to its lack of income and assets, DEB – which had no employees or credi-
tors – was unable to make the necessary advance payment of court costs required by German 
procedural law, nor to pay for representation by a lawyer, whose instruction was compulsory in 
the main proceedings. However, the German Court had refused to grant legal aid on the ground 
that the conditions laid down in the German procedural code were not satisfied.
60 CJEU, DEB, cited above, paragraph 60.
61 CJEU, DEB, cited above, paragraphs 61–62.
62 CJEU, Belvedere Costruzioni, case C-500/10, judgement of 29 March 2012, not yet published.
63 Decree-Law No 40/2010 of 25 March 2010, converted, with amendments, into Law No 
73/2010 of 22 May 2010.
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Tributaria Centrale) for more than 10 years at the date of its entry into force, 
were bound to be concluded without an examination of the appeal where the 
State tax authorities had been unsuccessful at first and second instance. This 
provision was introduced with the view to reducing the length of tax proceed-
ings and thus observing the principle that judgement must be given within a 
reasonable time, within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR. According to this leg-
islation, proceedings pending were automatically concluded, including the tax 
litigation concerned in the specific case. This would have the consequence of 
rendering the decision of the court of second instance final and binding, and the 
debt claimed by the tax authorities extinguished, but would result at the same 
time in a breach of some EU directives on VAT as interpreted by the Court of 
Justice. In essence, this was a case where a procedural rule aimed at granting 
the right of the individual to a reasonable lenght of proceedings would preju-
dice the correct application of EU law. In its judgement, following a preliminary 
reference of the national court judging on the merits, the Court of Justice main-
tained that the effectiveness of EU law on VAT could not be interpreted as run-
ning “counter to compliance with the principle that judgement should be given 
within a reasonable time, which, under the second paragraph of Article 47 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be observed by the 
Member States when they implement European Union law, and must also be 
observed under Article 6(1) of the ECHR”64. The Court of Justice thus ascertained 
that the limit imposed to the effectiveness of EU law should be justified in the 
light of the need to ensure the right of the individual, with due respect of the 
principles of necessity and proportionality65. 
A third scenario may be envisaged in situations where applicable EU law is 
neutral with respect to effective judicial protection and the principle is applied as 
to offer an interpretation of domestic law on remedies and procedure capable of 
ensuring a fair level of judicial protection to the parties in the main proceedings. 
The judgement of the Court in Lindner66 shall be referred to as an example. The 
case originated from a litigation between a Czech bank and Mr. Lindner, a Ger-
man national, who was required to pay arrears on the mortgage loan which was 
granted pursuant to a contract between the parties. At the time when the contract 
was concluded, Mr Linder was deemed to be domiciled in Czech Republic. The 
bank had brought the action before the ‘court with general jurisdiction over the 
64 CJEU, Belvedere Costruzioni, cited above, paragraph 23.
65 In fact, Italian law prescribed the conclusion solely of tax proceedings which, at the date of 
the entry into force of that provision, had lasted for more than 10 years since the application at 
first instance was made, and that it pursued the objective, as is apparent from its very wording, 
of remedying the breach of the reasonable time requirement in Article 6(1) of the ECHR. In the 
light of these considerations, the Court considered the Italian rule “an exceptional provision”, 
of a specific and limited nature, which did not create significant differences in the way in which 
taxable persons are treated as a whole (paragraphs 26–27). 
66 CJEU, Lindner, case C-327/10, judgement of 17 November 2011, not yet published.
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defendant’, as to say the court were Mr. Lindner was domiciled. However, when 
the payment order was adopted by the national court, Mr. Lindner was not stay-
ing at any of the addresses known to the referring court. Unable to establish any 
other place of residence for the defendant in the Czech Republic, the court, in ap-
plication of the national procedural law, considered the applicant to be a person 
whose domicile was unknown and assigned to him a guardian ad litem. Among 
other issues, related to the interpretation of certain provisions on jurisdiction 
contained in a EU Regulation67, the court referred to the Court of Justice the ques-
tion whether a provision of national law of a Member State enabling proceedings 
to be brought against persons whose domicile was unknown would be precluded 
by EU law, as it entailed the risk of a prejudice to the defendant’s rights. In this 
case, the Court of Justice applied the principle of effective judicial protection with 
the view to ensuring a fair balance between the rights of the applicant and those 
of the defendant. The Court moved from a fundamental rights perspective, refer-
ring several times to the guarantees connected to effective judicial protection as 
subjective rights of the parties which need protection: the right of the applicant 
to bring proceedings, the right of defence of the defendant, and even a general 
right to effective judicial protection68. According to the Court, “the requirement 
that the rights of the defence be observed, as laid down also in Article 47 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be implemented 
in conjunction with respect for the right of the applicant to bring proceedings 
before a court in order to determine the merits of its claim”69. In the light of this 
consideration, the Court held that a court having jurisdiction might reasonably 
continue proceedings, in the case where it has not been established that the de-
fendant has been enabled to receive the document instituting the proceedings, 
only if all necessary steps have been taken to ensure that the defendant can de-
fend his interests. Even if the possibility of taking further steps in the proceed-
ings without the defendant’s knowledge, by means of notification of the action 
served on a guardian ad litem appointed by the court, constitutes a restriction of 
the defendant’s rights of defence, that restriction may, however, be justified in the 
light of an applicant’s right to effective protection, given that, in the absence of 
such proceedings, that right would be meaningless70. In that respect, the Court of 
Justice pointed out that “in contrast to the situation of the defendant, who, when 
deprived of the opportunity to defend himself effectively, will have the opportu-
nity to ensure respect for the rights of the defence by opposing recognition of the 
judgement issued against him, the applicant runs the risk of being deprived of all 
67 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.
68 CJEU, Lindner, cited above, paragraphs 45, 49 and 53 respectively.
69 CJEU, Lindner, cited above, paragraphs 49–50.
70 CJEU, Lindner, cited above, paragraph 53. 
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possibility of recourse”71. According to the Court, such solution would avoid “situ-
ations of denial of justice”, which constitutes an “objective of public interest”72.
4. Conclusive remarks: current issues and future perspectives
As the proposed case–law analysis tried to illustrate, the approach of the Court 
of Justice in interpreting and applying the general principle of effective judicial 
protection when judging national law on remedies and procedures may consist-
ently vary, depending upon the specific circumstances of the case and the result 
that the Court is willing to achieve. Therefore, the consistency of the principle of 
effective judicial protection, as well as its impact on national rules, remains quite 
a complex issue.
Case–law shows in fact how effectiveness of judicial protection may at the 
same time be intended by the Court as a means to ensure effet utile of EU law, as 
a ground to strenghten EU procedural rights or as a tool to ensure protection to 
subjective rights of the individual – implying different consequences as to how 
this can affect the role of national courts and the application of domestic rules on 
remedies and procedure. 
Nonetheless, a certain evolution of the judicial trend of the Court of Justice 
on this matter towards a more defined human rights–based approach may be 
inferred from certain recent decisions which have been commented. This is the 
case where the Court derives from the principle subjective rights pertaining to 
the individual, whose protection requires a positive role of national courts, while 
interpreting and applying domestic law on procedure and remedies. According-
ly, effective judicial protection becomes more than a general principle inform-
ing the EU legal order, to be observed by both Member States and EU institutions, 
rather turning into a peculiar source of self–standing rights which need to be 
protected and granted effectiveness by the Court itself and by national courts 
within the field of application of EU law73.
71 CJEU, Lindner, cited above, paragraph 54.
72 CJEU, Lindner, cited above, paragraph 53.
73 It must be noted that such qualification of the principle entails some theoretical issues, in 
the light of the distinction traced in EU law between ‘rights’ and ‘principles’. As clarified in 
the explanation to Article 52(5) of the Charter, “according to that distinction, subjective rights 
shall be respected, whereas principles shall be observed [...]. Principles may be implemented 
through legislative or executive acts (adopted by the Union in accordance with its powers, and 
by the Member States only when they implement Union law); accordingly, they become sig-
nificant for the Courts only when such acts are interpreted or reviewed. They do not however 
give rise to direct claims for positive action by the Union’s institutions or Member States au-
thorities”. An interesting analysis referred to the right to a hearing, concerning its funcion in 
the EU legal order and the varying degrees of judicial scrutiny that it may entail, is to be found 
in TRIDIMAS, The general principles of EU law, cited above. More generally, on the position of the 
individual with respect to general principles, see ARNULL, The general principles of EEC law and 
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On the one hand, such evolution would ideally lead to the application of a test 
which appears more consistent with the need to ensure a balance between the 
fundamental rights linked to the principles of effective judicial protection and 
due process of law, on one side, and the competing EU or national interests, on 
the other side. This approach, typically characterising a fundamental rights per-
spective, would grant more coherence and legal certainty, also avoiding further 
ambiguity in terminology. 
On the other hand, as recent case-law shows, the interest of the Court of Justice 
in ensuring effectiveness of EU law – even when this may lead to the detriment 
of the fundamental rights enshrined in the principle of effective judicial protec-
tion and conferred to the benefit of other subjects – might give rise to delicate 
issues of coordination with respect to both ECtHR and national jurisprudence. 
First, with regard to coordination between the Court of Justice and the ECtHR, 
it is interesting to note how the two courts reached opposite conclusion with re-
spect to the compatibility with the requirements of effective judicial protection 
of certain national laws implementing the EU Asylum Directive74, which pro-
vided for an accelerated procedure to examine asylum application, granting low 
standards of protection as to the applicant’s right to defence, participation in the 
proceedings and review of legality. The Court of Justice, in its judgement in the 
case Samba Diouf75, regarded such national provisions as overall compatible with 
the principle of effective judicial protection, as the restrictions they may entail 
were proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued76; whereas the ECtHR ruled in 
a later judgement for their incompatibility with Article 13 ECHR, taken in con-
junction with Article 3: according to the Strasbourg Court, although pursuing the 
legitimate objective of rendering faster judgements, the limitation imposed on 
the applicant’s right to judicial review by the procedure on accelerated treatment 
of applications to international protection were disproportionate and incompat-
ible to the right to an effective remedy, as they had the effect of depriving appli-
cants from the enjoyment of basic procedural guarantees77. 
Secondly, referring to a potential conflict between the principle of effective ju-
dicial protection as interpreted by the Court of Justice and right to effective judicial 
the individual, Leicester, University Press, Leicester, 1990, GAJA, Identifying the status of general 
principles of European Community law, in Scritti in onore di G.F. Mancini, II, Giuffré, Milano, 1998, 
445 ff. and BERNITZ, NERGELIUS (eds.), General principles of European Community law, Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague, 2000.
74 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member 
States for granting and withdrawing refugee status. 
75 CJEU, Samba Diouf, case C-69/10, judgement of 28 July 2011, not yet published.
76 Which was “to ensure that unfounded or inadmissible applications for asylum are pro-
cessed more quickly, in order that applications submitted by persons who have good grounds 
for benefiting from refugee status may be processed more efficiently” (CJEU, Samba Diouf, cited 
above, paragraph 65).
77 ECtHR, I.M. v France, No. 9152/09, judgement of 2 February 2012.
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protection as it may be interpreted by national courts, an interesting case which is 
worth to recall is Chartry78. The case concerned a tax litigation between Mr. Chartry 
and the Belgian tax authority. Mr. Chartry claimed for an interpretation of national 
tax law, while the administration claimed for the opposite interpretation. At some 
point in the course of the proceedings, the legislator had adopted a law which sup-
ported the interpretation given by the administration for reasons of public inter-
ests, and which was intended to have effect also on pending proceedings. This fact 
obviously affected individuals’ rights of defence in pending proceedings; still, the 
Belgian constitutional court maintained that since the national law was pursuing an 
objective of general interest, this restriction of the individuals’ right of defence was 
justified and proportionate. Not convinced of such an interpretation, the national 
court before which Mr. Chartry had brought his action had referred to the Court 
of Justice, to ask whether this retroactive law was compatible with the EU right to 
an effective judicial protection. Before the fact that the case concerned a purely in-
ternal situation, which had no connection with EU law, the Court had to reject the 
reference, as obviously the application of the EU general principle of effective judi-
cial protection is limited to situations which fall within the field of application of 
EU law. The case nonetheless appears interesting, if one starts wondering how the 
Court would have ruled the question, if the claim of Mr. Chartry were based on EU 
tax law and the reference had been admissible: presumably, a conflict could arise be-
tween the interpretation given by a national constitutional court to the right to an 
effective remedy and the content of the EU principle of effective judicial protection.
Indeed these are challenges which would need to be faced if the EU general 
principle of effective judicial protection were to be applied as a self–standing right, 
likely to be claimed by the individual as such – in the field of application of EU law – 
both before the Court of Justice and before national courts. Still, this would appear 
a coherent solution, which would value the principle of effective judicial protec-
tion as a means to ensure individuals’ rights in the EU legal order as a whole, also in 
the light of the pressing calls for a more prominent role of the Court of Justice for 
the protection of human rights within the field of application of EU law79.
78 CJEU, Chartry, case C-457/09, order of 1 March 2011, not yet published.
79 See, in this regard the joint communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris, issued af-
ter the meeting of 17 January 2011 of the delegations from the ECtHR and the Court of Justice 
of the European Union, concerning the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union and the accession of the European Union to the ECHR. Full text of the 
communication is available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/02164A4C-0B63-44C3-
80C7-FC594EE16297/0/2011Communication_CEDHCJUE_EN.pdf.
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Abstract
Law 55/2006 (entitled “Amendments to the Civil Code dealing with “Patto di Famiglia”), which 
came into force on March 16th 2006, amended the Italian Civil Code by creating the legal in-
stitute of “patto di famiglia”, which aims at allowing the transfer of enterprise or sharehol-
dings during the life of the enterpreurner and entails an exception to inheritance rules.
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Many interpretative problems arise from the unclear phrasing of the new regulation; 
among these the most relevant one - both in theory and in practice - relates to the identifi-
cation of the necessary parties of the “patto di famiglia”, whose defect of consent leads to 
voidness of the contract. In particular, it is not certain whether the spouse and the persons 
entitled by law to a share of the deceased’s estate to whom the enterprise and/or the shares 
are not assigned must participate to the contract. Namely, since the first paragraph of arti-
cle 768-quater CC, provides that “the spouse and any person who would be entitled by law 
to a share of the deceased’s estate existing at the time of the conclusion of the agreement 
must participate to the agreement”, some authors argue that the persons entitled by law to 
a share of the deceased’s estate should give their consent to the “patto di famiglia”, while, 
according to others, those have just to be informed of its conclusion.
Three theories were formulated with regard to articles 768 bis, 768 quater, paragraph 1 
and 768 paragraph 1 CC. According to both first and second theory, the persons entitled by 
law to a share of the deceased’s estate must be a party to the “patto di famiglia”, however, 
while according to the former their participation is not essential, for the latter the lack of 
the participation of the persons entitled by law to a share of the deceased’s estate existing 
at the time of the conclusion of the agreement makes the contract void.
A third point of view assumes the ‘patto di famiglia’ as a special contract for the bene-
fit of third parties: the participation to the contract of any person who is not assignee of 
the enterprise and/or the shares and would be entitled by law to a share of the deceased’s 
estate is considered to be required by art. 768 quater CC for a different purpose than the 
participation of the disposing ascendant and assignee descendant (art. 768 bis). Namely, 
whilst the presence of the latters is necessary for the validity of the contract, the agreement 
of the persons who would be entitled by law to a share of the deceased’s estate and are not 
assignees is required in order to make the agreement enforceable towards them and to 
convert the share of the testator’s estate reserved by law for certain heirs into the right to 
receive its monetary value, which has to be calculated considering the enterprise and/or 
the shareholdings’ value. 
This paper analyses the matter above and the role of the persons who would be entitled by 
law to a share of the deceased’s.
The research leads to the conclusion that the participation of the persons entitled by law to a 
share of the deceased’s estate non-assegnees is required for the validity of the contract. 
The regulation of “patto di famiglia” appears to be inspired by the criterion of the compulso-
ry involvement at law of all persons entitled by law to a share of the deceased’s estate existing 
at a given time, because of the relevancy of the their interests at stake: far from being consi-
dered mere parties of the contract, they must be regarded as essential parties instead, whose 
consent is necessary for the validity of the “patto di famiglia” (Art. 1418, paragraph 1, of the 
Civil Code). Therefore, if one of the persons entitled by law to a share of the deceased’s estate 
cannot or does not want to participate to the agreement, it will not be possibile to conclude 
the “patto di famiglia” ; instead, the enterprises’s and/or the enterprises shareholdings’ tran-
sfer should be guaranteed by using different kinds of contractual agreements.
This conclusion also seems to be confirmed by the unsuccessful attempts made to amend 
the Italian “patto di famiglia” regulation over 2011 and 2012. Namely, all the legislative 
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initiatives providing the amendment of Art. 768, letter d) CC, concerning the “participa-
tion” to the ‘patto di famiglia’, layed out the possibility for the agreement to be drawn up 
also without the presence of all the persons entitled by law to a share of the deceased’s 
estate. Such proposals seem to confirm the fact that the regulation now in force subordi-
nates the validity of the “patto di famiglia” to the consent of the persons entitled by law to 
a share of the deceased’s estate.
Keywords
Succession - Transfer of business assets - Family agreement (Patto di 
famiglia) - Prohibition of succession agreement – Protection of persons 
entitled by law to a share of the deceased’s estate - Collation - Claim to 
distributive share - Settlement of persons entitled by law to a share of the 
deceased’s estate
1.1. Principi regolatori del sistema successorio italiano
La normativa italiana in materia di successioni è caratterizzata da rigorosi limiti 
alla libertà dispositiva del testatore posti a tutela dei congiunti più stretti: così 
insegna già l’art. 42, IV comma, Cost., il quale espressamente recita “La legge sta-
bilisce le norme ed i limiti della successione legittima e testamentaria e i diritti dello Stato 
sull’eredità”, e l’art. 457, III comma, cod. civ.1, a mente del quale il disponente ha 
limitati poteri di autodeterminazione.
Il sistema successorio italiano è, infatti, imperniato sulla centralità della le-
gittima: determinate quote del patrimonio ereditario devono essere necessaria-
mente destinate ad una particolare categoria di successori individuata tra i più 
stretti familiari del de cuius (c.d. legittimari) che, secondo l’art. 536, primo com-
ma, cod. civ., sono il coniuge, i figli legittimi e naturali e gli ascendenti legittimi.
L’intangibilità della legittima è garantita dall’azione di riduzione (ex artt. 553 e 
ss.2) e dal divieto posto al testatore di imporre pesi o condizioni sulla quota spet-
tante ai legittimari (art. 549 cod. civ.).
1 L’art. 457, III comma, cod. civ. così dispone: “Le disposizioni testamentarie non possono pregiudica-
re i diritti che la legge riserva ai legittimari”.
2 Occorre rilevare che, sebbene le disposizioni sulla legittima siano qualificabili come norme 
cogenti, la violazione delle stesse non determina la nullità del negozio, come vorrebbe l’art. 
1418 cod. civ., ma la minor sanzione della impugnabilità negoziale. Le clausole testamentarie 
poste in violazione dei diritti inderogabili dei legittimari sono valide, ma questi soggetti han-
no il diritto di impugnare il negozio di ultima volontà tramite l’azione di riduzione, la quale, 
se ritenuta fondata, si concluderà con una sentenza che comprimerà le disposizioni ritenute 
lesive per quanto necessario al fine di reintegrare la quota di riserva oggetto di domanda. Cfr. L. 
menGoni, Successioni per causa di morte. Parte speciale. Successione legittima, 4 ed., in Tratt. di Diritto 
civile e Commerciale, diretto da a. cicu e f. messineo, milano, 1990, 8.
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Tradizionalmente il sistema italiano ammette come uniche fonti per il rego-
lamento della delazione ereditaria la successione ope legis o quella testamenta-
ria, escludendo che essa possa essere affidata a strumenti di natura contrattuale. 
L’invalicabilità di detto limite viene garantita dall’art. 458 cod. civ., che enuncia il 
divieto di patti successori3.
Il sistema successorio italiano, perlomeno fino ad oggi, ha inoltre mostrato, 
nel rispetto del principio di unità, disinteresse per la natura dei beni che costitu-
iscono il patrimonio. Da ciò la conseguenza che le norme relative alla trasmissio-
ne ereditaria sono rimaste sempre le stesse indipendentemente dalla natura del 
bene destinato a cadere in successione.
In particolare, con specifico riferimento all’azienda, è stata trascurata un’impor-
tante esigenza, sempre più avvertita nella realtà imprenditoriale, consistente nella 
preservazione del valore dell’impresa, che potrebbe essere seriamente pregiudica-
to qualora la stessa venisse trasmessa, per esempio, ad un successore incapace di 
provvedere all’esercizio di un’attività d’impresa e di porsi alla guida di una società.
A questa esigenza l’ordinamento italiano ha recentemente dato rilievo preve-
dendo un nuovo istituto: il patto di famiglia, il quale cambia lo scenario, consen-
tendo all’imprenditore di programmare e definire per tempo la successione nella 
gestione dell’azienda, salvaguardando nel contempo l’unità della famiglia.
1.2. Legge n. 55/2006 e ratio del provvedimento
Con la legge n. 55 del 14 febbraio 2006, recante “Modifiche al codice civile in materia 
di patto di famiglia”, entrata in vigore il 16 marzo 2006, il legislatore italiano ha 
così introdotto nel nostro ordinamento l’istituto del patto di famiglia. Alla disci-
plina del patto di famiglia sono state dedicate sette disposizioni (artt. 768 bis – 
768 sexies) contenute nel nuovo capo V-bis4 del codice civile, inserito tra le norme 
dedicate all’annullamento e alla rescissione in materia di divisione e quelle in 
materia di donazioni.
3 Fatto salvo quanto disposto dagli articoli 768-bis e seguenti è nulla ogni convenzione con cui 
taluno dispone della propria successione. È del pari nullo ogni atto col quale taluno dispone dei 
diritti che gli possono spettare su una successione non ancora aperta, o rinunzia ai medesimi.
4 Il capo è stato correttamente nominato V bis anziché VI, come previsto dalla circolare della 
Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri del 20 aprile 2001 dal titolo “Regole e raccomandazioni per 
la formulazione dei testi legislativi”, che ha sostituito le circolari delle Presidenze delle Camere del 
28 febbraio 1986 e circolare con identico testo della Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri del 
25 febbraio 1986, pubblicate nella Gazzetta Ufficiale del 29 maggio 1986, n. 123, S.O. n. 40. La 
circolare del 20 aprile 2001 è stata adottata con identico testo da Camera e Senato e seguita dalla 
circolare della Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri del maggio 2001 dal titolo “Guida alla reda-
zione dei testi normativi” (Circolare n.1/1.1.26/10888/9.92, pubblicata nel Supplemento Ordina-
rio n. 105 del 3 maggio 2001 della Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica italiana n. 101 del 3 maggio 
2001). Cfr. s. deLLe monache, Spunti ricostruttivi e qualche spigolatura in tema di patto di famiglia, in 
Riv. notar., 2006, 889 e G. BoniLini, Patto di famiglia e diritto delle successioni mortis causa, in Fam., 
pers. e succ., 2007, 390.
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La novella si prefigge l’obiettivo di facilitare il trapasso generazionale dell’im-
presa evitando che le vicende successorie compromettano l’operatività dell’atti-
vità economica ed assicurando altresì una certa stabilità all’operazione5. A tal fine 
il legislatore ha introdotto la possibilità per l’imprenditore, ancora in vita, di in-
dividuare quello fra i suoi discendenti che abbia le capacità per succedergli nella 
conduzione dell’attività imprenditoriale iniziata.
Si è così previsto che l’imprenditore, ovvero il titolare di partecipazioni so-
cietarie, possa stipulare, con il coniuge e i soggetti che sarebbero legittimari, ove 
in quel momento si aprisse la propria successione, un contratto con cui trasferi-
re, in tutto o in parte, ad uno o più discendenti l’azienda o le proprie quote. Per 
assicurare l’effetto della “stabilità” la nuova normativa prevede, a fronte di una 
liquidazione a favore dei legittimari non beneficiari, l’esenzione da riduzione e 
collazione per le liberalità effettuate dal disponente.
L’obiettivo perseguito dal legislatore con la legge n. 55/2006 non rappresenta 
una novità nell’ordinamento giuridico: in Europa si registra da tempo l’esigenza 
di introdurre un assetto normativo che tenda ad assicurare la continuità dell’im-
presa e ad evitare lo smembramento del complesso produttivo nella fase del pas-
saggio generazionale6.
Già nella comunicazione del luglio 19947, la Commissione europea aveva 
identificato quattro problemi tipici dei trasferimenti delle piccole e medie im-
prese: (1) garantire la continuità delle società di persone e delle imprese indivi-
duali; (2) preparare i trasferimenti attraverso l’adozione della forma giuridica più 
appropriata; (3) incoraggiare i trasferimenti a favore dei terzi e (4) facilitare i tra-
sferimenti nell’ambito della famiglia tramite adeguate misure fiscali.
Sempre la Commissione Europea, con la raccomandazione 94/1069/CE8 
relativa alla successione nella piccole e medie imprese, emanata in seguito ad 
un’indagine svolta sulle disposizioni nazionali che intralciano la costituzione, la 
crescita e la successione nelle imprese - dalla quale era emerso che “ogni anno 
diverse migliaia di imprese sono obbligate a cessare la loro attività a causa di difficol-
tà insormontabili inerenti alla successione”, con ripercussioni negative sul tessuto 
5 Circa gli obiettivi della l. 55 del 14.02.2006, cfr. tra i più recenti L. GenGhini e c. carBone, Il patto 
di famiglia, in Le successioni per causa di morte, Padova, 2012, 1558; G. de nova, in Commentario del 
Codice Civile – Delle Successioni, III, a cura di v. cuffaro e f. deLfini, sub art. 768 bis, Torino, 2010, 
376; G. oBerto, in Codice delle successioni e delle donazioni, I, a cura di m. sesta, sub art. 768 bis, 
Milano, 2011, 1851.
6 m. Bernardini, Il patto di famiglia tra adozione e successione, in Studi in onore di Giorgio Cian, I, 
Padova, 2010, 215.
7 Comunicazione della Commissione sul trasferimento di imprese. Azioni a favore delle PMI, 
pubblicata in Gazzetta ufficiale C 204, del 23.7.1994, 1-23.
8 Raccomandazione della Commissione Europea sul trasferimento delle piccole e medie impre-
se, pubblicata in Gazzetta ufficiale L 385 del 31.12.1994, 14-17. Cfr. sul tema e. Lucchini GuastaLLa, 
Gli strumenti negoziali di trasmissione della ricchezza familiare: dalla donazione si praemoriar al patto 
di famiglia, in Studi in onore di Giorgio Cian, II, Padova, 2010, 1473.
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economico delle imprese, nonché sui loro creditori e lavoratori - sollecitava gli 
Stati membri “ad adottare le misure necessarie per facilitare la successione nelle piccole 
e medie imprese al fine di assicurare la sopravvivenza delle imprese ed il mantenimento 
dei posti di lavoro”.
Con la Comunicazione 98/C 93/029, la Commissione suggeriva, soprattutto agli 
Stati membri ove i patti successori sono vietati (Italia, Francia, Belgio, Spagna, Lus-
semburgo), di considerare l’opportunità di introdurre nel proprio ordinamento, al 
fine di agevolare la continuità dell’impresa, patti d’impresa o accordi di famiglia. 
In Italia, la prima proposta volta ad inserire nel sistema un istituto denomi-
nato “patto di famiglia” si deve ai risultati della ricerca promossa dal CNR negli 
anni 1996-1997, in tema di “Successione ereditaria dei beni produttivi”, coordinata dal 
Prof. Pietro Rescigno e dal Prof. Antonio Masi10.
Tale ricerca aveva dato vita a due proposte di riforma del codice civile, volte 
rispettivamente ad introdurre l’art. 734 bis sul patto di famiglia, diretto a discipli-
nare la successione nell’impresa individuale11, e l’art. 2355 bis sul patto di impre-
sa, finalizzato a disciplinare la successione nell’impresa collettiva12.
La proposta è poi confluita, senza sostanziali modifiche13, nel disegno di legge 
n. 2799 del 2 ottobre 1997, XIII Legislatura, recante “Nuove norme in materia di patti 
9 Comunicazione della Commissione Europea relativa alla trasmissione delle piccole e medie 
imprese, pubblicata in Gazzetta Ufficiale C 93 del 28.3.1998, 2-21.
10 I risultati della ricerca sono stati esposti al convegno su “Successioni nell’impresa e società a 
base familiare”, tenutosi a Macerata il 24.03.1997. A riguardo si veda la relazione del convegno 
maceratese di m. ieva, Il trasferimento dei beni produttivi in funzione successoria: patto di famiglia e 
patto di impresa. Profili generali di revisione del divieto dei patti successori, in Riv. notar., 1997, 1371 ss.
11 L’art. 734 bis prevedeva: “L’imprenditore può assegnare, con atto pubblico, l’azienda a uno o più di-
scendenti. Al contratto devono partecipare oltre all’imprenditore i discendenti che sarebbero legittimari 
ove in quel momento si aprisse la successione. Coloro che acquistano l’azienda devono corrispondere agli 
altri discendenti legittimari e non assegnatari, ove questi non vi rinunzino in tutto o in parte, una somma 
non inferiore al valore delle quote previste dagli articoli 536 e seguenti. Quanto ricevuto dai contraenti 
non è soggetto a collazione o riduzione. All’apertura della successione, il coniuge e gli altri legittimari 
che non vi abbiano partecipato possono chiedere il pagamento della somma prevista dal terzo comma, 
aumentata degli interessi legali, a tutti i beneficiari del contratto”. Sull’argomento: m. ieva, Il patto di 
famiglia, in Trattato breve delle successioni e donazioni, diretto da P. resciGno, coordinato da m. ieva, 
II, Padova, 2010, 319 ss; a. zoPPini, Il patto di famiglia (linee per la riforma dei patti sulle successioni 
future), in Diritto Privato 1998, Padova, 1999, 255 ss.
12 Sull’argomento: m. steLLa richter Jr, Il patto di impresa nella successione dei beni produttivi, in 
Diritto Privato 1998, Padova, 1999, 267.
13 Le uniche modifiche significative riguardano la circostanza che il testo non parla più di con-
tratto, bensì di donazione e viene introdotta la possibilità per il disponente di trasmettere non 
solo l’azienda, ma anche le partecipazioni societarie che, invece, nel progetto elaborato dal grup-
po di lavoro costituivano oggetto dei patti di impresa di cui all’art. 2355 bis cod. civ: “Art. 734- bis. 
- (Patto di famiglia) . – L’imprenditore può assegnare, con atto di donazione, l’azienda a uno o più discen-
denti. Al contratto devono partecipare anche i discendenti che sarebbero legittimari ove in quel momento 
si aprisse la successione; possono parteciparvi, ai soli effetti di cui al sesto comma, il coniuge dell’impren-
ditore e coloro che potrebbero divenirne legittimari a seguito di modificazioni del suo stato familiare. Gli 
assegnatari dell’azienda devono liquidare gli altri partecipanti al contratto, ove questi non vi rinunzino 
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successori relativi all’impresa” e nei successivi disegni14 sfociati nel testo finale della 
legge n. 55 del 2006.
1.3. Disciplina del patto di famiglia e divieto di patti successori
L’art. 768 bis cod. civ., rubricato “Nozione”, prevede che: “È patto di famiglia il con-
tratto con cui, compatibilmente con le disposizioni in materia di impresa familiare e nel 
rispetto delle differenti tipologie societarie, l’imprenditore trasferisce, in tutto o in parte, 
l’azienda e il titolare di partecipazioni societarie trasferisce, in tutto o in parte, le proprie 
quote ad uno o più discendenti”.
Da tale norma è possibile ricavare alcuni degli elementi caratterizzanti la 
struttura del patto di famiglia15: esso è un contratto avente ad oggetto il trasferi-
mento totale o parziale dell’azienda da parte dell’imprenditore, ovvero delle par-
tecipazioni societarie da parte del titolare, in favore di un discendente. Si tratta 
di un contratto avente una sua funzione tipica di natura complessa, irriducibile a 
quella dei tipi contrattuali già disciplinati nel codice civile.
Dal punto di vista soggettivo, tale norma accenna solamente alla presenza, 
da un lato, del disponente imprenditore o titolare delle quote e, dall’altro, di uno 
o più beneficiari discendenti. È un nuovo strumento che rompe con le categorie 
tradizionali e innova il panorama della successione “anticipata” nella titolarità 
dei beni produttivi.
Il patto di famiglia è un contratto; anche se collocato nel libro II del codice 
civile (Delle Successioni) e in particolare nel titolo IV dedicato alla divisione, non 
in tutto o in parte, con il pagamento di una somma corrispondente al valore delle quote previste dagli 
articoli 536 e seguenti; i contraenti possono convenire che la liquidazione, in tutto o in parte, avvenga in 
natura. Salvo patto contrario, i beni assegnati con lo stesso contratto agli altri partecipanti non assegnatari 
dell’azienda, secondo il valore attribuito in contratto, sono imputati alle quote di legittima ad essi spet-
tanti; l’assegnazione può essere disposta anche con successivo contratto che sia espressamente dichiarato 
collegato al primo e purché vi intervengano i medesimi soggetti che hanno partecipato al primo contratto 
o coloro che li abbiano sostituiti. Quanto ricevuto dai contraenti non è soggetto a collazione o riduzione. 
All’apertura della successione dell’imprenditore, il coniuge e gli altri legittimari che non vi abbiano parte-
cipato possono chiedere ai beneficiari del contratto il pagamento della somma prevista dal terzo comma, 
aumentata degli interessi legali. Il presente articolo si applica anche alle partecipazioni sociali”.
14 Disegno di legge n. 3870 approvato dalla camera dei Deputati il 25 luglio 2005 e passato al Se-
nato come disegno di legge n. 3567, nel quale è confluito il disegno di legge n. 1353 ed approvato 
definitivamente il 31.01.2006. Si veda sul punto, i. amBrosi e f. BasiLe, Le nuove norme in materia di 
Patto di famiglia, in Fam., pers. e succ., 2006, 375; G. oBerto, Il Patto di famiglia, Padova, 2006, 37 ss.
15 Come rilevato da c. caccavaLe (Appunti per uno studio sul patto di famiglia: profili strutturali e fun-
zionali della fattispecie, in Notariato, 2006, 289) “A dispetto delle illusioni suscitate dal suo titolo e dal 
carattere definitorio della regola che vi è espressa, l’interprete deve constatare, tuttavia, dopo averla più volte 
riletta, - quasi incredulo della sua lacunosità -, che la norma si mantiene su un piano di assoluta genericità 
e non riesce a specificare quali siano attributi e proprietà della fattispecie che valgano a caratterizzarla, non 
solo rispetto all’alternativa dell’onerosità o gratuità, ma anche, per l’appunto, in relazione alla dicotomia 
funzionale, che qui soprattutto può interessare, degli atti inter vivos e degli atti a causa di morte”.
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è, infatti, un testamento, bensì una convenzione la cui particolarità è quella di 
andare ad incidere sulle regole della successione dell’imprenditore.
L’art. 768-bis cod. civ. contiene la definizione di patto di famiglia, ma l’essenza 
del patto di famiglia non risiede in tale vicenda traslativa inter vivos, quanto piut-
tosto nella disciplina dettata dai successivi articoli, che prevedono l’imputazione 
delle attribuzioni patrimoniali ricevute alle quote di legittima (art. 768-quater, 
comma 3, cod. civ.) e - a fronte della “liquidazione” dei legittimari da effettuarsi 
con lo stesso o con successivo contratto - il non assoggettamento a collazione e ri-
duzione della liberalità effettuata al discendente; realizzando conseguentemente 
un particolare “effetto di stabilità” del trasferimento dell’azienda o delle parteci-
pazioni sociali16.
Si tratta di una disciplina profondamente innovativa che deroga parzialmen-
te al divieto dei patti successori, contenuto nell’art. 458 cod. civ.17: disposizione, 
quest’ultima, che è stata anch’essa modificata dalla legge 55/2006, facendo salvo 
per l’appunto quanto disposto dagli artt. 768-bis cod. civ. e seguenti.
Occorre analizzare la portata effettiva di questo inciso, precisando fin da subi-
to che il patto di famiglia non integra un patto successorio istitutivo, difettando-
ne, sotto un triplice profilo, la natura di atto mortis causa18.
In primo luogo, il patto di famiglia produce effetti traslativi immediati e de-
finitivi, non collegati cioè all’apertura della successione: l’azienda o le partecipa-
zioni sociali entrano immediatamente nel patrimonio dell’assegnatario (con cor-
relativa perdita del potere di disposizione in capo all’imprenditore disponente); 
ed un tanto vale anche per le attribuzioni patrimoniali a favore dei legittimari.
Secondariamente, quale riflesso di tale efficacia immediata, l’oggetto del con-
tratto è determinato con riferimento al momento della stipulazione, essendo ir-
rilevanti successive modifiche nella consistenza o nel valore dei beni attribuiti 
(il patto successorio istitutivo, al contrario, ha per oggetto l’id quod superest al mo-
mento dell’apertura della successione).
Da ultimo, i beneficiari delle attribuzioni patrimoniali sono individuati con 
riguardo al momento in cui il patto si perfeziona, e non con riferimento al mo-
mento della morte: il che significa che nel caso di premorienza dell’assegnatario 
al disponente, i beni assegnati, già entrati definitivamente nel suo patrimonio, 
faranno parte della sua successione, e non di quella del disponente.
16 G. oBerto, in Codice delle successioni e delle donazioni, I, a cura di m. sesta, sub art. 768 bis, cit., 1853.
17 Nel diritto italiano la nozione di patto successorio è molto ampia: oltre agli accordi con cui si 
dispone della propria successione, dunque dei diritti che saranno nella disponibilità del de cuius 
dal momento della morte (patti istitutivi), l’art. 458 cod. civ. vieta anche gli atti di disposizione 
sulla successione altrui non ancora aperta (patti dispositivi o rinunciativi). Nei patti destinati 
a regolare una successione futura rientrano, pertanto, atti strutturalmente e causalmente ete-
rogenei: vi rientrano sia atti tra vivi (la rinuncia ad un’eredità futura o la rinuncia ad avvalersi 
dell’azione di riduzione) sia atti mortis causa, sia patti che atti unilaterali.
18 Sul punto cfr. L. GenGhini e c. carBone, Il patto di famiglia, in Le successioni per causa di morte, 
cit., 1572.
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Si è ipotizzata, invece, la qualificazione del patto di famiglia come patto suc-
cessorio dispositivo19, con il quale i legittimari dispongono dei loro diritti sul-
la successione del disponente, non ancora aperta. In effetti, il patto di famiglia 
contiene tipicamente una “liquidazione dei legittimari”, realizzata a mezzo di 
un’attribuzione patrimoniale nei loro confronti, ed effettuata – ex art. 768-quater, 
comma 2, cod. civ. – dall’assegnatario dell’azienda o delle partecipazioni. Quest’ul-
tima attribuzione patrimoniale non costituisce, di per sé sola, atto di disposizio-
ne relativo a beni o diritti facenti parte della futura successione; tuttavia, dal lato 
dei legittimari, l’accettazione dell’attribuzione patrimoniale “a tacitazione” delle 
quote di legittima rappresenta certamente una disposizione di diritti derivanti 
dalla successione del disponente.
Nel caso, invece, in cui il legittimario rinunzi in tutto o in parte alla liquida-
zione dei propri diritti (come ammesso dall’art. 768-quater, comma 2, cod. civ.), 
si è in presenza di un vero e proprio patto successorio rinunciativo, in deroga 
all’art. 458 cod. civ20.
2.1. Aspetti problematici e individuazione delle parti essenziali del contratto
Nonostante si sia pervenuti all’emanazione della normativa sul patto di famiglia 
dopo molti anni di discussione, il testo dell’istituto attualmente in vigore non si 
distingue per chiarezza e precisione tecnico-giuridica: il testo licenziato, anche a 
detta del suo stesso relatore parlamentare, necessita di alcuni correttivi tecnici, 
ancorché a tale esigenza – si legge nella citata relazione – si potrebbe supplire 
attraverso un’adeguata attività interpretativa in funzione suppletiva21.
19 Secondo a. merLo (Il patto di famiglia, in CNN Notizie, 14 febbraio 2006, 5) “il patto successorio 
dispositivo è ravvisabile nel fatto che il donatario (o assegnatario), in vita del de cuius, anticipa ai suoi 
fratelli o sorelle ed all’altro genitore quanto di loro spettanza sui beni, oggetto del patto, che altrimenti 
cadrebbero in successione”.
m.c. LuPetti (Patti di famiglia. Note a prima lettura, in CNN Notizie, 14 febbraio 2006, 7 ss.) rinviene 
nel negozio in esame, e specificamente nella liquidazione dei diritti di legittima a favore dei 
legittimari partecipanti al patto, la natura di patto successorio, come tale volto a definire, da 
subito, tra i contraenti, i futuri assetti successori. Cfr. L. GenGhini, Il patto di famiglia, in Le succes-
sioni per causa di morte, cit., 1572.
20 Così G. BoniLini, Patto di famiglia e diritto delle successioni mortis causa, cit., 392; G. PetreLLi, La 
nuova disciplina del patto di famiglia, in Riv. not., 2006, 408; a. PischetoLa, Prime considerazioni sul 
“patto di famiglia”, in Vita not., 2006, 460. Analogamente a. merLo (Il patto di famiglia, cit., 7) per 
il quale “qualora i non assegnatari rinuncino alla liquidazione, si realizza un patto successorio rinun-
ciativo, poiché, in sostanza, tali soggetti rinunciano preventivamente a diritti di legittima che gli possono 
spettare sulla successione del genitore non ancora aperta”.
21 Relazione Semeraro in Commissione Giustizia del Senato in sede deliberante del 26 genna-
io 2006: “(..) è stato espresso dagli auditi un convinto sostegno circa l’opportunità della riforma 
e, in particolare, apprezzamento sull’articolato approvato dall’altro ramo del Parlamento, pur 
sottolineandosi l’opportunità di introdurvi alcuni correttivi tecnici; esigenza che peraltro potrebbe 
anche essere superata attraverso un’adeguata attività interpretativa in funzione suppletiva”.
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Questo lavoro si soffermerà su due questioni che, alla luce dei primi interven-
ti ermeneutici, apparsi all’alba dell’entrata in vigore della legge, sono sembrate 
essere fra quelle più controverse e di maggiore rilievo sul piano pratico-applica-
tivo. In particolare, si ritiene opportuno affrontare il problema relativo all’indi-
viduazione di quali siano le parti essenziali del contratto e quali siano i soggetti 
tenuti alla liquidazione in favore dei legittimari non assegnatari.
Occorre così in primo luogo chiedersi se tra le parti essenziali del contratto 
vadano annoverati anche il coniuge e tutti coloro che sarebbero legittimari ove in 
quel momento si aprisse la successione nel patrimonio dell’imprenditore e quali 
siano le conseguenze derivanti dalla mancata partecipazione di tali soggetti.
Dalla lettura dell’art. 768 bis cod.civ., si potrebbe, in prima battuta, affermare 
che il patto di famiglia abbia una struttura bilaterale e che possa essere valida-
mente stipulato in presenza del solo imprenditore o del titolare di partecipazioni 
societarie con uno o più discendenti.
Alla figura dei legittimari si riferiscono gli artt. 768 quater e 768 sexies cod. civ.. 
Il primo comma dell’art. 768 quater cod.civ., attualmente in vigore, prevede, in 
particolare, che “Al contratto devono partecipare anche il coniuge e tutti coloro che sa-
rebbero legittimari ove in quel momento si aprisse la successione nel patrimonio dell’im-
prenditore”. Tale norma, contenuta nell’articolo rubricato “Partecipazione”, sembra, 
contrariamente a quanto sopra affermato, attribuire al contratto in questione la 
qualifica di negozio plurilaterale e pattuire l’obbligatorietà, della partecipazione 
al contratto di tutti quei soggetti che sarebbero legittimari se in quel momento 
si aprisse la successione nel patrimonio del disponente, senza peraltro prevedere 
alcuna specifica sanzione per l’inosservanza del disposto.
Il primo comma dell’art. 768 sexies cod.civ. dispone, inoltre, che “All’apertura 
della successione dell’imprenditore, il coniuge e gli altri legittimari che non abbiano par-
tecipato al contratto possono chiedere ai beneficiari del contratto stesso il pagamento della 
somma prevista dal secondo comma dell’articolo 768-quater, aumentata degli interessi 
legali”. Questa disposizione, disciplinando espressamente l’ipotesi in cui uno o 
più legittimari non prendano parte al patto di famiglia, complica ulteriormente 
il quadro normativo. Da tale previsione potrebbe desumersi, infatti, che il coniu-
ge e i legittimari non siano obbligati a partecipare al patto di famiglia, posto che 
quest’ultimo, nonostante la loro assenza, sarebbe comunque valido, tornando 
quindi alla prima interpretazione circa la struttura bilaterale del patto di famiglia.
L’assenza di un qualsivoglia riferimento alla posizione dei legittimari nel-
la nozione fornita dal legislatore, in uno con l’apparente contrasto creato delle 
norme ora riportate, ha dato origine ad un problema interpretativo di notevole 
importanza22.
22 c. Bauco - v. caPozzi (Il patto di famiglia, Milano 2007, 39) affermano che i problemi attinenti 
alla figura dei legittimari costituiscono l’aspetto maggiormente controverso delle nuova di-
sciplina. n. di mauro (I necessari partecipanti al patto di famiglia, in Fam., pers. e succ., 2006, 534) 
similmente rileva che “La nuova normativa in tema di patto di famiglia pone rilevanti problemi erme-
neutici in virtù del non chiaro dettato legislativo: tra questi assume notevole importanza sul piano teori-
137patto di famiglia e tutela individuale del legittimario
La dottrina ha formulato, per quanto concerne la posizione e il ruolo dei legit-
timari, soluzioni assai diverse e contrastanti che possono essere ricondotte a due 
grandi filoni, all’interno dei quali vi è tra l’altro un’estrema varietà di posizioni23: 
secondo il primo filone (struttura bilaterale) i legittimari devono intervenire alla 
stipulazione del patto di famiglia, ma la partecipazione non è requisito struttura-
le del contratto stesso24; secondo l’altro, invece, la mancata partecipazione da par-
te dei legittimari esistenti al momento della stipulazione del patto di cui all’art. 
768 bis e ss. rende lo stesso invalido (struttura plurilaterale)25.
co e su quello applicativo il problema relativo all’individuazione di quali siano le parti essenziali, a pena 
di nullità, del contratto di patto di famiglia e, in particolare, se siano tali il coniuge e i legittimari non 
assegnatari dell’azienda e/o delle quote societarie”. Lo stesso legislatore – avvertita come pressante 
l’esigenza di consentire, per ragioni d’economia, che le nuove norme entrassero subito in vigo-
re – ha esortato l’interprete a riempire le lacune attraverso “un’adeguata attività interpretativa in 
funzione suppletiva”: così la relazione al Senato nella seduta n. 552 del 26 gennaio 2006.
23 La difficoltà di catalogare le diverse opinioni sostenute dai commentatori della nuova di-
sciplina è già stata sottolineata; cfr. G. amadio, Divieto di patti successori ed attualità degli interessi 
tutelati, in aa.vv., Patti di famiglia per l’impresa, a cura della Fondazione italiana per il notariato, 
Milano, 2006, 83, nota 2.
24 In tal senso: a. anGrisani - s. sica, Il patto di famiglia e gli strumenti di successione dell’impresa, 
Torino, 2007, 67; m. ateLLi, Prime note sul patto di famiglia, in Obbl. e contr., 2006, 6; m. avaGLiano, 
Patti di famiglia e impresa, in Riv. notar., 2007, 26; Cfr. m. Bernardini, Il patto di famiglia tra adozione 
e successione, in Studi in onore di Giorgio Cian, I, cit., 240; c. caccavaLe, Appunti per uno studio sul 
patto di famiglia: profili strutturali e funzionali della fattispecie, cit., 289; id, Divieto di patti successori 
ed attualità degli interessi tutelati, in aa.vv., Patti di famiglia per l’impresa, cit., 38; a. di simone – c. 
forino, Gli effetti della mancata partecipazione di un legittimario al patto di famiglia, in Notariato, 
2006, 703; G. PetreLLi, La nuova disciplina del patto di famiglia, cit. 432; G. oBerto, Lineamenti essen-
ziali del patto di famiglia, in Fam. e dir., 2006, 415; G. recinto, Il Patto di famiglia, in AA.VV., Diritto 
delle successioni, a cura di r. caLvo e G. PerLinGeri, Napoli, 2008, 630; G. sicchiero, Art. 768 sexies. Il 
Patto di famiglia, commentario a cura di s. deLLe monache, in Nuove leggi civ. comm., 2007, 84; a. 
vaLeriani, Il patto di famiglia e la riunione fittizia, in aa.vv., Patti di famiglia per l’impresa, cit., 135.
25 G. amadio, Divieto di patti successori ed attualità degli interessi tutelati, in aa.vv., Patti di famiglia 
per l’impresa, cit., 73; id, Patto di famiglia e funzione divisionale, in Riv. notar., 2006, 886; i. amBrosi-
f. BasiLe, Le nuove norme in materia di patto di famiglia, cit., 2006, 378; m.c. andrini, Il patto di fa-
miglia: tipo contrattuale e forma negoziale, in Vita not., 2006, 40; L. BaLestra, Art. 768 bis. Il Patto di 
famiglia, commentario a cura di s. deLLe monache, cit., 25; ID, Il patto di famiglia a un anno dalla 
sua introduzione, in Riv. trim. dir. e proc. civ., 2007, 733; ID, Prime osservazioni sul patto di famiglia, in 
Nuova giur. civ. comm., 2006, 382; G. BaraLis, Attribuzione ai legittimari non assegnatari dell’azienda 
o delle partecipazioni sociali, in AA.VV., Patti di famiglia per l’impresa, cit., 223; G. BoniLini, Manuale 
di diritto ereditario e delle donazioni, Torino, 2011, 171; G. caPozzi, Il patto di famiglia, in Successioni 
e donazioni, Milano, 2009, 1467; F. deLfini, Articolo 2 (art. 768 quater), in de nova, deLfini, ramPoL-
La, venditti, Il patto di famiglia, Milano, 2006, 25; s. deLLe monache, Spunti ricostruttivi e qualche 
spigolatura in tema di patto di famiglia, cit., 893; n. di mauro, sub art. 768 bis, in n. di mauro, e. 
minervini, v. verdicchio, Le nuove leggi civili. Il patto di famiglia. Commentario alla legge 14 febbraio 
2006, n. 55, a cura di E. minervini, Milano, 2006, 45; f. Gazzoni, Appunti e spunti in tema di patto di 
famiglia, in Giust. civ., 2006, 220; m. ieva, Profili strutturali del patto di famiglia, in AA.VV., Donazio-
ni, atti gratuiti, Patti di famiglia e trusts successorii, Bologna, 2010, 469; id, Art. 768 quater. Il Patto di 
famiglia, commentario a cura di s. deLLe monache, cit., 53; ID, La disciplina del patto di famiglia e 
l’evoluzione degli strumenti di trasmissione dei beni produttivi (ovvero del tentativo di rimediare a ipotesi 
di malfunzionamento dei meccanismi di riduzione e collazione), in Riv. notar., 2009, 1089; B. inzitari, Il 
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2.2. Tesi della struttura bilaterale del patto di famiglia
Secondo il primo orientamento, il patto di famiglia può essere validamente con-
cluso anche solo con taluni dei legittimari esistenti al momento della conclu-
sione del contratto. I sostenitori di tale tesi muovono dall’assunto che il patto di 
famiglia, delineato nella nozione contenuta nell’art. 768 bis cod. civ., si presenta 
come un contratto bilaterale, dove solo l’accordo tra l’imprenditore e l’assegnata-
rio assume un ruolo essenziale; il riferimento al testo dell’art. 768 quater cod. civ. 
non può essere di per sé sufficiente al fine di attribuire alla presenza dei legitti-
mari la qualifica di elemento essenziale a pena di nullità del patto. Si ritiene che 
il “devono” non sia elemento decisivo: tante volte la doverosità di un interven-
to negoziale non si giustifica con la necessità della partecipazione volitiva alla 
perfezione ed alla validità dell’atto26. La norma imporrebbe un mero obbligo a 
carico dell’imprenditore o dell’assegnatario di convocazione all’atto del coniuge 
e degli altri legittimari non assegnatari: dal che discenderebbe che, adempiuto 
tale obbligo, l’assenza o il rifiuto di costoro sarebbe irrilevante ai fini del per-
fezionamento del contratto, non essendo questi parti essenziali e ciò anche in 
virtù della loro diversa qualificazione normativa quali “partecipanti” (art. 768 
quater cod.civ.).
Tra i sostenitori di tale tesi occorre, però, distinguere coloro i quali ammetto-
no che gli effetti tipici del patto di famiglia possano spiegarsi anche nei confronti 
dei non intervenuti e quanti ritengono, invece, che gli effetti tipici del patto di 
famiglia si produrrebbero solo nei confronti delle parti del contratto, permanen-
do a favore dei non intervenuti le tutele previste dalle regole ordinarie del diritto 
successorio.
Secondo i primi, se i legittimari sono stati convocati, anche se non vi han-
no partecipato, sarà loro opponibile la quantificazione decisa dai contraenti; nel 
Patto di famiglia, Negoziabilità del diritto successorio con la legge 14 febbraio 2006, n. 55, Torino, 2006, 
105; f. maGLiuLo, L’apertura della successione:imputazione, collazione e riduzione, in AA.VV., Patti di 
famiglia per l’impresa, cit., 285; P. manes, Prime considerazioni sul patto di famiglia nella gestione del 
passaggio generazionale della ricchezza familiare, in Contr. e impr., 2006, 549; a. mascheroni, Divie-
to di patti successori ed attualità degli interessi tutelati, in AA.VV., Patti di famiglia per l’impresa, cit., 
21; a. merLo, Divieto di patti successori ed attualità degli interessi tutelati, in aa.vv., Patti di famiglia 
per l’impresa, cit., 102; f. noBiLi, Imprese di famiglia e passaggio generazionale, Milano, 2008, 31; a. 
PischetoLa, Il patto di famiglia a raffronto con gli istituti alternativi al testamento, in AA.VV., Patti di 
famiglia per l’impresa, cit., 301; c. PuLiGheddu, Donazioni e patto di famiglia: due figure a confronto, 
in AA.VV., Donazioni, atti gratuiti, Patti di famiglia e trusts successorii, cit., 516; f. tassinari, Il patto di 
famiglia: presupposti soggettivi, oggettivi e requisiti formali, in AA.VV., Patti di famiglia per l’impresa, 
cit., 162; a. zoPPini, L’emersione della categoria della successione anticipata, in aa.vv., Patti di famiglia 
per l’impresa, cit., 277.
26 Si osserva che ci sono almeno due utilizzazioni codicistiche del “devono” in senso assolu-
tamente differente: il “devono” della divisione del testatore e il “devono” dell’art. 1113 cod. civ., 
in cui i soggetti ivi indicati devono essere chiamati ad intervenire alla divisione, ma soltanto 
perché questa abbia effetti nei loro confronti: u. La Porta, La posizione dei legittimari sopravvenuti, 
in AA.vv., Patti di famiglia per l’impresa, cit., 302.
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caso in cui invece il disponente non abbia provveduto a sollecitare il loro inter-
vento, la valutazione operata dai contraenti sarà loro inopponibile27.
Secondo l’altra impostazione, invece, la partecipazione dei legittimari è ri-
chiesta al fine di rendere il sistema creato dal patto di famiglia opponibile anche 
nei confronti di questi ultimi28: la vincolatività del patto opera solo nei confronti 
dei legittimari che prendono parte al contratto, anche in un successivo momen-
to, e dei soggetti sopravvenuti che non hanno potuto partecipare, nei limiti di 
cui all’art. 768 sexies cod.civ.29. Per contro, coloro che non solo stati coinvolti nella 
stipulazione del patto, ovvero l’hanno rifiutata, non sono vincolati alla disciplina 
prevista dal legislatore e possono liberamente avvalersi della collazione ed espe-
rire l’azione di riduzione anche nei confronti dell’impresa o delle partecipazioni 
societarie oggetto di trasferimento30.
2.3. Tesi della struttura plurilaterale del patto di famiglia
Altra parte della dottrina, in particolare quella che intravede nel patto di famiglia 
una funzione divisionale – distributiva31, afferma che il patto di famiglia sareb-
27 Tale impostazione è affermata da coloro che configurano il patto di famiglia quale donazio-
ne modale. La natura di donazione modale dell’attribuzione compiuta con il patto di famiglia 
è affermata, inoltre da: c. caccavaLe, Appunti per uno studio sul patto di famiglia: profili struttura-
li e funzionali della fattispecie, cit., 304; a. merLo, Divieto di patti successori ed attualità degli inte-
ressi tutelati, in aa.vv., Patti di famiglia per l’impresa, cit., 102 e m.c. LuPetti, Il finanziamento 
dell’operazione:family buy out, in aa.vv., Patti di famiglia per l’impresa, cit., 370. Quest’ultimo auto-
re, in realtà, parla di donazione modale in senso atecnico e ne limita la configurabilità alla sola 
ipotesi in cui sia l’assegnatario discendente a liquidare i legittimari.
28 G. di Giandomenico, Divieto di patti successori ed attualità degli interessi tutelati, in aa.vv., Patti di 
famiglia per l’impresa, cit., 146;G. PetreLLi, La nuova disciplina del patto di famiglia, cit. 432; G. oBer-
to, Lineamenti essenziali del patto di famiglia, cit., 415; G. recinto, in Il Patto di famiglia, in AA.VV. Di-
ritto delle successioni, cit., 2008, 630; a. vaLeriani, Il patto di famiglia e la riunione fittizia, in aa.vv., 
Patti di famiglia per l’impresa, cit., 135.
29 Su tale punto divergono, tuttavia, le posizioni degli stessi autori della tesi ora riportata. Cfr. 
G. oBerto, Lineamenti essenziali del patto di famiglia, cit., 415, l’autore, infatti, basando le sue argo-
mentazioni sul disposto di cui all’art. 768 sexies cod.civ., esclude che i legittimari sopravvenuti 
possano essere vincolati alle previsioni del patto e al sistema da questo imposto. L’inopponibi-
lità, quindi, varrebbe anche nei confronti dei legittimari che non abbiano potuto partecipare al 
contratto in quanto sopravvenuti.
30 In questo senso v. G. PetreLLi, La nuova disciplina del patto di famiglia, cit., 429, l’autore afferma 
che tale ricostruzione permette di salvaguardare anche il principio di intangibilità della legitti-
ma, poiché questa sarebbe sacrificabile, per i legittimari esistenti al momento della stipula del 
contratto, solo previo loro consenso.
31 Affermano la plurilaterità del patto di famiglia anche autori che non riconoscono al patto 
di famiglia una funzione propriamente e/o esclusivamente divisionale: L. BaLestra, Il patto di 
famiglia a un anno dalla sua introduzione (parte prima), in Riv. trim. dir. e proc. civ., 750; ID, Prime 
osservazioni sul patto di famiglia, Nuova giur. civ. comm., 377; G. BaraLis, Attribuzione ai legittimari 
non assegnatari dell’azienda o delle partecipazioni sociali, in AA.VV., Patti di famiglia per l’impresa, cit., 
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be valido ed efficace solo se ad esso effettivamente partecipino tutti i soggetti 
nominati nell’art. 768 quater cod. civ., ossia, oltre all’imprenditore disponente e 
ai discendenti beneficiari, anche coloro che sarebbero legittimari se in quel mo-
mento si aprisse la successione nel patrimonio dell’imprenditore.
La ragione di questa impostazione si rinviene nella circostanza che il patto di 
famiglia, da un lato, rappresenta una sorta di anticipazione della distribuzione 
del patrimonio del disponente rispetto al momento dell’apertura della succes-
sione, mentre, dall’altro, esclude quanto ne è oggetto dall’azione di riduzione e 
dalla collazione.
Si osserva come non ci si possa limitare alle sole indicazioni contenute nell’art. 
768 bis cod. civ. che, in quanto generica definizione dell’istituto, escludono ogni ri-
ferimento ai legittimari32. Occorre, invece, tener presente la formulazione dell’art. 
786 quater cod. civ.: tale norma non permette di poter accogliere quelle interpreta-
zioni che, pur nell’intento di ampliare l’ambito di applicazione del nuovo istituto, 
appaiano contrarie al canone ermeneutico imposto dall’art. 12 delle preleggi33.
L’antinomia, descritta nei paragrafi precedenti, tra il testo dell’art. 768 quater, 
che impone la presenza dei legittimari, e l’art. 768 sexies, che disciplina l’ipote-
si della mancata partecipazione dei legittimari, dovrebbe essere risolta, secon-
do tale ricostruzione, riconoscendo che i soggetti richiamati dall’art. 768 sexies 
sono solo coloro che non abbiano potuto partecipare alla stipulazione del patto 
di famiglia, perché non esistenti, ignoti o non ancora investiti della qualifica di 
legittimari al momento della conclusione del contratto34.
223; s. deLLe monache, Spunti ricostruttivi e qualche spigolatura in tema di patto di famiglia, cit., 893; 
n. di mauro, sub art. 768 bis, in n. di mauro, e. minervini, v. verdicchio, Le nuove leggi civili. Il patto 
di famiglia, Commentario alla Legge 14 febbraio 2006, n. 55, a cura di E. minervini, cit., 52; a. merLo, 
Divieto di patti successori ed attualità degli interessi tutelati, in AA.VV., Patti di famiglia per l’impresa, 
cit., 101; f. tassinari, Il patto di famiglia: presupposti soggettivi, oggettivi e requisiti formali, in AA.VV., 
Patti di famiglia per l’impresa, cit., 166.
32 L. BaLestra, Art. 768 bis. Il patto di famiglia, Commentario a cura di s. deLLe monache, cit., 25; id, 
Il patto di famiglia a un anno dalla sua introduzione, cit., 751; L. carota, Commentario del Codice Civile 
– Delle Successioni, III, a cura di v. cuffaro e f. deLfini, sub art. 768 quater, cit., 425; s. deLLe mo-
nache, Funzione, contenuto ed effetti del patto di famiglia, aa.vv., in Tradizione e modernità nel diritto 
successorio: dagli istituti classici al patto di famiglia, a cura di S. Delle Monache, Padova, 2007, 330.
33 G. de nova, Commentario del Codice Civile – Delle Successioni, III, a cura di v. cuffaro e f. deL-
fini, sub art. 768 bis, cit., 382. Contra u. La Porta, Il patto di famiglia, Torino, 2007, 190, l’autore 
osserva che la “doverosità” di cui all’art. 768 quater cod. civ. può essere spiegata anche soltanto 
in riferimento a norme, tra le quali ad esempio l’art. 1113 cod. civ., che richiedono un dovere di 
intervento per soggetti terzi rispetto al negozio ai soli fini dell’efficacia relativa del contratto.
34 Così L. BaLestra, Il patto di famiglia a un anno dalla sua introduzione, cit., 755; G. BoniLini, Manua-
le di diritto ereditario e delle donazioni, cit., 178; F. deLfini, Articolo 2 (art. 768 quater), in G. de nova, f. 
deLfini, s. ramPoLLa, a. venditti, Il patto di famiglia. Legge 14 febbraio 2006, n. 55, cit., 25. Nello stesso 
senso anche G. BaraLis, Attribuzione ai legittimari non assegnatari dell’azienda o delle partecipazio-
ni sociali, in AA.VV., Patti di famiglia per l’impresa, cit., 223; s. deLLe monache, Spunti ricostruttivi 
e qualche spigolatura in tema di patto di famiglia, cit., 894; n. di mauro, sub art. 768 bis, in n. di 
mauro, e. minervini, v. verdicchio, Il patto di famiglia, cit., 49; f. Gazzoni, Appunti e spunti in tema 
di patto di famiglia, cit., 223; B. inzitari, Il Patto di famiglia, cit., 119; m.c. LuPetti, Il finanziamento 
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Tele impostazione trova giustificazione, oltre che nel riferimento letterale 
all’art. 768 quater, anche nei lavori preparatori35 ove si afferma che il patto di fa-
miglia “deve essere obbligatoriamente sottoscritto dal coniuge e dai legittimari” e dalla 
circostanza che, nel corso della seduta della Commissione Giustizia del Senato 
del 31 gennaio 2006, sia stato respinto un emendamento che ammetteva la valida 
stipulazione del patto di famiglia anche in assenza dei legittimari, col che si è vo-
luto chiaramente far intendere che non sia ammissibile, e quindi valido, il patto 
di famiglia nel quale non fossero intervenuti tutti i legittimari.
Secondo i sostenitori di tale orientamento, il patto di famiglia è un negozio 
complesso all’interno del quale l’assegnazione dei beni dell’impresa al beneficiario 
e la liquidazione in favore dei non assegnatari costituiscono entrambi elementi 
che concorrono ad integrare l’accordo contrattuale36. La causa del contratto può 
dirsi realizzata solo quando vengano soddisfatti i contrapposti interessi e tutela-
te le rispettive istanze; devono, pertanto, essere assicurati gli interessi del dispo-
nente a trasferire i beni aziendali o le partecipazioni societarie, gli interessi del 
beneficiario a vedersi attribuire con efficacia immediata i beni del disponente e 
gli interessi dei legittimari non assegnatari a vedersi liquidata la propria quota di 
legittima sull’impresa. I legittimari devono intervenire per salvaguardare i propri 
diritti e, in particolare, per concorrere alla determinazione del valore dell’azienda o 
delle partecipazioni e quindi, di riflesso, delle quote ad essi spettanti; per ottenere, 
consequenzialmente, la liquidazione in denaro delle loro quote; per procedere alla 
eventuale rinuncia totale o parziale a detta liquidazione; per assentire a che detta 
liquidazione avvenga in tutto o in parte in natura, piuttosto che in denaro37.
La partecipazione dei legittimari attuali deve essere, secondo questa imposta-
zione, considerata qualificante del contratto stesso e indispensabile per realiz-
zare quell’equilibrio di interessi38: in assenza di tali soggetti il contratto posto in 
essere non può assumere la qualifica di patto di famiglia39.
dell’operazione:family buy out, in aa.vv., Patti di famiglia per l’impresa, cit., 360; c. PuLiGheddu, Do-
nazioni e patto di famiglia: due figure a confronto, in AA.VV., Donazioni, atti gratuiti, Patti di famiglia 
e trusts successorii, cit., 516. Contra u. La Porta, Il patto di famiglia, cit., 301, secondo l’autore “è as-
solutamente da dimostrare che il legittimario non partecipante, cui l’art. 768 sexies cod. civ. si riferisce, 
sia soltanto “quello sopravvenuto” e non pure, più genericamente e più rispettosamente verso la rubrica 
dell’articolo, quello che, ancorché esistente non abbia partecipato alla stipula del patto, restando, rispetto 
ad esso, appunto terzo, ossia estraneo…”.
35 Ne dà atto anche G. PetreLLi, La nuova disciplina del “patto di famiglia”, cit., 429.
36 L. carota, Il contratto con causa successoria, Contributo allo studio del patto di famiglia, Padova, 
2008.97.
37 n. di mauro, sub art. 768 bis, in n. di mauro, e. minervini, v. verdicchio, Il patto di famiglia, a 
cura di E. minervini, cit., 49.
38 L. carota, Commentario del Codice Civile – Delle Successioni, III, a cura di v. cuffaro e f. deLfini, 
sub art. 768 quater, cit., 436.
39 La funzione del notaio è diretta proprio a garantire la tutela dei diritti dei legittimari con 
la verifica della loro necessaria partecipazione all’atto. Si osserva che il ruolo del notaio sarà 
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2.4. Adesione alla tesi della necessaria partecipazione dei legittimari al 
patto di famiglia
Diversi sono gli elementi che portano a ritenere necessaria la partecipazione di 
tutti i legittimari al patto di famiglia.
La tesi opposta trascura, in primo luogo, la formulazione delle norme. Il dato 
letterale insegna, infatti, che i legittimari non si debbono limitare a prestare il 
loro consenso ai trasferimenti decisi dal disponente, ma debbono rivestire il ruo-
lo di contraenti all’interno della vicenda caratterizzante il patto di famiglia. In 
tal senso fanno propendere sia il primo comma dell’art. 768 quater cod. civ., sia 
l’uso, nell’ultimo comma del medesimo articolo, del termine “contraenti”, il quale 
fa riferimento non solo ai discendenti assegnatari, ma anche gli altri legittima-
ri, nei confronti dei quali si estende la previsione dell’esenzione da collazione e 
riduzione per i beni a loro trasferiti a titolo di liquidazione, sia, infine, il primo 
comma dell’art. 768 quinquies cod. civ. che permette a tutti i “partecipanti”- non 
solo al disponente e al beneficiario - di impugnare il patto di famiglia.
L’opinione, inoltre, che ammette la preterizione di uno o più legittimari si 
scontra con la circostanza che dalla medesima fattispecie discendono effetti tra 
loro incompatibili: se si accogliesse la tesi della inopponibilità del patto ai legitti-
mari esclusi dal contratto, dovrebbe, infatti, logicamente accettarsi che il mede-
simo fatto dovrebbe essere qualificato e produrre gli effetti tipici della liberalità 
per i pretermessi, mentre dovrebbe produrre effetti opposti e inconciliabili per 
i legittimari che hanno concluso il patto di famiglia. Tale soluzione, però, appare 
incoerente sul piano logico e giuridico.
In un sistema, come quello italiano, dove il legislatore ha introdotto una disci-
plina eccezionale rispetto alle norme generali del diritto successorio, sembra do-
versi richiedere il consenso di tutti i legittimari esistenti al momento del contratto, 
al fine di poter attribuire una validità alle attribuzioni effettuate dal disponente.
Appare così necessario, in coerenza con il precipuo scopo della legge, richie-
dere l’intervento nel contratto costituente il patto di famiglia di tutti coloro che 
vanterebbero diritti (come legittimari) sulla successione dell’imprenditore se la 
stessa si aprisse al momento della stipula del patto. I diritti dei legittimari, con il 
patto di famiglia, senza il loro intervento nella predisposizione del regolamento 
negoziale, potrebbero venire lesi, sacrificati da accordi tesi a tal fine tra impren-
ditore e assegnatari.
È opinione oramai consolidata, nella dottrina italiana, quella secondo la quale 
le norme poste a tutela dei diritti dei legittimari siano da considerarsi come 
pertanto quello di verificare preliminarmente la sussistenza di tutti i requisiti essenziali del 
patto di famiglia, e quindi l’intervento alla stipula dell’atto di tutti i legittimari esistenti in quel 
dato momento storico, nessuno escluso; in tal senso G. caPozzi, Il patto di famiglia, in Successioni 
e donazioni, cit., 1460; n. di mauro, sub art. 768 bis, in n. di mauro, e. minervini, v. verdicchio, Il 
patto di famiglia, a cura di E. minervini, cit., 52.
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cogenti in quanto inderogabili dalle parti prima dell’apertura della successione, 
rappresentando le stesse un’estrinsecazione di un principio di ordine pubblico40.
Appare chiaro, pertanto, che l’incidenza del patto di famiglia sui diritti dei le-
gittimari non assegnatari non può che postulare, a pena di nullità, la necessaria 
partecipazione di questi ultimi al patto di famiglia, la cui struttura è pertanto 
essenzialmente a carattere plurilaterale.
Escludere la partecipazione dei legittimari dai requisiti essenziali del contrat-
to se, da un lato incoraggia l’utilizzo dell’istituto, dall’altro finisce in concreto per 
depotenziarlo perché perde ogni vantaggio rispetto ad una normale donazione 
con dispensa da collazione.
Il beneficiario si vedrebbe infatti costretto, ai sensi del disposto del secondo 
comma dell’art. 768 quater cod. civ., a liquidare gli altri legittimari non assegnata-
ri, senza tuttavia evitare, al momento dell’apertura della successione, l’esercizio 
della comune tutela da parte dei legittimari che, seppur liquidati, non accetti-
no le disposizioni effettuate dal disponente. Il discendente assegnatario, tenuto 
alla liquidazione dei legittimari, otterrebbe una disattivazione dei meccanismi 
di tutela, limitatamente ai partecipanti al patto e, in quanto tale, insufficiente a 
rendere definitivo il valore della sua attribuzione o stabile l’attribuzione stessa.
Pare, pertanto, doversi concludere che oggi le parti essenziali, a pena di nulli-
tà, del patto di famiglia siano:
1)  l’imprenditore e/o il titolare di partecipazioni societarie (art. 768 bis cod. 
civ.) o disponente;
2)  uno o più discendenti del soggetto di cui sopra (art. 768 bis cod. civ.), defi-
niti anche assegnatario o assegnatari (art. 768 quater cod. civ.) o anche be-
neficiario o beneficiari (art. 768 sexies, primo comma, cod. civ.);
3)  il coniuge dell’imprenditore che sia tale al momento della conclusione del 
contratto (art. 768 quater, primo comma, cod. civ.);
4)  coloro che sarebbero legittimari dell’imprenditore, ove al momento della 
conclusione del contratto si aprisse la successione di quest’ultimo (art. 768 
quater, primo comma, cod. civ.).
Se uno dei legittimari non assegnatari non può o non vuole intervenire all’atto, 
non potrà procedersi alla conclusione del contratto di patto di famiglia e si dovrà, 
40 Sul punto cfr. in termini G. BoniLini, Manuale di diritto ereditario e delle donazioni, cit., 123, se-
condo cui il nostro ordinamento giuridico ha da sempre salvaguardato l’esigenza di assicura-
re la legittima caratterizzando come cogenti le norme sulla successione necessaria; in quanto 
inderogabili rivelano un’opzione di fondo che conforma un principio di ordine pubblico; L. 
menGoni, Successioni per causa di morte, Successione necessaria, in Tratt. di Diritto civile e Commerciale, 
già diretto da a. cicu e f. messineo e continuato da L. menGoni, XLIII, 2, Milano, 2000, 89, nt. 1, 
secondo cui l’intangibilità della legittima è un principio di ordine pubblico non solo interno, 
ma anche di diritto internazionale privato ex art. 16, l. 31.5.1995, n. 218; c.m. Bianca, Diritto civile, 
2, Le successioni, Milano, 2005, 537-538, 670.
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pertanto, ricorrere all’utilizzo di altro strumento negoziale per assicurare la tra-
smissione dell’azienda e/o delle partecipazioni societarie.
In tal senso pare debbano leggersi anche i tentativi legislativi, non andati a 
buon fine, succedutesi nel corso degli anni 2011 e 2012, per la modifica della disci-
plina del patto di famiglia.
Sia l’anno 2011 che il 2012, si sono caratterizzati, infatti, per un rinnovato inte-
resse delle istituzioni italiane nei confronti della normativa del patto di famiglia: 
in primo luogo, la materia è stata incisa dalla prima versione del Decreto svilup-
po n. 70/2011, approvato dal Governo in data 5 maggio 2011, ma successivamen-
te cancellata quando il decreto è approdato al Quirinale41, presumibilmente in 
quanto non rispondente ai criteri di urgenza propri del decreto legge ed altre-
sì in considerazione del fatto che “un argomento così delicato e sentito necessita di 
un adeguato approfondimento”42. È stata poi recuperata nella proposta di legge C. 
4463, presentata il 28 giugno 2011, assegnata alla II Commissione Giustizia in 
sede Referente il 20 luglio 2011 e, infine, nella bozza del Decreto sviluppo dell’ot-
tobre 2011, anche questo poi non approvato. Nel 2012, invece, la riforma del patto 
di famiglia è stata presentata sotto forma di emendamento, poi ritirato, durante 
la fase di conversione in legge del Decreto legge 22 giugno 2012, n. 83, recante 
misure urgenti per la crescita del Paese (C. 5312 Governo). 
Soffermandosi sull’aspetto maggiormente interessante ai fini del presente lavo-
ro, e tralasciando i limiti di natura tecnica delle proposte43, tutte le iniziate legislative 
prevedevano la modifica dell’art. 768 quater cod. civ. dedicato alla “Partecipazione”.
La nuova formulazione dell’art. 768 quater cod. civ. prevedeva, infatti, la pos-
sibilità che l’atto venisse redatto anche senza la presenza di tutti i legittimari44.
Donde conferma ulteriore al rilievo che, secondo la disciplina ancora ad oggi 
in vigore, la stipulazione del patto non sia possibile qualora non vi partecipino 
tutti i legittimari esistenti al momento in cui viene stipulato il patto di famiglia. 
Se il testo attuale, infatti, fosse da interpretare nel senso esposto della struttura 
bilaterale del patto, il legislatore non avrebbe sentito la necessità di modificare 
le norme ammettendo espressamente la possibilità che il contratto possa esse-
41 La versione definitiva del Decreto è stata adottata in data 13 maggio 2011 ed è stato convertito 
con Legge 12 luglio 2011 n. 106.
42 Si veda l’incipit della Proposta di Legge n. 4463 presentata alla Camera dei Deputati in data 
28.06.2011.
43 Sul punto, per una prima analisi, m. ieva - a. zoPPini, Brevissime note sulla proposta di modifica 
del patto di famiglia inserita nel testo originario del decreto sviluppo, in Riv. notar., 2011, 1457.
44 La proposta di modifica aggiungeva che, nel caso di mancata partecipazione di uno dei le-
gittimari, il disponente dovesse notificargli, entro trenta giorni dalla conclusione del contratto, 
il relativo contenuto, per l’eventuale accettazione del beneficiario o il suo rifiuto, nelle forme 
dell’art. 768 bis cod. civ. (probabilmente il richiamo era all’art. 768 ter, dedicato alla forma e non 
all’art. 768 bis dedicato alla nozione del patto di famiglia). Nei casi di mancata partecipazione al 
contratto di tutti i legittimari, inoltre, il valore dell’azienda o delle partecipazioni doveva essere 
oggetto di perizia giurata da parte di un esperto nominato dal Tribunale.
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re concluso anche in assenza di uno dei legittimari e prevedendo una disciplina 
particolare per tale eventualità.
Da ultimo, in data 25 luglio 2012, è stato presentato un Ordine del Giorno con 
il quale la Camera ha impegnato il Governo a valutare l’opportunità di interveni-
re, mediante gli opportuni atti normativi, sulla disciplina del patto di famiglia 
al fine di rendere facoltativa la partecipazione al contratto di tutti quei soggetti 
in capo ai quali è attualmente previsto un obbligo alla partecipazione, e affinché 
fosse previsto un obbligo di notifica, da parte del disponente, dell’intenzione di 
stipulare il patto, nell’intento di conferire stabilità nel tempo agli effetti del tra-
sferimento patrimoniale mediante lo strumento del patto di famiglia.
2.5. Modalità di liquidazione dei legittimari non assegnatari
Sono tre le possibili modalità attraverso le quali l’assegnatario dell’azienda o delle 
partecipazioni societarie può estinguere l’obbligazione di liquidazione in favore 
dei potenziali legittimari non beneficiari45.
La prima modalità è costituita dall’adempimento immediato dell’obbligazione 
da parte del beneficiario mediante il pagamento delle somme risultanti dovute 
all’esito della valutazione dei beni e della determinazione delle quote di legitti-
ma46. L’art. 768 quater permette, inoltre, al beneficiario, in caso di accordo tra i con-
traenti, di liquidare i legittimari attraverso il trasferimento dei beni in natura47.
La seconda modalità è costituita dalla rinuncia, totale o parziale, dei legittima-
ri non assegnatari a quanto di loro spettanza48. La rinunzia può essere contenuta 
nel patto di famiglia, o in un atto separato, anche successivo al patto di famiglia. 
Nel caso di rinunzia con atto separato, la stessa deve essere formalizzata per atto 
pubblico, per simmetria con la disposizione dell’art. 768 ter cod. civ.
La rinunzia può essere pura e semplice o verso corrispettivo: il legittimario 
può rinunziare, cioè, alla liquidazione della propria quota verso pagamento di 
45 Cfr. G. caPozzi, Il patto di famiglia, in Successioni e donazioni, cit., 1481.
46 Il beneficiario potrà fare ricorso all’indebitamento in forme nuove e peculiari quali il family 
buy-out. Cfr. m. Bernardini, Il patto di famiglia tra adozione e successione, in Studi in onore di Giorgio 
Cian, cit., 239.
47 Per quanto riguarda il consenso che deve essere prestato ai fini della liquidazione in natura, 
si ritiene che non sia necessario che venga reso da tutti i contraenti essendo sufficiente l’accor-
do dell’assegnatario e del legittimario da tacitare in natura. Tali due soggetti, infatti, indipen-
dentemente dal consenso delle altre parti contrattuali possono convenire una datio in solutum 
ex art. 1197 cod. civ. Sul punto si veda nota n. 20, f. deLfini, in aa.vv, Commentario del Codice Civile 
– Delle Successioni, a cura di f. deLfini e v. cuffaro, sub art. 768 bis, cit., 389; id., Struttura e patologia 
del patto di famiglia, in Studi in onore di Giorgio Cian, cit., 755.
48 In questo caso si configura un patto successorio rinunziativo, eccezionalmente legittimato 
dall’art. 768 quater, II comma, cod. civ., in deroga al divieto previsto dall’art. 458 cod. civ.
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una somma di denaro o verso trasferimento di altri beni, provenienti da qualsia-
si soggetto, anche lo stesso disponente o un terzo49.
Occorre rilevare che la rinunzia alla liquidazione produce il venir meno del 
diritto dei legittimari non assegnatari ad esperire l’azione di riduzione o a po-
ter chiedere la collazione dell’impresa. La rinunzia è, pertanto, equiparabile alla 
liquidazione; i legittimari non assegnatari, infatti, che hanno rinunziato alla 
propria quota, nonostante nulla abbiano ricevuto dal patto di famiglia, qualora 
intendano agire in riduzione perché lesi, dovranno comunque imputare alla 
quota di legittima ad essi spettante sul patrimonio del disponente al momento 
dell’apertura della successione, quanto astrattamente avrebbero avuto il diritto 
di ricevere sul valore del bene attribuito con il patto.
La terza modalità di liquidazione è, secondo il disposto dell’art. 768 quater, ter-
zo comma, parte seconda, cod. civ., il differimento della liquidazione ad un mo-
mento successivo. La norma, infatti, prevede che “l’assegnazione disposta in favore 
degli altri partecipanti non assegnatari può essere fatta anche con successivo contratto 
che sia espressamente dichiarato collegato al primo con il quale si procede all’assegnazio-
ne dell’azienda, e purché vi intervengano i medesimi soggetti che hanno partecipato al 
primo contratto o coloro che li abbiano sostituiti50”.
Con tale previsione il legislatore ha voluto favorire la liquidazione da parte 
del discendente assegnatario, concedendogli la facoltà di corrispondere quanto 
dovuto agli altri legittimati in momenti successivi rispetto alla stipula del patto 
di famiglia: è facilmente prevedibile, infatti, che l’assegnatario non disponga, al 
momento della conclusione del contratto di cui all’art. 768 bis, delle sostanze ne-
cessarie per liquidare le quote dei non beneficiari51.
Ai fini della validità delle successive assegnazioni, è necessario che si proce-
da alla stipula di un successivo contratto, espressamente dichiarato collegato al 
primo, nel quale devono rivestire il ruolo di parti tutti i soggetti che hanno par-
tecipato al primo contratto o coloro che li abbiano sostituiti. Il patto di famiglia 
e gli eventuali successivi contratti, collegati al primo52, vengono a far parte di un 
un’unica operazione negoziale finalizzata all’esecuzione del patto di famiglia.
49 L. GenGhini e c. carBone, Il patto di famiglia, in Le successioni per causa di morte, cit., 1601.
50 G. caPozzi (Il patto di famiglia, in Successioni e donazioni, cit., 1482) chiarisce che l’espressione 
“a coloro che li abbiano sostituiti” si riferisce agli eredi, legittimi, testamentari o per rappresenta-
zione degli originari partecipanti al patto che siano nel frattempo deceduti. G. caPozzi osserva, 
inoltre, che nel caso in cui al legittimario non siano subentrati altri legittimari nessuna asse-
gnazione dovrà essere eseguita a favore dei suoi eredi. Nello stesso senso anche m.c. LuPetti, 
Patti di famiglia. Note a prima lettura, cit., 9.
51 Rileva il problema della difficoltà nel reperimento della provvista da parte del discendete as-
segnatario f. deLfini, in AA.VV., Commentario del Codice Civile – Delle Successioni, a cura di f. deLfini 
e v. cuffaro, sub art. 768 bis, cit., 388.
52 Nel senso che la fattispecie delineata nel testo rappresenti un’ipotesi di collegamento nego-
ziale: cfr. P. manes, Prime considerazioni sul patto di famiglia nella gestione del passaggio generaziona-
le della ricchezza familiare, cit., 561; G. rizzi, I patti di famiglia. Analisi dei contratti per il trasferimento 
147patto di famiglia e tutela individuale del legittimario
La fattispecie base del patto di famiglia è, dunque, quella della liquidazione da 
parte dell’assegnatario delle quote di legittima degli altri legittimari, ma questa 
soluzione non pare escludere l’ammissibilità di sistemazioni del patrimonio fa-
miliare in vita con carattere più ampio.
Si discute, infatti, circa la possibilità per il disponente di provvedere perso-
nalmente, al posto del discendente assegnatario, alla liquidazione dei legittimari 
da lui non prescelti quali beneficiari del patto di famiglia53. Secondo parte della 
dottrina, il terzo comma dell’art. 768 quater andrebbe inteso nel senso che i parte-
cipanti al contratto non assegnatari possano ricevere dal disponente la soddisfa-
zione dei propri diritti54. Tale variante del patto di famiglia, lasciata all’autonomia 
delle parti, troverebbe la sua ratio sia nella volontà di agevolare l’esecuzione del 
patto di famiglia, superando le eventuali difficoltà economiche dell’assegnatario 
che si veda costretto a versare ingenti somme di denaro agli altri legittimari, sia 
“nella volontà dell’ascendente di assecondare non solo la vocazione di impresa di uno dei 
discendenti, ma magari altresì le vocazioni non imprenditoriali degli altri legittimari”55.
I sostenitori di tale tesi ritengono plausibile che sia lo stesso disponente ad at-
tribuire beni e somme di denaro tratte dal suo patrimonio agli altri partecipanti 
al patto, realizzando in tal modo una sorta di contratto successorio avente natu-
ra divisoria56. Codesta possibilità potrà trovare fondamento implicito nel terzo 
e nel quarto comma dell’art. 768 quater cod. civ. Il terzo comma parla, infatti, di 
assegnazione di beni agli altri partecipanti non assegnatari dell’azienda, preve-
dendo, anche per essi, il principio della stima del valore concordata al momento 
della stipulazione del patto. La norma può disciplinare il caso in cui l’assegna-
zione di beni venga fatta da parte del discendente assegnatario di azienda, ma 
non disciplina esclusivamente tale ipotesi. Vi rientra anche quella, qui ipotizzata, 
dell’azienda e per il trasferimento di partecipazioni societarie, Padova, 2006, 22. Se i due contratti 
sono collegati ne deriva che le eventuali vicende patologiche che riguardino uno dei contratti 
in questione, sono destinate a riverberarsi anche sull’altro accordo: così, a titolo esemplificati-
vo, eventuali cause d’invalidità che riguardino uno dei contratti, potranno comportare anche 
l’invalidità dell’altro; cfr. L. GenGhini - c. carBone, Il patto di famiglia, in Le successioni per causa di 
morte, cit., 1593.
53 Dubbi sostanzialmente analoghi si sono posti in dottrina circa la possibilità che la liquida-
zione provenga dal patrimonio di un terzo, come nel caso frequente nella prassi in cui il coniu-
ge del disponente attribuisce un determinato bene, o una somma di denaro, ai figli che non 
hanno ricevuto l’azienda, L. GenGhini - c. carBone, Il patto di famiglia, in Le successioni per causa di 
morte, Padova, cit., 1599.
54 L. BaLestra, Il patto di famiglia a un anno dalla sua introduzione, cit., 745; L. carota, Il contratto 
con causa successoria. Contributo allo studio del patto di famiglia, cit., 200 ss. Cfr. anche di recente P. 
matera, Il Patto di famiglia, in I rapporti patrimoniali, L’impresa familiare, Il patto di famiglia, Torino, 
2011, 627.
55 Così F. deLfini, Articolo 2 (art. 768 quater), in G. de nova, f. deLfini, s. ramPoLLa, a. venditti, Il patto 
di famiglia, cit., 25.
56 B. inzitari, Il Patto di famiglia. Negoziabilità del diritto successorio con la legge 14 febbraio 2006, n. 
55, cit., 171.
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che sia lo stesso ascendente ad assegnare tali beni non costituenti l’azienda agli 
altri legittimari: infatti solo rispetto a quest’ultima ipotesi assume significato 
pregnante quanto previsto nell’ultimo comma dell’articolo 768 quater cod. civ.. 
Il quarto comma del predetto articolo, disponendo che quanto ricevuto dai con-
traenti non è soggetto a riduzione e a collazione, fa riferimento al caso in cui il 
disponente abbia effettuato delle assegnazioni a favore di tutti i contraenti: non 
avrebbe, infatti, senso parlare di una soggezione a collazione o a riduzione rispet-
to ad assegnazioni di beni fatte dal discendente assegnatario di azienda.
La possibilità rappresentata, ovvero quella di assegnazioni diverse dall’azienda 
da parte dell’ascendente, pare trovare conferma nei lavori preparatori: nella seduta 
in Commissione del 23 settembre 2003 - ma la stessa affermazione è stata ripetuta 
anche nella seduta del 21.07.2005 - l’on. Buemi precisava che con le norme proposte 
veniva disciplinata “l’ipotesi che l’imprenditore mediante il patto di famiglia o con succes-
sivo contratto ad esso collegato, assegni beni agli altri figli non assegnatari dell’azienda, in 
tal caso il valore di detti beni dovrà essere imputato alle loro quote di legittima”.
In tal senso milita, inoltre, l’esigenza di consentire all’autonomia privata di 
disporre di incentivi per ottenere quella partecipazione al patto da parte di tutti 
i legittimari. Per evitare dunque il verosimile insuccesso pratico del tentativo di 
conclusione di un patto di famiglia, si dovrebbe ritiene possibile l’intervento pe-
requativo dello stesso disponente a favore di tutti i legittimari.
Tale soluzione trova ulteriore conferma nei tentativi di riforma della disciplina 
del patto di famiglia, sopra richiamati, presentati nel corso del 2011 e del 2012. Tutti 
i testi, infatti, prevedevano che alla liquidazione dei non assegnatari potesse preve-
dere direttamente l’imprenditore o il titolare delle partecipazioni societarie, in de-
naro o con beni in natura, anche mediante imputazione di pregresse donazioni di-
sposte a loro favore, previa rivalutazione del valore delle stesse alla data del patto57.
57 Da ultimo, nell’ordine del giorno presentato dalla Camera in data 25.07.2012 (Ordine del 
Giorno di data 25.07.2012 presentato da Savino in assemblea, 9/05312/180, testo modificato nel 
corso della seduta), si è chiesto l’impegno del Governo a valutare l’opportunità di intervenire 
sulla disciplina del patto di famiglia anche per modificare le disposizioni relative alla liquida-
zione dei legittimari, posto che i soggetti sui quali attualmente ricade tale obbligo sovente non 
sono in grado di provvedervi.
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Introduction
This presentation deals with contracts entered into by a person suffering from 
mental incapacity, in the context of Italian, French and English law as well as 
the new Proposal for a Common European Sales Law.
We will discuss this through four key points. 
First, we will provide an overview of the rules of invalidity linked to men-
tal incapacity of one contracting party in the three legal systems and their 
general features.
Second, we will consider in greater depth the invalidity conditions under 
Italian, French and English law.
Third, we analyze the limits of the rule: both the lower limit, given by eve-
ryday life contracts, and the upper ones, regarding whether an absolute mental 
incapacity can lead to a different kind of invalidity and the special rule given 
under Italian law in the context of gifts.
Finally, the fourth part deals with mental incapacity in the light of the broad-
er framework of ‘bargaining power abuse’, also considered by the new Proposal 
for a Common European Sales Law.
1. Outline: Invalidity of the contract for mental incapacity
We are now going to consider the first point, i.e. an overview of the consequenc-
es linked to contract entered into by a person who lacks capacity.
Generally speaking, under Italian, English and French law a contract entered 
into by a person suffering from mental incapacity is invalid, provided that cer-
tain conditions are met.
Whilst the examined legal systems refer to such invalidity using different 
terminology and approaches (with the civil law systems seeing such invalidity 
as the rule and common law referring to it as an exception), the kinds of invalid-
ity provided share a number of common features. 
Specifically, the aim of the invalidity rule is to protect the person of unsound 
mind. This is why only the person considered incapable is allowed to exercise 
the rights associated with the status. 
Moreover, a distinction can be drawn between a general and a special regime 
of invalidity of the contract, depending on whether the person is subject to any 
protective measure (though in the common law such distinction is not express-
ly drawn by doctrine).
In Italy this issue is regulated by article 428 of the codice civile (entitled “Acts 
made by a mentally disordered person”), the second and third paragraph of ar-
ticle 427, which deal with situations where the person is subject to a protective 
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measure and someone else should have acted on his behalf or assisted him, and 
article 412 which addresses the case of ‘amministrazione di sostegno’1.
Under French law, the relevant provisions are found in the code civil with ar-
ticle 414-1 setting a general regime, and special rules being provided by articles 
435, from 464 to 466 and 4882.
In contrast to the aforesaid systems, in the United Kingdom the matter is al-
most entirely regulated by case law. The only relevant statutory provision is sec-
tion 7 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The most relevant precedents are found 
in: in re Walker (1904); Imperial Loan Company Ltd v Stone (1892) and Hart v 
O’Connor (1985)3.
2. Italian, French and English law: 
Person’s competency not limited by any protective measure
If we now turn to the second point and consider the conditions for such inva-
lidity under Italian, French and English law, we firstly have to say that each of 
the legal systems under consideration provides a different regime regarding the 
conditions for contractual invalidity depending on whether the person is subject 
to a protective measure or not. In other words, different provisions apply for le-
gal incompetency (incapacità legale in Italy, incapacité légal in France) and mental 
incapacity (incapacità naturale in Italy; insanité d’esprit in France).
First considering the general case, i.e. the case where the person’s competency 
has not been limited by any protective measure but he was non compos mentis at 
the moment the contract was concluded, we observe two approaches. 
On the one hand, Italian and English law establish that the contract is void-
able at the insane person’s will on the condition that the other party was aware of 
his mental impairment at the time of the contract.
Conversely, under French law the contract can be declared void at the request 
of the mentally incapable person without the need of any further requirement 
but the proof of the mental incapacity. The other party’s awareness is therefore 
irrelevant for the determination of invalidity of the contract. 
The Italian courts have interpreted the second paragraph of Article 428 of the 
Italian codice civile as allowing the mentally incapable party to avoid the contract 
1 For an overview, see Pescara, Tecniche privatistiche e istituti di salvaguardia dei disabili psichici, in 
Trattato di diritto privato Rescigno, III, 4, 2nd edn, Utet, Torino, 1997, 839 ff.; PietroBon, Incapacità 
naturale, in Enciclopedia giuridica, XVIII, Treccani, Roma, 1989.
2 duBois-PaiLLet, «Incapable Majeurs», in Encyclopédie Juridique Dalloz, Repertoire de droit civil, VI, 
Dalloz, France, mise a jour 2012; starck-roLand-Boyer, Droit civil. Les obligations, 2. Contrat, 16th edn, 
Litec, Paris, 1998, 157 ff.
3 In re Walker [1905] 1 Ch 160; Imperial Loan Company Ltd v Stone [1892] 1 Q.B. 599; Hart v O’Connor 
[1985] 1 A.C. 1000.
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on the basis of his mental impairment if the other party was in bad faith, which 
generally consists in the knowledge of the party’s incapacity. However, it has to 
be said that the interpretation of the article has been a matter of considerable de-
bate. In fact, if we read the first paragraph of article 428 codice civile, it refers to the 
discipline of acts made by a mentally incapable person and provides that the act 
can be avoided if it causes a prejudice to the mentally impaired party. Now, if we 
remember that a contract is in the first instance an act, we could argue that a con-
tract can be avoided only if both conditions (bad faith and a prejudice suffered 
by the incapable person) are met. Such argument is supported by a large part of 
the doctrine, whilst on the contrary jurisprudence does not require the existence 
of any prejudice.
Similarly, under English law a contract entered into by a person suffering 
from mental incapacity is voidable if the other party was aware of his lack of 
capacity at the moment the contract was concluded. The rule was issued in Im-
perial Loan Company Ltd v Stone (1892)4. Besides, voidability does not depend 
upon a prejudice suffered by the party, understood as unfairness of the bargain, 
as shown in Hart v O’Connor (1985). Lastly, at English law a contract is also void-
able if any reasonable man would have realized that the person was incapable, 
which is argued against by Italian authors.
Both Italian and English law try to find a balance between the protection of 
the person of unsound mind and the protection of the other party’s reliance on 
the contract. In particular, the reason for the bad faith requirement for avoidance 
is to safeguard the sane party reliance on the contract.
On the other hand, French law does not afford similar protection to the other 
party’s reliance on the contract and is more favorable to the mentally incapable 
person. In fact, article 414-1 code civil does not require that the other party be 
aware of the incapacity for declaring the contract ‘nul’ (that means void). Instead, 
the proof of mental insanity is sufficient. Despite the term used to refer to such 
invalidity, which is ‘nullité’ and could be translated with ‘voidness’, the kind of 
invalidity provided by French law is similar to Italian voidability.
The same favor to the incapable can be seen as the basis of a further rule. In 
the French legal system a contract (and, more generally, an act) entered into by 
a person during the two years preceding the commencement of proceedings for 
subjecting that person to a protective measure can be declared void just if he 
proves that he was unable to defend his own interests and he suffered a prejudice 
from the act (article 462 code civil).
This framework raises the question as to how one deals with cases where the 
mental incapacity is not easily recognizable by the other party. 
This could occur in at least two situations. 
4 For English law, see Treitel’s The Law of Contract, 13th edn, Sweet&Maxwell, London, 2011, 586 
ff.; cLarke, Vitiating Factors, in Furmston (ed), The Law of Contract, 4th edn, Part of Butterworths 
Common Law Series, United Kingdom, 2010, 857 ff.; haLe, Mental Health Law, Sweet&Maxwell, 
London, 2010. 
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The first is when no symptom is easily perceptible - we can think about an old 
person who seems alert at first sight, but who actually suffers from Alzheimer 
and forgets events after a short time. 
A second potential scenario is when the contract is concluded without the 
physical presence of the parties, for example by means of the internet - for in-
stance a person suffering from a mental incapacity who buys some rare stamps 
on E-bay -. In such cases, under a domestic point of view, assuming an objective 
meaning of bad faith might be a helpful approach. The reference to a prejudice 
ensuing from the act to the incapable contained in the second paragraph of arti-
cle 428, could be considered sufficient to raise a presumption of bad faith thereby 
creating the possibility for avoiding the contract. To put it differently, a flexible 
application of statutory rules could lead to a better protection for the mental in-
capable. At English law, the courts’ concern with not interfering with the free-
dom of contract means that it is unlikely they would grant voidability of the con-
tract. On the contrary, in France the declaration of voidness simply requires the 
proof of the mental impairment, meaning that such questions do not arise and 
the mental insane will always be protected.
3. Italian, French and English law: 
judicial measure which limits the person’s capacity
Moving on to the second hypothesis, this is the case the court has found the 
person permanently insane and has consequently rendered a judicial measure 
which limits the person’s capacity to act for himself (in Italy the relevant legal 
institutes are interdizione, inabilitazione and amministrazione di sostegno; in France 
they are tutelle, curatelle and sauveguarde de justice; the United Kingdom does not 
have the same legal institutes, however section 16 of the Mental Capacity Act 
2005 provides that the court could make the decision on his behalf in relation to 
certain matters or appoint a ‘deputy’ to make decisions on the person’s behalf). In 
this context, all of the systems under consideration provide for a higher level of 
protection for the incapable person.
In particular, two issues are worth highlighting.
Firstly, since an evaluation of the person’s capacity to understand and act in 
accordance with his own interests is made ex ante by the court, invalidity is not 
subject to the verification of the lack of mental capacity in the specific case. A 
non-rebuttable legal presumption of fact applies (that means that the other party 
is not permitted to prove the contrary). 
Turning to the second point, the filing system provided by each legal system 
enables anyone to be aware of the judicial measure the incapable person is sub-
jected to. Therefore one could argue that the reliance the other party could have 
had on the contract does not deserve further protection since he has the possibil-
ity of taking knowledge of the incapacity. 
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In fact, the Italian codice civile provides that any act the incapable person 
makes without the necessary assistance or legal representation of the guardian 
(the so called ‘curatore’ in the first case and ‘tutore’ in the second one) is voidable 
without any need for effective knowledge of the party’s incapacity (article 427, 
second and third paragraph). 
Similarly, in the United Kingdom if the person’s property is subject to the 
control of the court, the contract through which he disposes of the property does 
not bind him, but binds the other party. However, it is unclear whether the rule 
extends also to contracts unrelated to the disposition of property.
The French system differs from the ones examined and is more complex. If a 
person is subject to sauvegarde de justice or other measure and he personally made 
an act he should have been legally represented for, the act is voidable (nullité rela-
tive, provided by articles 435, 465, n. 3 code civil). If the person should have been 
only assisted for acting, the contract can be avoided if a prejudice ensued from it 
to the incapable (article 465, n. 2 code civil). 
With regard to those acts for which the person subject to a protective meas-
ure retains capacity, the general rules seem to apply in each of the legal systems 
considered. 
However, the French system provides a more flexible regime. Such acts can 
still be avoided in virtue of the general rule of art. 414-1 code civil, but can other-
wise be “rescinded for overreaching on the ground of enormous disproportion 
between the prestations of the parties” or “reduced for excess” (art. 425, 465, n. 1 
code civil). In such cases the court must consider the usefulness of the act for the 
person, the other party’s good or bad faith and the importance or consistence of 
the insane person’s property.
4. Limits to the rule: Lower limit
After analyzing the conditions in which operates the invalidity rule, we have 
now to examine the third aspect, which concerns the lower and upper limits to 
the afore examined rules of invalidity.
The lower limit deals with everyday life contracts concluded by the person 
subject to a protective measure. These are referred to as ‘atti’ or ‘contratti’ ‘mini-
mi’ in Italy, ‘actes de la vie courant’ in France and ‘contracts for necessaries’ in the 
United Kingdom. The question is whether the regime of invalidity we have seen 
applies to such contracts, or, on the other hand, the need for securing necessary 
goods and services to the person of unsound mind justifies a different approach. 
Although Italian statutory law does not provide any special rule for the case, 
it is believed that the person subject to a protective measure retains a minimum 
freedom of contracting in relation to everyday life necessities. Therefore such 
contracts are to be considered valid, provided that they are not prejudicial (as the 
general rule provided by article 428 codice civile still applies).
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Similarly, in France the same approach has been supported by the authors in the 
absence of any statutory provision. Before 1968, the reason for the rule was found 
in the existence of an implied mandate in favor of the incapable person. Since then 
the courts have relied upon the analogic application of the code civil rules concern-
ing minors that grant a limited capacity in relation to everyday life acts.
Under English law, the rule applying to this kind of contracts has been set 
out in Statute. Namely, section 7 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 provides that if 
the contract refers to the supply of necessary goods and services, the person who 
lacks capacity to contract must pay a reasonable price for them. For this purpose, 
“‘necessary’ means suitable to a person’s condition in life and to his actual re-
quirements at the time when the goods or services are supplied”. In other words, 
in such cases, even if it is not directly stated that the contract is valid, the law 
allows the supplier a remedy at common law for recovering a reasonable price. 
In brief, the aim of these rules is to find a balance between the interests of the 
mentally impaired to secure necessary goods and services at fair terms - avoiding 
the risk of social exclusion and exploitation -, and the interest of the other party 
to enter into valid contracts, - avoiding the risk of precariousness of the effects -, 
or at least to obtain payment. 
5. Limits to the rule: Upper limits
Moving on to the upper limits, two aspects have to be considered.
Firstly, it has to be examined whether an absolute lack of mental capacity ex-
cludes the existence of an effective consent and therefore leads to voidness / nulli-
ty of the contract (rather than voidability) for lack of one of its essential elements.
The aforesaid argument used to be supported in the past but appears to have 
lost its persuasiveness as of recent. 
In France, until the 1968 reform, authors referred to mental incapacity as an 
element excluding effective consent, required by article 1108 code civil for the va-
lidity of the contract. 
In Italy the argument had some followers under the previous codice civile 
1865, whilst since then it has been generally accepted that article 428 codice civile 
has set an organic discipline (only isolated authors still argue that the contract 
entered into by a person in state of absolute lack of mental capacity is void for 
defect of consent).
Secondly, special rules are provided by Italian and English law for gifts, there-
fore the general rule requiring proof of the other party’s awareness for avoiding 
the contract does not apply to such contracts (anyway, it has to be said, gift is not 
a contract according to English law). Instead, a gift is voidable to the mentally in-
capable donor choice if he only gives proof of his mental impairment. The reason 
for such rule is clear: the reliance of the donee can be sacrificed in favor to the 
mentally disordered donor interests according to the gratuity of gift.
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6. Incapacity and the CESL: Lack of any specific rule
One last point has to be tackled: the one concerning the broader framework 
where incapacity has to be seen. 
A comparative analysis of the subject “mental capacity and contract” is cer-
tainly useful in any case that presents elements of extraneousness, which is be-
coming more and more frequent as a result of increased mobility and of weaken-
ing of the connection between trade and national territory.
Where an element of extraneousness exists international private law rules ap-
ply: namely, with reference to domestic law, article 13 of Regulation Rome I (n° 
593/2008) on the law applicable to contractual obligations, and the second para-
graph of article 23 of Italian law n° 218/1995 on the reform of Italian interna-
tional private law indicates which law to apply in case of one party’s incapacity.
However, comparison is not sufficient for an exhaustive analysis of the topic 
of mental incapacity and contract. In fact, it cannot fail to consider the broader 
dimension, in which the phenomenon has to be framed namely European law.
In particular, although mental incapacity stands out from its object, it is use-
ful to refer to the new proposal for a regulation on a Common European Sales 
Law, dated October 2011, which was born from the revision of the Draft Common 
Frame of Reference and provides an optional regime for sale contracts.
The choice for excluding specific rules about mental incapacity from the pro-
posal (also expressed in recital n° 27 of the proposal) is consistent with the tra-
ditional European and international policy as well as with soft law instruments. 
Namely, an identical exclusion is made, among others, by Convention of 1968 on 
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
and Regulation Bruxelles I (n° 2001/44/EC) on the same matter and by the PECL 
(Principles of European Contract Law, art. 4:101) and the Unidroit Principles 
(edition 2010: chapter 3, art. 3.1.1.) as soft law instruments. 
Two reasons could explain this exclusion. 
The first is the subsidiarity and proportionality principles that guide the 
European Union’s intervention.
The second reason relates to the Regulation’s objective matter, the means con-
tracts are more frequently concluded by and the nature of the parties. In fact, 
the proposed regulation does not only consider natural persons but also small 
and medium sized enterprises, to which no question of mental incapacity arises. 
Moreover, the regulation covers cross-border contracts. This implies that the 
more frequent hypothesis will be the one where the purchase is concluded with-
out the physical presence of the parties, thus it is unlikely that one of them will 
be aware of the mental incapacity of the other. Finally, as regards contracts whose 
parties are a trader and a consumer, the lower limit of the invalidity rule could 
come into consideration; in fact, those contracts would normally provide for 
everyday life needs.
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7. CESL and unfair exploitation
However, although mental incapacity is not considered by the Proposal for a 
Common Sales Law, the interests of someone who is mentally impaired could be 
protected in two different ways.
Firstly, remedies provided for consumer contracts apply if the impaired per-
son acts as a consumer, and not as an entrepreneur. Specifically, in the case where 
the contract is concluded without the physical presence of the parties provisions 
for distance contracts could apply. That means that the consumer who is men-
tally impaired could exercise the right of withdrawal provided by each Member 
State's statutory law after directive 97/7/EC, which was recently amended by di-
rective 2011/83 on consumer rights (and to which Member States should comply 
with by December 2013).
Secondly, a wider provision could absorb the importance of mental capacity 
provisions. Namely Article 51 of the proposal, which regulates unfair exploita-
tion, a legal institute linked to the bargaining power abuse of one party to the 
detriment of the other. 
The rule provides that a party may avoid a contract if two conditions are met 
at the time of the conclusion of the contract: “(a) that party was dependent on, or 
had a relationship of trust with, the other party, was in economic distress or had 
urgent needs, was improvident, ignorant, or inexperienced; and (b) the other 
party knew or could be expected to have known this and, in the light of the cir-
cumstances and purpose of the contract, exploited the first party’s situation by 
taking an excessive benefit or unfair advantage.”
Avoidance can be reached extra-judicially, by giving notice of it to the other 
party (according to Article 52) within one year from when the party becomes 
aware of the relevant circumstances or becomes capable of acting freely. The 
mechanism was already provided for by the Unidroit Principles (article 3.2.11), 
but it remains unknown to domestic law.
From an internal point of view, the rule on unfair exploitation has some fea-
tures in common with rescission for overreaching on the ground of enormous 
disproportion between the parties’ performances (art. 1448 codice civile). How-
ever, while the latter requires a certain disproportion between performances, 
unfair exploitation rescinds from it: the attribution of an unfair advantage is 
substantially sufficient for presuming the agreement to be harmful for the inca-
pable person or, in any case, for rebalancing contractual positions by providing 
the mentally impaired the right to avoid the contract.
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8. Final remarks
In conclusion, it appears that special rules on mental incapacity could lose a great 
deal of their importance in the light of the attention paid by the new instruments 
to bargaining power abuse. 
This will be especially true in each case the person of unsound mind would be 
able to make use of easier accessible remedies provided for situations of contrac-
tual power inferiority.
In other terms, the system resulting from the new provisions will be more 
complex and flexible and will lead to the overcoming of the traditional distinc-
tion between capacity and incapacity, this means that protection would be also 
granted to persons suffering from modest incapacity and undergoing abuse. 
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Summary
1. General overview of Gaza situation. – 2. Operation Cast Lead. – 3. The 
Goldstone Report and the call for accountability. – 4. Failure of the do-
mestic proceedings. – 5. Palestine knocking at the International Criminal 
Court’s door. – 6. Recourse to the principle of universal jurisdiction.
Abstract
The Israeli military operation against the Gaza Strip of 27 December 2008 – 18 January 
2009 (so-called Operation Cast Lead) started a critical debate at the international level on 
the alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Gaza. In September 
2009 the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict presented its results: the Gold-
stone Report, named after the president of the mission, found that grave violations of in-
ternational law, humanitarian law and human rights had been committed by both sides 
of the conflict, but in particular by the Israeli side. The report also denounced the possible 
commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity and called for proper account-
ability mechanisms at the national and international level. The report’s conclusions and 
recommendations were endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council and by the General 
Assembly amidst high political pressure. In case of lack of proper domestic investigations 
and prosecutions, it was recommended the recourse to international justice mechanisms, 
and in particular to the ICC. The ICC Prosecutor in fact had opened a preliminary exami-
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nation of the situation, but difficulties arose because of the uncertain status of Palestine 
under international law. In the meanwhile, the principle of universal jurisdiction seems 
to represent the only available, although difficult, option in the search for justice and ac-
countability. The Gaza situation can be seen as a test case for international justice and 
sheds a light on the role of international institutions in the difficult mix of law and poli-
tics that is the feature of international justice.
Keywords
International Criminal Law - International Humanitarian Law - Interna-
tional Criminal Court – Gaza - Goldstone Report - War Crimes.
1 – General overview of Gaza situation
The Gaza Strip is part of the occupied Palestine territory and, according to the 
Oslo Accords1, forms a unitary territory with the West Bank. In fact, as a con-
sequence of Israeli long-standing policy, the West Bank and Gaza are nowadays 
two separated territories (almost impermeable for their respective residents that 
cannot move for one territory to the other). Gaza in particular has been subjected 
for many years to a persistent closure imposed by Israel, which controls all Strip’s 
border crossing (along with its sea and aerial space), with the exception of the 
southern border crossing with Egypt (Rafah). 
Over the course of the occupation the process of economic and political iso-
lation imposed by Israel on the Gaza Strip was progressively reinforced. The 
closure policy was initially enacted on specific occasions as a form of collective 
punishment in response to attacks committed by Palestinians in Israel, or to po-
litical incidents. It involved the complete closing of all border crossings to both 
people and goods. These closures lasted for periods ranging from days, to weeks, 
or even months. This had a devastating impact given that the Palestinian econ-
omy had become increasingly dependent on Israel, which was a major source of 
employment, and the origin and destination of the majority of goods. Israel also 
imposed a dramatic reduction of the fishing zone (from the original 20, to 12, to 
6, to the current 3 nautical miles) and a ‘buffer zone’ all along the Strip’s borders, 
which considerably reduces the land available for agriculture and industry (up to 
35% of Gaza’s agricultural land are off limits, according to UN sources). Both the 
naval and the land restrictions are implemented through the recourse to live fire, 
which often results in civilian causalities.
1 The “Oslo Accords”, which were eventually signed in Washington, consisted of two parts, both 
of which were in fact the product of secret negotiations in the Norwegian capital: the Declara-
tion of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements was signed on 13 September 1993 be-
tween the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); the Israeli-Palestinian 
Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was signed on 28 September 1995.
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The current total closure of Gaza has been imposed continuously since June 
2007, after Hamas takeover. The closure (called siege by the Palestinians) not only 
prevents Gazans from leaving the territory or exporting anything to the outside 
world, but also prevents the import of most of the goods, comprised the primary 
necessity ones. It basically only permits the import of a narrowly-restricted num-
ber of humanitarian goods. Since September 2007, when it officially declared 
Gaza a ‘hostile entity’, Israel has also reduced the supply of fuel and electricity, 
which made the Gaza power plant run out of fuel. The effects of the power cuts 
have been disastrous, in particular on hospitals. In general the closure of Gaza 
has devastating socio-economic effects and has resulted in the emergence of a 
humanitarian crisis. The entire 1,7 million population of the Gaza Strip has been 
forced to survive thanks to an underground economy, dependent upon a system 
of tunnels along the Egyptian border. The tunnels are the only remaining means 
of survival, everything comes through them, and without them life in Gaza 
would be simply unimaginable.
The closure is a violation of numerous international human rights and hu-
manitarian law principles; it infringes upon a number of fundamental human 
rights starting from the right to freedom of movement to the right to life. The 
closure indiscriminately affects the Gaza’s civilian population; indeed it consti-
tutes a form of collective punishment in violation, inter alia, of article 33 of the 4th 
Geneva Convention2. The Goldstone Report (see infra) concluded that this policy 
of closure might well amount to the crime against humanity of persecution. 
2 – Operation Cast Lead
It is in this framework that Israel decided to conduct the military offensive on the 
Gaza Strip (the so-called operation Cast Lead), which lasted for three weeks, from 
27 December 2008 until 18 January 2009. Israel’s announced objective was to re-
spond to the threat represented by the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip 
and to defeat Hamas. Since 2001 Palestinian armed groups had launched about 
8000 rockets and mortars into southern Israel, which caused injures to civilians, 
damaged houses, schools and cars. 
However, the way the Israeli operation was conducted sparked immediately 
a wave of criticism within the international community, in particular for the ex-
tensive destruction inflicted on the Palestinian civilian population. In order to 
grasp the dimension of the attack’s lethal effects, it is worth recalling that more 
than 1,400 individuals were killed, and over 5,300 injured, many of them very se-
2 According to Article 33 of the Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949: “No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she 
has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation 
or of terrorism are prohibited. Pillage is prohibited. Reprisals against protected persons and 
their property are prohibited.”
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riously, as a direct result of the attacks. It is estimated that the overwhelming ma-
jority of the casualties were civilians not taking part in hostilities, among which 
326 were children and 111 were women. The civilian infrastructure of Gaza was 
also subject to extensive destruction and damage: 2,864 housing units were com-
pletely destroyed and 5,014 rendered uninhabitable, displacing approximately 
50,000 individuals. Hospitals, schools, mosques, and factories were also targeted 
and in some cases destroyed beyond repair.
As for the losses on the other side, 9 Israeli soldiers were killed during the 
combat operations inside Gaza, 4 of whom from friendly fire. Moreover, 4 per-
sons were killed in southern Israel by rockets launched from Gaza, among whom 
one soldier and 3 civilians.
Numerous investigations and reports by national and international inde-
pendent human rights organizations, as Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch, B’Tselem, PCHR, the Arab League Report, provided compelling evidence 
indicating grave violations of international law by both sides, but in particular, 
by the Israeli armed forces (IDF). The tactics used by the IDF were consistent with 
previous practices, used most recently during the Lebanon war in 2006. A con-
cept known as the Dahiya doctrine emerged then, involving the application of dis-
proportionate force and the causing of great damage and destruction to civilian 
property and infrastructure and suffering of civilian population. Statements is-
sued by Israeli representatives as “destroy 100 homes for every rocket fired” indi-
cated the possibility that Israel was resorting to reprisal against civilians, which 
is prohibited under international law.
3 – The Goldstone Report and the call for accountability 
Given the seriousness of the allegations, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) 
established the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (FFM) with 
the mandate to “investigate all violations of international law and international 
humanitarian law that might have been committed at any time in the context 
of the military operations that were conducted in Gaza during the period from 
27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, whether before, during and after”. The 
FFM was led by the South African Judge Richard Goldstone, and composed by 
other three well-respected experts in international humanitarian, human rights 
and military law. The mission interpreted its mandate as requiring it to place 
the civilian population of the region at the centre of its concerns regarding the 
violations of international law. The normative framework adopted was general 
international law, international humanitarian law, international human rights 
law and international criminal law.
The FFM based its work on independent and impartial analysis and on inclu-
sive approach to gathering information: the mission reviewed 300 reports from 
different sources; conducted 188 individual interview with victims and witness-
167the gaza situation as a test bench for international justice
es and several site visits; analysed 30 video 1200 photos and satellite imagery, 
medical reports, forensic analysis of weapons and ammunitions; held public 
hearings. However, the FFM did not obtain the cooperation of the government 
of Israel and it only managed to enter Gaza from the Rafah crossing with Egypt. 
Since the mission was prevented to enter Israel and thus also the West Bank, it 
had to hold meetings with the Palestinians in Amman. The refusal by the Israeli 
authorities also prevented the mission to meet with victims in Israel and in the 
West Bank; public hearings were thus broadcasted live, to enable the victims to 
speak directly to the FFM. The mission also submitted comprehensive lists of 
questions to government of Israel, the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank 
and to the Gaza authorities, but no replies were provided by Israel. 
The ‘Goldstone Report’3 – a detailed and very accurate document (which 
amounts to almost 600 pages) - was issued on 25 September 2009. The mission 
concluded that there are serious indications that war crimes and crimes against 
humanity have been committed by the Israeli forces and, on a different scale, by 
Palestinian armed groups. On the one side, the Mission found that the Palestin-
ian rocket attacks constitute indiscriminate or deliberate attacks upon the civil-
ian population and may therefore amount to war crimes; it also highlighted the 
commission of human rights violations by the Palestinian factions in the course 
of the 2006-2007 intra-Palestinian violence. On the Israeli side, the mission de-
nounced the disregard of the fundamental principles of necessity, proportional-
ity and distinction. The mission investigated in particular 36 incidents, which 
occurred in Gaza and are only indicative of the overall offensive; the report in 
fact does not purport to be exhaustive in documenting the very high number of 
incidents that happened in the relevant period.
It is impossible to summarize such a long and detailed report in few sentenc-
es but in my view among the most important findings of the Goldstone Report, 
it can be recalled in particular that: 
–  “The Mission concludes that what occurred in just over three weeks at the 
end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009 was a deliberately disproportionate 
attack designed to punish, humiliate and terrorize a civilian population, 
radically diminish its local economic capacity both to work and to provide 
for itself, and to force upon it an ever increasing sense of dependency and 
vulnerability”; 
and that: 
–  “Whatever violations of international humanitarian and human rights 
law may have been committed, the systematic and deliberate nature of 
3 Report of the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48, 25 Sep-
tember 2009.
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the activities described in this report leave the Mission in no doubt that 
responsibility lies in the first place with those who designed, planned, or-
dered and oversaw the operations.”
The Mission, “in view of the gravity of the violations of international human 
rights and humanitarian law and possible war crimes and crimes against human-
ity”, recommended that the UN HRC should request the UN Secretary General 
(SG) “to bring this report to the attention of the Security Council under Article 
99 of the UN Charter so that the Security Council may consider action according 
to the Mission’s relevant recommendations”; and that the UN HRC should for-
mally submit this report to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court” 
(Report, par. 1968). 
Indeed one the most significant achievements of the Goldstone Report lies 
in its final recommendations, which envisage concrete judicial responses to the 
allegations of war crimes and other violations of international law committed 
by the parties to the conflict. The FFM called for the criminal accountability of all 
those suspected of the commission of war crimes (and possible crimes against 
humanity). As the report concluded: “Investigations and, if appropriate, prosecu-
tions of those suspected of serious violations are necessary if respect for human 
rights and humanitarian law is to be ensured and to prevent the development of 
a climate of impunity”. In particular, the mission recommended the UN Security 
Council that in the absence of good-faith investigations that are independent 
and in conformity with international standards having been undertaken or be-
ing under way within six months of the date of the resolution by the appropriate 
authorities (both Israel and Gaza), the UN Security Council acting under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, refer the situation in Gaza to the Prosecutor of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court pursuant to article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute4.
The Goldstone Report and its recommendations were endorsed by the UN 
HRC and by the UN General Assembly (GA). With resolution 64/10 dated 5 No-
vember 2009 and again with resolution 64/254 of 26 February 2010, the GA 
called both sides “to conduct investigations that are independent, credible and 
in conformity with international standards into the violations of international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law reported by the Fact-
Finding Mission towards ensuring accountability and justice”. Notably such 
resolutions established a very precise time frame (3 months initially, further 
extended to 5 months more) in order for the domestic authorities to cope with 
4 Pursuant to Article 13 of the Rome Statute: “The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with re-
spect to a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: (a) A 
situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to 
the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with article 14; (b) A situation in which one or 
more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Secu-
rity Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; or (c) The Prosecutor 
has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in accordance with article 15.”
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their obligation to conduct proper investigations. However, it can be anticipat-
ed that more than three years after the events no accountability or justice for the 
victims has been achieved.
4 – Failure of the domestic proceedings
It is a fact that neither the Palestinian authority not the Israeli government con-
ducted proper investigations pursuant to international law standards, as was 
requested by the UN. The HRC established an Independent Committee of Experts in 
international humanitarian and human rights law to monitor and assess any domestic, 
legal or other proceedings undertaken by both the government of Israel and the Palestinian 
side, “including the independence, effectiveness, genuiness of these investigations 
and their conformity with international standards” (HRC Resolution n. 13/9 of 25 
March 2012)5. The Committee of Experts (COE) was presided by the emeritus inter-
national law professor Tomuschat of the Humboldt University of Berlin, and pre-
sented its report on 27 September 2010 (a follow-up report was presented in March 
2011 under the presidency of the American judge McGowan Davis).
With regard to the Palestinian side, the COE’s report acknowledged that the 
Palestinian Authority in the West Bank established an ‘Independent Investiga-
tive Committee’, which had conducted “independent and impartial investiga-
tions in a comprehensive manner that squarely addressed the allegations in the 
FFM report”. However, it shall be noted that – as the European Court for Human 
Rights clarified - in order to be effective, investigations must be capable of lead-
ing to the identification and punishment of those responsible: this was certainly 
not the case with regard to the West Bank investigations. The Gaza authorities, 
although claiming that they had also established an ‘International Investigative 
Commission’, failed to submit any substantial result to the COE. Thus ultimately 
both the West Bank and the Gaza authorities failed to conduct any proper inves-
tigations on the alleged crimes committed by Palestinians.
It shall be further noted that according to the terms of the 1995 Israel-Pales-
tine Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian 
National Authority (PNA) does not have jurisdiction over Israelis. This would 
explicitly remove Israeli citizens, and members of its armed forces, from the 
jurisdiction of the PNA; no Israeli may be brought before a Palestinian court. 
This restriction (although legally questionable in the light of the doubtful cur-
rent value of such Israel-Palestine interim agreements) effectively removes the 
Palestinian judicial system from the ambit of legal options available to Palestin-
ian victims of Israeli crimes. 
5 For all the documentation and follow-up to the “Goldstone process”, see meLoni, toGnoni (eds), 
Is there a Court for Gaza? A test bench for International Justice, T.M.C. Asser/Springer, The Hague, 2012.
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On the other hand, after reviewing Israel’s system of investigation and pros-
ecution of serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, in particu-
lar of suspected war crimes and crimes against humanity, the COE stressed that: 
“the Mission found major structural flaws that, in its view, make the system in-
consistent with international standards.” In particular, 
Israel has not conducted investigations into decisions made at the highest levels about 
the design and implementation of the Gaza operations. A core allegation in the FFM 
report was that the systematic and deliberate nature of the destruction in Gaza left 
the Mission in no doubt that responsibility lies in the first place with those who designed, 
planned, ordered and oversaw the operations. Those alleged serious violations go beyond 
individual criminal responsibility at the level of combatants and even commanders, 
and include allegations aimed at decision makers higher up the chain of command.
(Par. 64 first COE Report) 
In other words, the Israeli system – as it relates to Palestinian victims of Israeli 
violations – does not meet necessary international standards with respect to the 
effective administration of justice. The Israeli authorities’ presumption that all 
Palestinians are ‘enemy aliens’ or ‘potential terrorists’ has evident implications 
regarding the impartiality of the judiciary, the presumption of innocence, and 
the right to a fair trial. The hierarchical nature of the military, the ineffective 
manner in which investigations are conducted, and the lack of civilian oversight 
– as epitomized by the wide margin of discretion awarded by the Israeli Supreme 
Court – all combine to fundamentally frustrate the pursuit of justice. 
The same conclusion was already contained in the Goldstone Report:
[…] there are serious doubts about the willingness of Israel to carry out genuine in-
vestigations in an impartial, independent, prompt and effective way as required by 
international law. [...] the Israeli system presents inherently discriminatory features 
that have proven to make the pursuit of justice for Palestinian victims very difficult 
(Par. 1832 Goldstone report).
Given the reality of the situation in the occupied Palestinian territory and 
Israel, and the inability or unwillingness of the respective national courts to 
conduct genuine investigations and prosecutions, the practical pursuit of ac-
countability necessarily has to focus on the triggering of international judicial 
mechanisms, and notably in the first place on the intervention of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court.
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5 – Palestine knocking at the International Criminal Court’s door
The International Criminal Court (ICC)6 is the first supranational, permanent 
and independent criminal tribunal. It was established through a treaty – the 
Rome Statute of 1998 – which entered into force in July 2002. The Court has juris-
diction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed on 
the territory or by national of State parties (which are currently 121, but with no-
table absences, as the USA, Russia, China and India). The jurisdiction of the ICC 
is thus not universal, but rather bound to territorial or national links; the only 
exception to this jurisdictional limitation is represented by those cases which 
are referred to the Court by the Un Security Council. According to its Statute, the 
ICC Prosecutor can open an investigation on alleged crimes everywhere commit-
ted, and by any State national, if those crimes have been referred by resolution of 
the UN SC. The investigations before the Court can also be triggered by a State’s 
referral, or initiated proprio motu by the Prosecutor (but, in the last case, only after 
an authorization by the Pre-Trial Chamber).
A declaration under article 12(3) of the ICC Statute was lodged by the Palestin-
ian government, in the person of the Minister of Justice, back in January 2009. 
Article 12(3) of the Statute provides that a State, which is not a party to the Rome 
Statute, can accept the Court’s jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis. The Palestinian dec-
laration was thus accepting the jurisdiction of the Court for the purpose of “iden-
tifying, prosecuting and judging the authors and accomplices of acts committed 
on the territory of Palestine since 1 July 2002.” 
Following this declaration the ICC Prosecutor opened a ‘preliminary examina-
tion’ of the situation in Palestine but the actual opening of an investigation was 
put on hold, allegedly due to the unclear jurisdiction of the Court on the facts at 
stake. In fact Israel is not a State Party of the Court and Palestine is currently not in 
a position to ratify the Statute either. However, whereas the statehood status of Pal-
estine remains uncertain for the purpose of international law generally speaking, 
a convincing argument had been made by eminent international law professors7, 
in favour of the Palestine’s declaration: according to a functional interpretation of 
the concept of statehood, thus for the sake of the jurisdiction of the Court only, a 
determination by the ICC that Palestine is a State that can be under the jurisdiction 
of the ICC would be valid and in line with the Statute’s requirements. 
6 All the documentation about the International Criminal Court can be found at: http://www.
icc-cpi.int/.
7 See for all, PeLLet, The Effects of Palestine´s Recognition of the International Criminal Court’s jurisdic-
tion, in meLoni, toGnoni (eds.), Is There a Court for Gaza, cited above, 409 ff. where he argues that 
the Court did not need to pronounce in theory on the issue whether “in absolute” Palestine is or 
not a State; rather the Court had just to acknowledge the for the purpose of the Rome Statute the 
Palestine’s declaration can have the effects to activate the jurisdiction of the Court. The paper 
was written as a legal opinion and submitted to the Court in 2009 co-signed by forty interna-
tional law professors/individual authorities.
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For more than three years the Prosecutor seemed to be actively dealing with 
the question of Palestine and encouraged scholars, NGO’s, victims legal repre-
sentatives to submit documentation to the Office for the purpose of the prelimi-
nary examination. However on 3 April 2012 a two-pages ambiguous ‘Update’ by 
the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) concluded that the Prosecutor had no authority 
to decide on the issue because “the Rome Statute provides no authority for the 
Office of the Prosecutor to adopt a method to define the term ‘State’”.
The Office has assessed that it is for the relevant bodies at the UN or the ICC 
Assembly of States Parties to make the legal determination whether Palestine 
qualifies as a State for the purpose of the Rome Statute and thereby enabling the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court and that the ICC could potentially “consider 
allegations of crimes committed in Palestine, should competent organs of the 
United Nations or eventually the Assembly of States Parties resolve the legal is-
sue” regarding Palestine’s member status.
The 3 April 2012 OTP statement meant the closing of the preliminary exami-
nation: despite the deceptive title, it is in fact not a ‘update’ but a ‘decisions not to 
investigate’, pursuant to article 15 of the Statute. Following these two pages, after 
39 months, the situation Palestine disappeared indeed from the list of the prelimi-
nary examinations before the ICC.
Some substantial questions arise over the fairness of the procedure adopted 
by the then Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, in dealing with the Palestine situ-
ation. Certainly the OTP never affirmed that there was no reasonable basis for 
the investigation. In other words, the Prosecutor never alleged that the available 
information did not provide a reasonable basis to believe that crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court had been committed in Gaza/Palestine (as he did, on 
the contrary, in the other 2 situations, Iraq and Venezuela, where it was decided 
not to open the investigation). Nor the decision was based on the (lack of) gravity 
of the crimes. Rather, the decision was presented as a problem of preconditions 
to the exercise of the jurisdiction, and in this sense as a mere procedural issue. 
However the procedural problem was based on a substantive issue, i.e. the in-
terpretation of the term ‘State’ for the purposes of the ICC jurisdiction, and in 
particular according to article 12(3) ICC Statute. Thus, the question is: if it was not 
for the Prosecutor to interpret the term ‘State’ for the purposes of the Statute, and 
therefore to decide on the admissibility of the declaration lodged by the Palestin-
ians, who is the competent organ in this regard? 
In the 3 April 2012 decision the Prosecutor alleged that it must be either for the 
UN Secretary General (SG) or the Assembly of the States Parties (ASP) to decide. 
It shall be noted, however, that delegating the decision to political bodies under-
mines the independence of the Court and that a judicial determination of the issue 
by the ICC judges would have been the best option. In this sense speak also the 
words of the Registrar of the Court, Silvana Arbia, who, when issuing receipt of the 
Palestinian declaration, on 23 January 2009, noted that a conclusive determination 
on its applicability would have to be made by the judges at an appropriate moment. 
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Therefore it is contended that the Prosecutor could and should have referred the 
question to the judges. Pursuant to article 19(3) of the Rome Statute: “[t]he Prosecu-
tor may seek a ruling from the Court regarding a question of jurisdiction or admis-
sibility”, a process that can only be commenced by the Prosecutor. 
In theory the ICC door is not completely closed: should Palestine get recogni-
tion at the international level the Court could definitely reconsider the opening 
of the investigation. It is certainly not easy to make any prediction on what will 
happen in this regard. Although Palestine has been recognised by 130 States, the 
status of Palestine at the UN level is still to be determined. However, regardless 
of how the Palestinian bid to the UN will end, it is surprising that the Prosecutor 
did not take into serious consideration the fact that Palestine has been already 
admitted by a UN agency, notably the UNESCO, which is one of the guidance cri-
teria used by the UN SG, in his role as the depositary of international treaties 
(upon which the Prosecutor relied), in managing the problem of the indetermi-
nacy of the question of statehood status. In this sense it has been maintained by 
authoritative scholars8 that the UNESCO acceptance would have been enough for 
the Prosecutor to accept Palestine’s article 12 ICC Statute declaration. 
6 – Recourse to the principle of universal jurisdiction 
Given the impasse of the International Criminal Court on the issue, the only way 
that – although difficult - seems currently to be available for the Palestinians in 
order to pursue justice, is the recourse to the principle of universal jurisdiction.
The principle of universal jurisdiction is a longstanding component of in-
ternational law. This principle holds that international crimes – such as grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other war crimes, genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and torture (the so called ‘core crimes’) – are of such serious-
ness that they affect the international community as a whole. Universal jurisdic-
tion “means that there is no link of territoriality or nationality between the State 
and the conduct of the offender, nor is the State seeking to protect its security or 
credit. In other words, despite the lack of a direct link to the crime, third States’ 
national courts are granted jurisdiction over international crimes “on behalf” of 
the international community. Although the issue is still controversial, under the 
principle of absolute universal jurisdiction – which is recognised in some coun-
tries as for instance Germany, Swiss, or Chile – it is not even required that the 
8 See schaBas, Relevant Depositary Practice of the Secretary-General and its Bearing on Palestinian Ac-
cession to the Rome Statute, 3 November 2011, at http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com.
au/2011/11/relevant-depositary-practice-of.html. For a updated comprehensive analysis of the 
issue see meLoni, Palestine and the ICC: Some Notes on Why It Is Not a Closed Chapter, 25 September 
2012, at http://opiniojuris.org/2012/09/25/palestine-and-the-icc-some-notes-on-why-it-is-
not-a-closed-chapter/.
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suspect be present in the state exercising jurisdiction in order to open the pro-
ceedings and take investigative measures9. 
In this regard the Goldstone Report recommended:
[…] that the States parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 should start criminal in-
vestigations in national courts, using universal jurisdiction, where there is sufficient 
evidence of the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
Where so warranted following investigation, alleged perpetrators should be arrested 
and prosecuted in accordance with internationally recognized standards of justice.
However, universal jurisdiction cases have given rise to significant political con-
troversy. Criminal proceedings based on the principle of universal jurisdiction 
go to the very heart of inter-States’ relationships because they typically involve 
the highest echelons of the political and military establishment – those ‘most 
responsible’ – of a foreign State. International crimes indeed, for their systematic 
or widespread character, are normally perpetrated with the support of the politi-
cal apparatus. 
Lawyers recurring to the principle of universal jurisdiction have thus been 
accused of manipulating international and criminal law principles for political 
purposes, and in some instances a court’s decision to affirm its competence on 
the basis of universal jurisdiction has led to an aggravation of inter-State tension. 
Such political tension and the consequent pressure exerted on the governmental 
authorities of the State exercising universal jurisdiction has sometimes resulted 
in drastic consequences, for example in the changing of national legislation in 
order to restrict the scope of universal jurisdiction. 
This was the case also with regard to the issuance in 2009 of an arrest warrant 
against former Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni in the UK, for her responsi-
bility regarding the alleged crimes committed by Israeli forces during Operation 
Cast Lead. The claim was made that ideological or political goals were behind this 
move. However, as noted by Daniel Machover, a UK solicitor working on univer-
sal jurisdiction cases, “[t]here is not a single example of the current system in 
Britain failing to filter out cases that are an abuse of process.” 
To conclude, notwithstanding the obstacles to its full implementation, uni-
versal jurisdiction constitutes an integral and vital component of the interna-
tional legal order. In fact, recent case law shows that criminal complaints pre-
sented before the judicial authorities for third states have given rise to a number 
of successful prosecutions (in particular, but not limited to, regarding Rwandan 
cases). Pending universal ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, recourse to third States’ courts shall be seen as the best way to pursue ac-
countability and uphold victims’ legitimate rights. 
9 See macedo (ed), Universal Jurisdiction, National Courts and the Prosecution of serious crimes under 
International Law, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2006.
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In particular with regard to the Palestine situation, given the respective in-
ability and unwillingness of the Palestinian and Israeli courts, and the ICC’s de-
clared lack of jurisdiction, it is presented that universal jurisdiction is a practical 
and possible means of securing accountability, a precondition to any workable 
justice in the region. As concluded in the Goldstone Report:
The Mission is firmly convinced that justice and respect for the rule of law are the in-
dispensable basis for peace. The prolonged situation of impunity has created a justice 
crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory that warrants action.
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